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ABSTRACT 
 
In the UK and Saudi Arabia, it is necessary for the contracting parties in insurance 
contracts to comply with the requirement of the doctrine of utmost good faith. In 
recent years, the doctrine of utmost good faith and the mutual duties of the 
contracting parties have developed in different ways in each jurisdiction. Both 
jurisdictions provide consumer protection in insurance markets by Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representation) Act 2012 in the UK and Insurance 
Consumer Protection Principles 2014 in Saudi Arabia. However, there are many 
differences between the conduct of each jurisdiction since the coming into force of 
the Insurance Act 2015 in the UK, which revolutionised the insurance law in several 
key areas. This thesis particularly aims to critically analyse the reform of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith and looks at how the current reform impacts on the 
interpretation of this doctrine between the UK and Saudi jurisdictions. This study 
critically analyses the insureds’ pre-contractual duties for consumers and businesses 
in the UK with a comparison to Saudi jurisdiction. Uncertainty of mutual duties 
especially for specific insurers’ pre and post-contractual duties and the insureds’ 
post-contractual duties can easily be found in both jurisdictions. Accordingly, this 
study critically analyses the mutual duties of insurers and insureds. Finally, this 
thesis intends to develop recommendations to fill legal gaps, significantly, for the 
Saudi jurisdiction in respect of the doctrine of utmost good faith which should 
respectively contribute to developing insurance law in Saudi Arabia. Several 
outcomes for the UK jurisdiction are produced to contribute towards developing 
insurance law with respect to the doctrine of utmost good faith.  
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          CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Background 
Insurance contracts are based upon the doctrine of utmost good faith, which 
imposes duties on both parties but more significantly on insureds, prior to the 
conclusion of the contract and during the performance of the contract. The insured 
was assumed to voluntarily disclose material facts to the insurer before the 
conclusion of the contract. The insurer was not expected to play any positive role 
in respect of the insured’s compliance with duty of disclosure, for example, by 
asking specific questions. Insurance contract law was crticisied as ‘archaic, unclear, 
and unfair’1. Another criticism was the harshness of the insurer’s remedy of 
avoidance of the contract for a breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith2 
especially for innocent insureds.3 It was also described as a ‘draconian’4.  
The case law5, literature6, academic discussions7, a number of the Law Commission 
Reports8, and consumer association9 had criticised the regime in the UK and called 
                                                          
1 Peter Tyledysley, ‘Reform at Last’ in Peter Tyledysley (ed), Consumer Insurance Law: Disclosure, 
representation, and the Basis of Contract Clauses (Bloomsbury 2013) 45. See also, Drake Insurance 
plc v Provident Insurance plc [2004] QB 601. 
2 Hasson R, ‘The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law: A Critical Evaluation’ (1969) 32 
MLR 615. See also, Cox v Bankside Members’ Agency Limited [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 437. 
3The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, 
Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty by the Insured (Law Com No 182, Scot Law Com No 134, 
2007). 
4 Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc [2004] QB 601. 
5 Lambert v Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 486 (CA) 491, and Drake 
Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc [2004] QB 601. 
6 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017); Peter 
MacDonald Eggers & Patrick Foss, Good Faith and Insurance Contracts (LLP Reference 
Publishing, 1998); John Lowry, Philip Rawlings, & Robert Merkin, Insurance Law: Doctrines and 
Principles (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2011); and John Birds, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law (10th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016). 
7 Howard Bennet, ‘Mapping the Doctrine of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Contract Law’ [1999] 
LMCLQ 165; John Lowry, ‘Redrawing the Parameters of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts’ (2007) 
60(1) CLP 338; Hasson R, ‘The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law: A Critical 
Evaluation’ (1969) 32 MLR 615; and John Lowry & Philip Rawlings, ‘That Wicked Rule, that Evil 
Doctrine: Reforming the Law on Disclosure in Insurance Contracts’ (2012) 75(6) MLR 1099. 
8 For example, The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: 
Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment 
(Law Com No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014). 
9 National Consumer Council, Insurance Law Reform: the consumer case for review of insurance 
law (May 1997). 
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to have legislative reform of sections 17-20 of Marine Insurance Act 1906 (MIA). 
Discussions about the Law Commissions proposals were undertaken by Soyer10, 
Eggers11, and Merkin and Lowry12. The attempts to reform the law were to 
recognise the growing need to have a satisfactory and fair result. Therefore, 
insurance contracts law has developed in recent years to accommodate modern 
changes through the coming into force of specific legislation for consumer 
insurance, Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 
(CIDRA), and business insurance, Insurance Act 2015 (IA).  
It is important to highlight that the wording of s 17 of MIA is not limited to only 
pre-contractual duties; but the extent to which the doctrine of utmost good faith 
includes post-contractual duties is questionable. The post-contractual duties were 
acknowledged in case law13, by the Law Commissions14, and in academic debates15. 
Both CIDRA and IA fail to include any provisions covering post-contractual duties 
except fraudulent claims by IA. The basis of fraudulent claims and related remedies 
had been discussed in case law16, by the Law Commissions17, and in academic 
discussions18. After IA, there is a separation between fraudulent claims and the 
doctrine of utmost good faith.  
                                                          
10 Baris Soyer, ‘Reforming Pre-Contractual Information Duties in Business Insurance Contracts: 
One Reform too Many?’ (2009) 1 JBL 15; and Baris Soyer, ‘Reforming the Assured's Pre-
Contractual Duty of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Contracts for Consumers: Are the Law 
Commissions on the Right Track?’ (2008) 5 JBL 385. 
11 Peter MacDonald Eggers, 'The Past and Future of English Insurance Law: Good Faith and 
Warranties' [2012] UCLJLJ 211. 
12 Robert Merkin & John Lowry, ‘Reconstructing Insurance Law: The Law Commissions' 
Consultation Paper’ (2008) 71(1) MLR 95; and John Lowry ‘Whither the Duty of Good Faith in UK 
Insurance Contracts’ (2009) 16(1) UCILJ 97. 
13 For example, Black King Shipping Corp v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437; 
Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd and others (the star sea) [2003] 1 AC 469; 
and K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters (The Mercandian Continent) [2001] 
CLC 1836. 
14 The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law: The 
Insured’s Post-Contract Duty of Good Faith (Issue Paper 7, 2010); and the Law Commission and 
Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and Other Issues, A Joint 
Consultation Paper (Law Com CP No 201, Scot Law Com DP No 152, 2011). 
15 Baris Soyer, ‘Continuing Duty of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Contracts: Still Alive?’ [2003] 
LMCLQ 39; and John Lowry & Philip Rawlings ‘Insurers, Claims, and the Boundaries of Good 
Faith’ (2005) 68 MLR 82. 
16 For example, Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd and others (the star sea) 
[2003] 1 AC 469; Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) Ltd [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 209; and 
Black King Shipping Corp v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437. 
17 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business 
Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com 
No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014). 
18 John Lowry & Philip Rawlings ‘Fraudulent Claims: Framing the Appropriate Remedy’ [2006] 
JBL 338. 
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After the coming into force of CIDRA and IA, there is a significant need to analyse 
and critique the current law in the UK to explore the changes in this area of law. 
Academic debates consider many significant aspects especially in respect of IA, as 
IA leads the main changes in the insurance law. Numerous academic authors 
consider the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith19, pre-contractual duties 
in business insurance20, consumer insurance21, fraudulent claims22, contracting out 
and basis of contract clauses23. Significantly, several writings have been updated to 
recognise the current changes in the law.24  
Insurance law is one of the most controversial areas of contract law in Saudi Arabia. 
Insurance contracts are allowed but based on different premises. In Saudi 
jurisdiction which applies Sharia, Takaful or cooperative insurance is permitted 
only and conventional insurance is prohibited. Discussion of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith in insurance contracts is rarely discussed in Saudi insurance literature, 
and the lack of academic literature in respect of insurance law, generally, is 
remarkable.25 Therefore, to a limited extent, this study will examine other Arab 
legal literature. 
The growth of the insurance sector in Saudi Arabia is noticeable. The Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Authority (SAMA) is controller of licensed financial institutions 
including insurance and re-insurance companies, and SAMA is deemed to be 
responsible for the insurance sector. SAMA issues an annual report regarding the 
size of the insurance industry in Saudi Arabia. The latest published report in 2017 
                                                          
19 Baris Soyer, ‘Mapping (Utmost) Good Faith in Insurance Law- Future Conditional?’ [2016] Law 
Q Rev 132, 618; Özlem Gürses, ‘What Does ‘Utmost Good Faith’ Mean?’ (2016) 27 Insurance Law 
Journal 124; and Yong Qiang Han, ‘Good Faith in Insurance Law: General and Independent, Not a 
Duty but an Interpretative Principle’ (2016) 28 Insurance Law Journal 95. 
20 David Kendall & Harry Wright, A Practical Guide to the Insurance Act 2015 (Practical Insurance 
Guides) (Informa Law from Routledge 2017); Robert Merkin & Özlem Gürses, ‘The Insurance Act 
2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured’ (2015) 78(6) MLR 1004; and Malcolm 
Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime for Commercial and Marine 
Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017).  
21 Peter Tyledysley (ed), Consumer Insurance Law: Disclosure, representation, and the Basis of 
Contract Clauses (Bloomsbury 2013). 
22 Philip Rawling & John Lowry, ‘Insurance Fraud: The "Convoluted and Confused" State of the 
Law’ [2016] Law Q Rev 132. 
23 James Davey, ‘Utmost good faith, freedom of contract and the Insurance Act 2015’ (2016) 
27 Insurance Law Journal 247. 
24 Peter MacDonald Eggers & Simon Picken, Good Faith and Insurance Contracts (4th edn, Informa 
Law from Routledge 2017); Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2017); and John Birds, Ben Lynch, & Simon Milnes, MacGillivray on Insurance Law (13th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015). 
25 Richard Price & Andreas Haberbeck, The Maritime Laws of the Arabian Gulf Cooperations 
Council States (Graham and Trotman 1986). 
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indicated that the value of subscribed insurance premiums in the Saudi insurance 
market was 30.855 billion Saudi Riyal (SR), about £5.7 billion.26 The report showed 
that health insurance was the largest active area accounting for 60.5% of the 
insurance industry, 18.630 billion SR, about £3.497 billion.27 This clearly 
demonstrates the size of the Saudi insurance industry, which requires efficient laws 
and regulations.  
The importance of this study is established through the following points. In 2014, 
Insurance Consumer Protection Principles (ICPP) were applied by SAMA, and, in 
2017, decisions of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations (CRIDV) were first published28, no other Saudi study has been 
conducted to study the law of consumer insurance in Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, to analyse and reference a large number of CRIDV decisions. 
The literature and the academic studies usually focus on studying the reasons 
behind the prohibition of conventional insurance and permitting cooperative 
insurance.29  
Accordingly, the significance and the value of conducting this study is obvious. On 
the one hand, this thesis is going to fill different gaps in the law and its analysis and 
the contribution of this study shall be essential, particularly, for Saudi literature, 
which has a significant and remarkable lack in legal and academic up to date 
sources.  
On the other hand, by comparing the Saudi position to the UK insurance law after 
the UK’s reform of the doctrine of utmost good faith will be important. As the UK’s 
reform in some areas is very clear and straightforward, the uncertainty of other areas 
in relation to the interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith, the insurers’ 
duties, the insured’s post-contractual duties, contracting out, and remedies can be 
easily seen. Several academics have tried to clarify the uncertainty of the recent 
reform. However, the importance of conducting this study is because this study 
                                                          
26 Saudi Arabian Mandatory Agency, 'Saudi Insurance Market Report' (2017) 
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/ar-
sa/EconomicReports/AnnualReport/نوسمخلاو20%ثلاثلا20%يونسلا20%ريرقتلا.pdf> accessed 1st May 
2018. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations, ‘Committees Decisions’ 
<http://www.idc.gov.sa/en-us/CommitteesDecisions/Pages/Riyadh.aspx> accessed 1st May 2018.  
29 Mohammed Ahmed Alsaleh, Altameen Bain Alhazr O Alebaha (Al-Riyadh 2004); Mohammed 
AlJurf, Altameen mn Manzor Islami (King Abdul-Aziz University 2007); and Mohammed AlJurf, 
Altameen O Altakaful: Bain Alsharia O Alqanoon (Dar Alqahira 2010). 
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focuses in depth on s 17 of MIA and examines the role of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith in all related aspects. It provides detailed discussions about the possible 
interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith by referencing modern cases, 
literature, and other commonwealth jurisdictions such as Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand. Accordingly, this study can add valuable analysis of insurance law 
in the UK. 
1.2. Aim and Objectives 
There are many challenges for Saudi Arabian insurance laws and regulations, 
especially, regarding the interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith and the 
level of clarity, limitations, and remedies upon the breach of a duty of utmost good 
faith. Significantly, these challenges have an impact on the interpretation of 
insurance cover and contractual obligations on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
the continuity of insurance contracts.  
Accordingly, this thesis aims to provide a comparative analysis of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith and mutual duties of the insurer and the insured between the UK 
and Saudi insurance laws and regulations. Furthermore, this comparison will 
contribute to the development of recommendations for Saudi insurance laws and 
regulations in respect of the doctrine of utmost good faith. To achieve this aim, 
examining the UK experience as a world leading expert would be valuable guidance 
for Saudi Arabia especially where the Saudi experience remains modest30 by 
comparison with the UK. Making such a vague doctrine understandable and 
accessible would help CRIDV interpret this doctrine and related duties properly, 
and clarifying this doctrine to the contracting parties would allow them to comply 
with it and its associated obligations. This should be done taking into account the 
conflict between the different Islamic schools in this field. Another contribution this 
work will make is to assist the legislator in order to make insurance law and 
regulations more clear, specific, certain, and predictable, which would add value to 
the Saudi insurance industry as a whole. 
                                                          
30 It is important to highlight that the first official insurance law which is regulated the modern 
insurance market is the Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies’ By the Royal 
Decree M/32 dated 1/8/2003; and the Implementing Regulations are promulgated by the decision of 
the Minister of Finance No 569/1 dated 21/4/2004. 
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The objectives of this study to achieve this comprehensive aim are, as follows: 
Firstly, to analyse in-depth the concept, limitations, and possibilities of the doctrine 
of utmost good faith in both the UK and Saudi Arabia. Secondly, to illustrate and 
analyse criticisms of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK and Saudi 
insurance laws and regulations. Thirdly, to examine the difference between the 
impact of the doctrine of good faith and the doctrine of utmost good faith in order 
to find which one should be applied. Fourthly, to analyse the differentiation 
between consumer and business insurance in the UK, the generated duties, and 
related issues of each type of insurance contract. This should significantly help 
develop the main recommendations for Saudi insurance law and regulations 
especially in regard to the distinction between business and consumer insurance. 
Fifthly, to examine and analyse closely the possible legal remedies available upon 
breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK and Saudi Arabia. Finally, to 
develop recommendations for Saudi insurance laws and regulations based on the 
in-depth analysis and comparison with the UK insurance laws.  
1.3. Scope and Research Questions 
To achieve the proposed aim and objectives, this study is limited to insurance 
contract law and not general contract law, nor the historical aspects of utmost good 
faith, or the general principles in Islamic law including the conflict around the 
acceptance of conventional insurance contracts. However, providing brief 
discussions about these aspects is necessary for the following chapters’ analysis. 
There is a further limitation with reference to Islamic law, in addition, by not 
identifying all Islamic madhabs and schools except for the Hanbali madhab that is 
generally accepted in Saudi Arabia.  
The focus of the research is on the recent reform of the doctrine of utmost good 
faith in insurance contracts and recent applications in both the UK and Saudi Arabia 
for insurers and insureds but it is further restricted to disregard the intermediaries’ 
rules, third parties, and changes in specific type of insurance contracts such as life 
insurance and the case of group insurance.  
These limits are set to allow discussion of the main thesis questions that are: 
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1. What are the meaning, limitations, exclusions, and possibilities of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK and Saudi insurance laws and 
regulations? 
2. What are the major criticisms of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK 
and Saudi laws and regulations? 
3. How do the UK and Saudi insurance laws and regulations distinguish 
between the doctrine of good faith and the doctrine of utmost good faith?  
4. What are the legal remedies for breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith 
in the UK and Saudi laws and regulations? 
5. Who is the consumer in the UK insurance Law? What is the duty of 
reasonable care to not make misrepresentation and its limitation? How do 
Saudi regulations apply consumer insurance?  
6. What are the similarities and differences between consumer and non-
consumer insurance contracts in related to the doctrine of utmost good faith?  
7. What is the position of the duty of disclosure, misrepresentation, and the 
duty of fair presentation in business insurance in the UK and Saudi Arabia? 
8. Is there any need to differentiate between provisions of consumer and non-
consumer insurance contracts in Saudi Arabia?  
9. What are the insured’s post-contractual duties in both the UK and Saudi 
Arabia? What are major criticisms of these duties? 
10. What are the insurer’s pre-contractual duties in the UK and Saudi 
jurisdictions? What are major criticisms of these duties? 
11. What are the insurer’s post-contractual duties in both the UK and Saudi 
Arabia? What are major criticisms of these duties? 
12. How can Saudi laws and regulations learn lessons from the UK approach by 
moving toward consumer and business insurance and away from applying 
principles to binding provisions? 
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1.4. Methodology and Structure 
This study is doctrinal. This is because it focuses on the doctrine of utmost good 
faith in insurance law in both the UK and Saudi Arabia. According to Chynoweth, 
doctrinal research is ‘concerned with the formulation of legal ‘doctrines’ through 
the analysis of legal rules… deciding on which rules to apply in a particular 
situation is made easier by the existence of legal doctrines’31. Further, the role of 
formulations is to ‘clarify ambiguities within rules, place them in a logical and 
coherent structure and describe their relationship to other rules’32. From another 
perspective, it was clarified that doctrinal study was where ‘arguments are derived 
from authoritative sources, such as existing rules, principles, precedents, and 
scholarly publications’33. 
Since the aim of this study is to develop recommendations mainly for Saudi 
insurance law by learning lessons from the UK experience and to propose 
recommendations for the UK insurance law in respect of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith and related duties, the study employs a critical analytical comparative 
law methodology. Terry Hutchinson illustrated this method, as follows34: 
Doctrinal researchers have tended to continue to work within the parameters of the 
discipline in order to make recommendations for reform. They have confined their 
research to a critical analysis… The essential features of doctrinal scholarship involve 
‘a critical conceptual analysis of all relevant legislation and case law to reveal a 
statement of the law relevant to the matter under investigation’… This ‘conceptual 
analysis critique’ is based on an understanding of the rules of precedent between the 
court jurisdictions, the rules of statutory interpretation.  
The comparative method is important to show how various jurisdictions deal with 
the same legal concept. According to the analysis of Hoecke, who examined the 
differences between comparative legal methods, the analytical comparative method 
‘studied the logical relation between the different sub-concepts of ‘right’ and other 
concepts, such as ‘duty’…For example, if one has the right to do A, there can be no 
duty not to do A’35. This will be followed in this study as it examines and analyses 
the doctrine of utmost good faith and other related concepts and duties in both 
                                                          
31 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research' in Les Ruddock & Andrew Knight (eds), Advanced Research 
Methods in the Built Environment (Wiley-Blackwell 2008) 29. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Rob Van Gestel, & Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: 
What about Methodology? (European University Institute Working Papers Law 2011) 26. 
34 Terry Hutchinson, ‘The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming 
the Law’ (2015) 8(3) Erasmus Law Review 130, 130 - 131. 
35 Mark Van Hoecke, 'Methodology of Comparative Legal Research' [December 2015] Law and 
Method. 
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systems. Related legal concepts and duties are deducted from laws, regulations, and 
judicial decisions; then, the researcher shall compare, analyse and assess 
similarities and differences to reach the objectives of this study. 
It is understandable choice to compare the UK and Saudi Arabia. In comparing the 
Saudi and the UK jurisdictions and analysing in-depth the impact of the related 
concepts and duties especially after the modern reform will contribute to filling 
legal gaps that have been recognised. This is especially because the common law 
has not yet dealt in-depth with the modern reform based on enforcing CIDRA and 
IA in the UK. Many issues are left to the common law which needs yet to be further 
analysed by academics and practitioners. Therefore, this present analysis will be 
useful for proposed further solutions on issues that CIDRA and IA are silent about 
such as the post-contractual duties of the insurer and insured. However, the strength 
of the UK experience in the insurance market remains extant and the wealth of this 
experience can be found through its case law and academic literature. Saudi Arabia 
would gain benefits from both analysing its own insurance law and regulations as 
there is a lack of Saudi academic literature in insurance law, and from analysing the 
UK insurance law to learn from the UK experience. This would fill gaps that are 
recognised in this area of law for all academics, practitioners, regulators, and 
supporting committees’ members. 
Since this study is a doctrinal and comparative study, it is advised to start with 
primary resources including legislations, courts decisions, and secondary resources 
including academic books and articles.36 Accordingly, this study is going to analyse 
and use primary resources such as laws, regulations, judicial decisions, Law 
Commissions reports, the Holy Quran; and secondary resources including academic 
literature that are elaborated in books and journal articles. The researcher’s opinions 
and analysis are employed through this work. Other commonwealth jurisdictions 
such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand shall be used to interpret the common 
law position of the doctrine of utmost good faith and those jurisdictions are 
provided as examples to share a similar experience to the UK insurance law. 
Choosing those jurisdictions is supported as well by the Law Commissions which 
                                                          
36 Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
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explored and used them in their reports through the last reform regarding the 
interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith and the related duties.37 
This methodology shall achieve the aim of the thesis by investigating how Saudi 
insurance law can learn lessons from the UK experience. Analysing the UK 
insurance law will contribute towards finding some answers and filling some legal 
gaps in the UK which have been generated after the coming into force of CIDRA 
and IA. In its conclusions, this work shall contribute to academic knowledge by 
giving a significant analysis for each jurisdiction on the reform of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith, focusing on s 17 of MIA in the UK and related duties. Finally, 
this work is going to give recommendations for Saudi insurance law to develop 
properly. 
According to Siems, four steps are suggested to be followed in a comparative 
analysis study that are: (1) start with determining research questions and the choice 
of legal systems, (2) describe the laws of these countries, (3) compare and find 
similarities and differences, and, (4) critically evaluate the results to make possible 
recommendations.38 Accordingly, to achieve the purpose of this study, the structure 
of this work is divided into nine chapters.  
Chapter one, this chapter, provides an overview of the research, the significance of 
the study, aims, objectives, research questions and methodology.  
Chapter two will explore the background of the UK and Saudi insurance laws by 
looking at how reform has been conducted in both jurisdictions. Also, it will provide 
insight about the Saudi legal structure and the accepted insurance model in Saudi 
Arabia. The importance of this chapter is that, as is illustrated by Siems, it is 
interesting to consider the sources of law upon which the legal rules are based and 
differences in legal styles and concepts.39 
Chapter three looks at the doctrine of utmost good faith. This chapter is going to 
give an analysis of the fundamental basis of the doctrine of utmost good faith and 
                                                          
37 See for example, The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract 
Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late 
Payment (Law Com No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014); and The Law Commission and Scottish 
Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, Scot Law Com No 219, 2009). 
38 Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 13. 
39 Ibid 20. 
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justification of the meaning and the significance of this doctrine in both 
jurisdictions.  
Chapter four criticises the doctrine of utmost good faith. This chapter will focus on 
analysing the main criticisms that impact the doctrine of utmost good faith in each 
system in order to allow a suitable analysis of those criticisms including those of 
the judgment in Carter v Boehm40 and MIA in the UK, on the one hand, and 
criticisms based on Takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia, on the other. Significantly, 
this chapter shall attempt to answer whether insurance law should apply the doctrine 
of ‘utmost good faith’ or ‘good faith’ in both jurisdictions.  
Chapter five covers the insured’s pre-contractual duties for consumer insurance. 
The focus of this chapter is to analyse and identify the distinction between the 
doctrine of utmost good faith and the insured’s pre-contractual duties in consumer 
insurance in the UK, and shall analyse the impact of this by illustrating and 
identifying who the consumer is and what the related duties are in consumer 
insurance. This chapter shall analyse the new duty that has been introduced in 
CIDRA. The chapter will answer how Saudi regulations can be developed in a way 
that reflects the modern reform in the UK.  
Chapter six shall examine the insured’s pre-contractual duties for business 
insurance. Again, the focus of this chapter is to analyse and identify the distinction 
between the doctrine of utmost good faith and the insured’s pre-contractual duties 
for business insurance in the UK, and to analyse how the previous duty of disclosure 
and misrepresentation are still relevant and to what extent. Significantly, this 
chapter shall analyse the new duty addressed in IA. In comparison, Saudi 
regulations do not recognise a differentiation between consumer and business 
insurance. This should lead to development of significant recommendations in the 
conclusion of this chapter.  
Chapter seven looks at the insured’s post-contractual duties. Chapter eight shall 
look at the insurer’s pre-contractual duties. Chapter nine covers the the insurer’s 
post-contractual duties. These three chapters apply the same methodology to 
achieve their purposes. These chapters analyse the potential duties that may be 
introduced in both jurisdictions. Additionally, these chapters use the 
                                                          
40 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
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commonwealth jurisdictions to properly analyse the UK side as legal gaps have 
been noticed in those situations where there may be utmost good faith possibilities. 
Saudi law would benefit from analysing its laws and regulations and considering 
the findings of analysis of the UK side through a collaboration with the 
commonwealth jurisdictions.  
The final conclusion of the whole study shall provide recommendations that meet 
the aim of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE OF GOOD 
FAITH IN THE UK AND SAUDI INSURANCE LAWS 
 
2.1. The Developments of the Doctrine of Good Faith in the General Law 
of Contracts in the UK  
The duty of good faith is not recognised in the UK contract law41 because of three 
principal reasons 42 except in specific types of contracts43, for example contracts of 
employment, partnership, and any contract of a fiduciary nature. Furthermore, the 
position of the duty of good faith is unlike its position in insurance contracts where 
it is accepted and well-recognised. Although this study limits to the insurance law, 
the consideration of the recent developments of the duty of good faith in the general 
contract law should allow understanding how the duty of good faith is currently 
more considerable.  
There are three main reasons to not recognise the duty of good faith. The first reason 
considers specific rules rather than applying a broad principle. The second reason 
is the possibility of uncertainty and the third reason is the protection of the 
contracting parties' interests at the negotiation stage and during the performance of 
the contract. The UK position is uncommon as there is wide recognition of this 
doctrine among civil law jurisdictions44 and some of the common law jurisdictions, 
                                                          
41 See Monde Petroleum SA v WesternZagros Ltd [2016] EWHC 1472 (Comm), [248] – [51], [255]. 
42 For further discussion, Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), 
[124].    
43 Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust 
[2013] EWCA Civ 200, [2013] BLR 265; Monde Petroleum SA v WesternZagros Ltd [2016] EWHC 
1472 (Comm); and Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), 
[696].  
44 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1988] 2 WLR 615, [1989] QB 
433, [433].  
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such as USA45, and the Islamic law46. However, there have been some recent 
attempts to recognise this duty in some modern cases47, which are analysed below. 
A significant attempt to recognise the duty of good faith as an implied term 
especially for long-term 'relational' contracts, for instance, franchise and long-term 
distributorship agreements was made in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade 
Corp Ltd48. However, in this case, Leggatt J did not provide a detailed justification 
for the need of this duty in such contracts unless there was a need for honesty and 
cooperation between contracting parties in ‘relational’ contracts. Similarly, in 
Bristol Groundschool Ltd b Intelligent Data Capture Ltd49, the England and Wales 
High Court affirmed the Leggatt J judgment by implying the duty of good faith in 
an agreement for the EU Joint Aviation Authority training course as a ‘relational’ 
contract50. 
Two major issues were recognised by Leggatt J as difficulties in applying the duty 
of good faith. Uncertainty of the existence of the duty of good faith as an implied 
term and the willingness of the English law to interpret the duty. Leggatt J had well-
illustrated the position of the duty of good faith. On the one hand, there was an 
attempt to recognise the duty whilst recognising that English Law would be hesitant 
to do, as Leggatt J stated that ‘English law could and should recognise an implied 
doctrine of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts’.51  
The uncertainty was the cause for a further long illustration made by Leggatt J about 
the position of good faith in contracts nowadays in the USA, New Zealand, 
Australia, Canada, and the UK to identify the different positions of the common 
law jurisdictions.52 Importantly, Leggatt J found the need for the existence of the 
doctrine of good faith as an implied term is formed in any commercial contracts.53 
                                                          
45 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), [695]. See section      
1-203 of The Uniform Commercial Code 1951, and Wigand v Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co. 
(1918) 222 NY 272, 118 NE 618, 277, where The New York Court of Appeals held that ‘every 
contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it’. 
46 See below in section 2.4.  
47 See Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB); Monde Petroleum 
SA v Western Zagros Ltd [2016] EWHC 1472 (Comm); and National Private Air Transport Services 
Co (National Air Services) Ltd v Creditrade LLP [2016] EWHC 2144 (Comm). 
48 [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), [698]. 
49 [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch). 
50 Ibid [196]. 
51 [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), [664].  
52 Ibid [126] – [132].  
53 Ibid [664]. 
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Leggatt J recognised a difficulty of applying the duty of good faith which is 
'sensitive to context', and this difficulty would differ based on the facts of each 
case.54 In addition, Leggatt J specified the objective test to examine the duty of good 
faith is ‘commercially unacceptable by reasonable and honest people’.55 A 
considerable element of the duty of good faith is honesty, which is similar to the 
judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court in Bhasin v Hrynew56, where the 
Canadian Supreme Court held that ‘there is a common law duty which applies to 
all contracts to act honestly in the performance of contractual obligations’57. 
On the other hand, Leggatt J argued there was an unwillingness of the English law 
to consider and interpret the duty of good faith due to uncertainty in the 
interpretation of this duty.58 It was held that the fear to challenge the existence of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing was unjustified as there was ‘nothing unduly 
vague or unworkable about the concept’59. 
Recent cases that recognised Leggatt J judgment attempted to exclude the implied 
duty of good faith from specific types of long-term contracts. For example, there 
were successful attempts to exclude from the implication of the duty of good faith a 
contract between distributors of financial products and an independent financial 
adviser60, an exclusive supply agreement61, and long-term franchising agreements. 
This was based on the terms of the contract, such as in Carewatch Care Services 
Ltd v Focus Caring Services Ltd and Grace62, Henderson J held that although the 
contract was a long-term franchise contract, it did not consider the duty of good 
faith.63 This decision gave the space for more interpretation regarding interpretation 
of the contractual terms. In Apollo Window Blinds Limited v Mr McNeil, Mr 
Taylor64, the court held that although the duty of good faith might be implied, it 
rejected allowing the duty of good faith as an implied term in franchise agreements 
                                                          
54 Ibid [145]. 
55 Ibid.  
56 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 494. 
57 Ibid.  
58 [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), [701]. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Acer Investment Management Ltd and another v The Mansion Group Ltd [2014] EWHC 3011 
(QB), [109].  
61 Globe Motors, Inc (a corporation incorporated in Delaware, USA), Globe Motors Portugal-
Material Electrico Para A Industria Automovel LDA, Safran USA Inc v TRW Lucas Varity Electric 
Steering Limited, TRW Limited, [2016] EWCA Civ 396, [68].  
62 [2014] EWHC 2313 (Ch). 
63 Ibid [112].  
64 [2016] EWHC 2307 (QB). 
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where there are positive contractual obligations on the parties.65 However, this case 
did not deny the possibility of applying the duty to some parts of the agreement.66 
Similarly, in Property Alliance Group Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc67, the High 
Court found no implied term to act in good faith in accordance with fair dealing in 
a standard banking documentation as this would be contrary to the facility 
agreement’s express term to exclude equitable or fiduciary duties.68 To support this 
conclusion, the High Court considered significantly the view of Andrewes J, in 
Greenclose v National Westminster Bank69, who found that ‘such a term is unlikely 
to arise by way of necessary implication in a contract between two sophisticated 
commercial parties negotiating at arms' length’.70 Furthermore, the High Court 
supported its conclusion by discussing the judgment of Jackson LJ in the Mid 
Essex71 case where he said that ‘such a term may be implied based on the presumed 
intention of the parties’.72 Consequently, the High Court provided a reason to 
exclude such agreements from categories of contract that may imply the duty of 
good faith by stating that ‘such an implied term cannot have reflected the presumed 
intention of the parties nor is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
contracts’.73 
In The Law Debenture Trust Corpn plc v Ukraine74, Blair J found that there was an 
overlap between the implied requirement to act in good faith and the obligation not 
to prevent performance75, which is implied into all contracts.76 Blair J interpreted 
preventing performance as it ‘is understood as comprising total prevention of 
performance, delaying of performance, hindering performance, and/or interfering 
                                                          
65 Ibid [23] – [24]. 
66 Ibid. 
67 [2016] EWHC 3342 (Ch). 
68 Ibid [250]. 
69 [2014] EWHC 1156 (Ch), [2014] 1 CLC 562. 
70 [2016] EWHC 3342 (Ch), [250]. 
71 Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust 
[2013] EWCA Civ 200, [2013] BLR 265. 
72 [2016] EWHC 3342 (Ch), [275]. 
73 Ibid [276]. 
74 [2017] EWHC 655 (Comm) [2017] QB 1249. 
75 Ibid 1317.  
76 See Barque Quilpué Ltd v Brown [1904] 2 KB 264, [271] – [272]. 
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with performance’.77 This was because the legal test to imply the duty of good faith 
was not satisfied.78 However, this case is currently being appealed.   
The duty of good faith was not been implied either in a distribution agreement in 
Ilkerler Otomotiv Sanayai ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi and another v Perkins Engines 
Co Ltd79. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judge’s decision that the duty of good 
faith did not exist as an implied term, and the appeal was dismissed. Longmore LJ 
pointed out with whom Briggs LJ agreed that ‘the judge was prepared to 
contemplate the possibility of a general good faith term but even that which he 
identified would not be broken in the present case if it existed’80.  
In BP Gas Marketing Limited v La Societe Sonatrach, Sonatrach Gas Marketing 
UK Limited81, the duty of good faith was not found to be a free-standing obligation 
by the High Court.82 There was a significant discussion about breach of the duty of 
good faith without acting bad faith.83 There was a serious allegation by the claimant 
that BP had breached the duty of good faith by refusing to amend the agreement 
and not acting in a particular way at a particular time.84 The High Court pointed out 
that, under that agreement, performing obligations must be in good faith85, as good 
faith did not ‘require a party to surrender contractual rights’86. Further, the High 
Court did not find BP in breach of the duty of good faith.87  
Similarly, in Monde Petroleum SA v Western Zagros Ltd88, the court rejected an 
attempt to imply the duty of good faith into a commercial contract, which had a 
commercial and practical coherence without implying such duty. Recently, the 
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed this judgment.89  
                                                          
77 [2017] EWHC 655 (Comm) [2017] QB 1249, 1261. 
78 The Law Debenture Trust Corpn plc v Ukraine [2017] EWHC 655 (Comm) [2017] QB 1249, 
[356]. 
79 [2017] EWCA Civ 183 [2017] 4 WLR 144. 
80 Ibid [29] – [30]. 
81 [2016] EWHC 2461 (Comm). 
82 Ibid [403]. 
83 Ibid [379-80]. 
84 Ibid [378]. 
85 Ibid [378]. 
86 Ibid [401]. 
87 Ibid [385]. 
88 [2016] EWHC 1472 (Comm).  
89 Ibid. 
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Different positions were recognised in Emirates Trading Agency Llc v Prime 
Mineral Exports Private Ltd90 and Emirates Trading Agency Llc v Sociedade De 
Fomento Industrial Private Ltd91, where the England and Wales High Court found 
a dispute resolution clause required the parties to resolve the dispute by ‘friendly 
discussions’ that required negotiating in good faith before arbitration was enforced. 
The High Court held that ‘the obligation to seek to resolve disputes by friendly 
discussions must import an obligation to seek to do so in good faith’92. 
Significantly, in 2017, a different position from that of Leggatt J was recognised in 
respect to the duty of good faith in Astor Management AG v Atalaya Mining plc93, 
where the claimant argued the defendant’s obligation to act in good faith as an 
implied term in the context to use reasonable endeavours in order to obtain a senior 
debt facility. Non-compliance with this obligation would be considered a breach of 
the duty of good faith.  
Leggatt J had described the duty of good faith as a ‘modest requirement’94. This 
new position on the meaning of good faith would be highlighted in terms of the 
discussion of this duty in the English law, as Leggatt J stated that ‘there is no need 
or scope to imply a term requiring the defendants to act in good faith… since such 
a requirement is subsumed within the express obligation to use all reasonable 
endeavours’95.  
It is very clear that Leggatt J views have changed about the duty of good faith since 
his position in Yam Seng96. However, it should be noted that Leggatt J did not find 
if this agreement should be recognised as a ‘relational’ or long-term contract to 
apply the duty of good faith, and why good faith should be recognised as a modest 
requirement. The lack of justification of these views found in Astor Management 
AG v Atalaya Mining plc97 might meet some further comments about the hesitation 
of the Leggatt J to set the duty of good faith as an implied term.  
                                                          
90 [2014] EWHC 2104 (Comm). 
91 [2015] EWHC 1452 (Comm). 
92 [2014] EWHC 2104 (Comm), [51]. 
93 [2017] EWHC 425 (Comm). 
94 Ibid [98]. 
95 Ibid [99]. 
96 [2013] EWHC 111 (QB). 
97 [2017] EWHC 425 (Comm). 
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To sum up, the duty of good faith is generally not recognised in the English law, 
however, there were some doubts to reconsider its position in terms of the long-
term contracts. Some comments in regard to the justification of its effectiveness let 
to the possibility of the existence of such duty as an implied term. Nevertheless, the 
recognition of such a duty for a ‘relational’ contract may lead to further debate. 
Finally, the existence of the duty of good faith may still be under debate for its 
interpretation and elements in the English contract law. 
2.2. The Developments of the Doctrine of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance 
Law in the UK 
Since 1957 there have been many attempts to reform insurance law especially with 
regard to sections 17 to 20 of MIA. The Fifth Report of the Law Reform Committee 
in 1957 called to reform the law because of the crucial effect of the remedy in case 
of non-disclosure especially in the case where the insured was honest and 
reasonably careful.98 However, this attempt was unsuccessful. Other unsuccessful 
attempts were in 1979 and 1980.99  
Significantly, the English and Scottish Law Commissions (the Law Commissions) 
had a serious project in 2006 to reform insurance law where needed. The first paper 
was issued in September 2006, ‘Misrepresentation and Non-disclosure’ calling for 
relevant views in order to identify the scope of this reform. The scope was for 
specific issues including consumer insurance, business insurance, late payment, 
warranties, and pre-contract disclosure and misrepresentation.100 Following this 
paper, the Law Commissions published a report and consultation paper in 2007 for 
misrepresentation, non-disclosure and warranties. Later, in 2010, The Law 
Commissions’ project focused, as well, on post-contractual duties of utmost good 
faith by publishing a report, ‘The Insured's Post-Contract Duty of Good Faith’; later 
                                                          
98 Law Reform Committee, Fifth report: conditions and exceptions in insurance policies (HMSO, 
London 1957) Cmnd 62, [11-12].  
99 See further reading in Rob Merkin and Özlem Gürses, The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the 
Interests of Insurer and Assured, (2015) 78(6) MLR 1004, 1005. See also John Birds, Birds’ Modern 
Insurance Law (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 20 - 21. 
100 See the Law Commission, ‘Insurance Contract Law Project’ 
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/insurance-contract-law> accessed 1st May 2018. 
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the Law Commissions published the joint consultation paper ‘Post-Contract Duties 
and Other Issues’ in 2011101. 
The Law Commissions’ project contributed to produce two Acts of Parliament. The 
first Act is CIDRA102 which imposes the duty of reasonable care and a variation of 
matched remedies based on the differentiation between reckless or deliberate 
breach and careless breach. These changes are important for two reasons. Firstly, 
they abolish the existing duty of disclosure in consumer insurance contracts and the 
connected remedy for breach of the duty as provided in MIA, avoidance of the 
contract by the insurer ab initio. Secondly, they impose consumer protection within 
the UK insurance market.   
The other Act is IA. Following the passing of this Act, the Law Commission 
published an Explanatory Note for the IA103. Significantly, this Act modifies the 
doctrine of utmost good faith based on a significant repeal of parts of s 17 of MIA 
by abolishing the remedy of avoidance of the contract. This Act imposes the duty 
of fair presentation of the risks and creating a variation of matched remedies in case 
of breach of the duty. Importantly, the duty of fair presentation provides a balanced 
position between the contracting parties on an inquiry basis instead of a disclosure 
basis in terms of the repealed sections 18 to 20 of MIA. Moreover, the duty of fair 
presentation of the risks was the approach that was adopted by the common law, 
for example, in Garnat Trading & Shipping (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Baominh 
Insurance Corp104, where the insurer could not avoid the policy because of the fair 
presentation of the risks. This was held not to count as breach of the duty of 
disclosure.  
According to the wording of s 17 of MIA after the recent reform which abolished 
the avoidance as a remedy of the contract, the doctrine of utmost good faith appears 
to be without definition, specific elements, or remedies. This shall be investigated, 
discussed, and analysed in this study in light of the meaning of the doctrine of 
                                                          
101 The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract 
Duties and Other Issues, A Joint Consultation Paper (Law Com CP No 201, Scot Law Com DP No 
152, 2011). 
102 Significant report by the Law Commission to shape this Act was The Law Commission and 
Scottish Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and 
Misrepresentation (Law Com No 319, Scot Law Com No 219, 2009). 
103 HM Treasury’s Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015, 12 February 2015. 
104 [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 573, [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep 589, [2011] Lloyd's Rep IR 366. See also, 
Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc [2004] QB 601. 
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utmost good faith  and the related issues by using the position of common law and 
academic discussions on the related issues with a consideration to the 
commonwealth position where needed in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 
2.3. The Developments of Insurance Law in Saudi Arabia 
2.3.1. Saudi Legal Structure  
According to the Basic Law of Governance105, the highest law in Saudi Arabia, 
which is equivalent to the constitution in other countries, is Sharia law, the Islamic 
law. Sharia is the constitution of Saudi Arabia and the umbrella of all Saudi laws 
and regulations. 106 This means that if any law challenges the Islamic provisions, it 
would be constitutionally abolished. Moreover, major Islamic sources are 
considered including the Holy Quran, the holy Islamic book, Prophet's traditions, 
and ‘Fiqh’ provisions. ‘Fiqh’ provisions are distinguished based on differences 
between Islamic schools 'madhabs', which include Shafiey madhab, Maalki 
madhab, Hanafi madhab, and Hanbali madhab.  
It is important to address that any modern issue in Saudi Arabia regarding social or 
religious aspects, and commercial transactions are discussed by the ‘Council of 
Senior Islamic Scholars’ (CSIS), the only permitted council to observe ‘Fatwa’107 
in Saudi Arabia based on the Royal Order of the past king, King Abdullah Al-
Saud108, under the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta’ (PCSRI). 
Then, these scholars consider a ‘Fatwa’ based on the Islamic schools for a specific 
issue109, which becomes often a guide for judges. In addition, it is common to say 
                                                          
105 The Basic Law of Governance by the Royal Decree No A/90 dated 02/03/1992. 
106 Ibid. Article 1 states ‘God's Book (the Holy Quran) and the Sunnah of His Prophet are the 
country's constitution’.  
107 Frank Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 2000) 5, which 
explains Fatwa, as follows:  
In practice, a lay Muslim, seeking to act in harmony with God's law in some difficult 
or perplexing situation, approaches a scholar of the law whom he or she respects, 
summarizes the situation faced, and asks for his views of the Sharia ruling for that 
situation. In this function the scholar is called a Mufti, and his opinion is called a 
Fatwa. 
Generally, Fatwa is based on “Ijtihad”, which is the mechanism to access a religious opinion of the 
Islamic scholars depending on a combination between the past and the present Islamic perspectives, 
and it is related to the all affairs of Muslims life, especially, where no existence of laws. 
108 Royal Order (2010) No 13876 dated 2/9/1431H. 
109 Article 45 of The Basic Law of Governance (1992) states that:  
The sources for the deliverance of fatwa in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are God's 
Book and the Sunnah of His Messenger. Article 17 of the same regulation: Property, 
capital, and labour are essential elements in the Kingdom's economic and social life. 
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that Saudi Arabia is following generally Hanbali madhab, and Saudi judges are 
adopting and following Hanbali Islamic resources more than other Islamic schools’ 
resources.110 In 1928, the Saudi Judicial Monitoring Association decided that if the 
four schools agreed about a particular provision, judges should consider this agreed 
provision without any objection, but if the four schools do not agree about a 
provision, the Hanbali madhab would be generally considered. However, if there is 
any difficulty to apply the Hanbali madhab on the contracting parties or society, 
other madhab may be considered depending on the discretion authority of judges.111  
In regard to insurance law, Saudi Arabia did not have any valid insurance law till 
July 2003, when it first regulated the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies (2003)112 (LSCIC). LSCIC does not cover substantive aspects of 
insurance contracts, such as insurance principles and parties' obligations, but is 
more about managing insurance market. Accordingly, LSCIC left significant 
legislative gaps. Although the Commercial Court Law 1931113 (CCL) is recognised 
as the oldest commercial law in the country, which considers marine insurance 
provisions by articles 324-389; CCL is invalid in practice as the Commercial Court 
is not founded till 2017114, and its provisions are ‘too unclear’115. In fact, CCL had 
a limited impact only as a guide in arbitration cases.116 The Implementing 
Regulation of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 2004 
(IRLSCIC) is issued by the decision of the Minister of Finance No 1/596 dated 
21/4/2004, which considers some significant insurance principles and partially fills 
legal gaps that were indicated in LSCIC. 
SAMA is deemed to be responsible for the insurance sector. Accordingly, SAMA 
has codified some significant insurance regulations as part of its role.117 The most 
                                                          
They are personal rights which perform a social function in accordance with Islamic 
Sharia.  
110 The Ministry of Justice, ‘A Brief Summary of the Judiciary System in Saudi Arabia’ (2018) 
<https://www.moj.gov.sa/ar/Ministry/Pages/HistoryMOJ.aspx> accessed 1st May 2018. 
111 Decision of the Judicial Monitoring Association (1928) No 3 dated 03/24/1347. 
112 Issued by the Royal Decree M/32 dated 1/8/2003.  
113 Issued by the Royal Decree No 32 dated 1/6/1931. 
114 As had been announced by the Ministry of Justice in 2017, see The Ministry of Justice, ‘Media 
Centre Report’ (18/09/2017) <https://www.moj.gov.sa/ar/MediaCenter/Documents/27-12-38.pdf> 
accessed on 1st May 2018. 
115 Richard Price & Andreas Haberbeck, The Maritime Laws of the Arabian Gulf Cooperations 
Council States (Graham and Trotman 1986) 32. 
116 Ibid. See also, Andreas Haberbeck, ‘Insurance under Saudi Arabian Law’ [1986] LMCLQ 246, 
248-250. 
117Article 2 of LSCIC states that: 
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important regulations are including the Insurance Market Code of Conduct 
Regulation 2008118 (IMCCR), the Anti-Fraud Regulation 2008119 (AFR), and 
Online Insurance Activities Regulations 2011120 (OIAR). Importantly, SAMA 
recently applies Insurance Consumer Protection Principles 2014121 (ICPP). There 
are other law and regulations which apply to specific types of insurance, for 
examples, the Unified Compulsory Motor Insurance Policy 2011122 (UCMIP), 
Cooperative Health Insurance Law123 1999 (CHIL), and Implementing Regulation 
of Cooperative Health Insurance Law124 2014 (IRCHIL). Although there are laws 
and regulations to regulate insurance in Saudi Arabia, there are significant 
legislative gaps, for examples, regarding detailed provisions and limitations for 
legal principles, doctrines, and duties, legal remedies, and specifically, in respect of 
the doctrine of utmost good faith. Significantly, any gaps could be filled by Islamic 
provisions.125  
For a comprehensive understanding of Sharia law in regard to insurance contracts, 
understanding the differences between Islamic schools is necessary. While the 
majority of Islamic scholars prohibit conventional insurance and permit Takaful 
insurance, which is the Islamic form of an insurance system, others objected to this 
perspective and permitted conventional insurance. However, a minority of Islamic 
scholars prohibited all types of insurance contracts. All of these positions are 
considered below. 
2.3.2. Prohibition of Conventional Insurance  
Takaful insurance has been permitted and conventional insurance has been 
prohibited in Saudi Arabia since 1977 by the majority of the CSIS under the PCSRI 
                                                          
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (the "Agency") shall, in the course of 
implementing the Regulations, have the following powers:… c) approving insurance 
and re-insurance standard policy forms; d) establishing rules and controls to determine 
the means of investing in the assets of insurance and re-insurance companies. e), 
establishing general rules to determine the assets that each company should maintain 
inside and outside the Kingdom. 
118 Insurance Market Code of Conduct Regulation, issued by SAMA dated 8/9/2008. 
119 Anti-Fraud Regulation, issued by SAMA dated 18/12/2008 
120 Online Insurance Activities Regulation, issued by SAMA dated 13/12/2011 
121 Insurance Consumer Protection Principles, issued by SAMA dated 07/2014. 
122 The Unified Compulsory Motor Insurance Policy, issued by SAMA dated 13/12/2011. 
123 Issued by Royal Decree M/10 dated 13/8/1999. 
124 Implementing Regulation of the Cooperative Health Insurance Law No 299/1 dated 12/1/2014. 
125 Article 1 of LSCIC states that ‘insurance in the Kingdom shall be undertaken through registered 
insurance companies operating in a cooperative manner…and in accordance with the principles of 
Islamic Sharia’.  
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except one of the members, Abdullah Almuna’i, who denied Takaful insurance and 
permitted conventional insurance.126 Nonetheless, no amendments were considered 
to CCL based on these changes on the nature of insurance contracts.  Later, in 1978, 
the majority of the Islamic scholars of the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA) issued a 
Fatwa, which stated that conventional insurance is prohibited, except one of the 
member, Mustafa Alzarqa, one of the most famous Islamic scholars, who followed 
the same views as Abdullah Almuna’i. Furthermore, Alzarqa made an observation 
in regard to IFA session by saying that the session did not include the half members 
of the Academy, and it was important to wait for the majority of members for such 
an important fatwa.127 However, this observation did not receive any attention from 
the rest of the Academy, and they concluded to prohibit the conventional insurance.  
The prohibition of the conventional insurance was depending on several principles 
including, significantly, gharar (uncertainty), maysir (gambling), and riba 
(usuary).128 The first reason is gharar which means that ‘fraudulent transaction 
where details about the sold item are unknown or uncertain’129. From this 
perspective, at the time of entering into the insurance contract, insurance companies 
cannot determine the exact amount that would be paid if the risk occurred.130 As a 
result of this perspective, if the risk does not occur, the insured will pay for nothing, 
which challenges Islamic commercial principles.131 These commercial principles 
require that the value of the price paid must be properly linked to services or goods. 
Thus, if the value is not proper to the goods or services provided under the contract, 
gharar would exist and the contract would be prohibited according to gharar and, 
consequently, void.132 
It can be argued however that insurance contracts do not seem to include gharar due 
to several reasons. This is because at the time of conclusion of an insurance contract, 
the insured understands exactly the level of cover which is provided by the insurer 
                                                          
126 Fatwas of Council of Senior Islamic Scholars, decision no 55 of 10th session, 4/4/1397H 
23/3/1977. See also, the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Albio’a 3’, Group 
1, Volume 15, 275, Fatwa No.18047.  
127 Islamic Fiqh Academy, decision no 9(9/2)[1], 1st session of 10/08/1398, 15/07/1978. 
128 Fatwas of the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta' (2001), decision no (5/10), 
part 4, 312. 
129 Ibid; see also Fatwas of the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Albio’a 3’, 
Group 1, Volume 15, 275, Fatwa No.18047. 
130 Mohammed Ahmed Alsaleh, Altameen Bain Alhazr O Alebaha (Al-Riyadh 2004) 108 - 109. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
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under the insurance contract.133 This insurance cover should have been well-
explained and be part of the contract terms. Accordingly, the level of cover will be 
reflected in the premium. Insurance contracts are similar to the warranty included 
in the sale of goods, as far as uncertainty is concerned. This is especially when the 
buyer pays extra for a special warranty or a comprehensive warranty against theft 
or loss. The warranty is taken because it can provide protection for consumers from 
manufactures problems, but there are other types of warranty which exist because 
of external circumstances such as against theft. The warranty contracts or terms are 
permitted in Sharia even though they include uncertain elements.134  
Another comparison would be with security guard contracts. The contracting parties 
of such a contract understand that one party works for the other party to guard them 
from uncertain risks. The parties understand that this protection, from one side, and 
the risk, from the other, may or may not occur.135 Although, the insurance contract 
is not about labour, it is, similarly, about transfer of uncertain risks to the other party 
in order to provide certain level of insurance cover. However, from the Islamic 
perspective, the hiring of a security guard is not considered an uncertain or gharar 
contract. Therefore, insurance contracts should be considered in the same light.  
Another Saudi system that recognises a type of social insurance is the Saudi 
Retirement Pension System, which applies all insurance principles under another 
umbrella.136 Furthermore, this system is based on the payment of a small premium, 
which would be invested to meet the participants’ need, to receive a large sum after 
retirement or infirmity, which is similar to life insurance.137 However, while the 
Retirement Pension System is operated by the government, life insurance contracts 
are operated by insurance companies. Because of the different status of these 
operators, some of the Islamic scholars permitted the Retirement Pension System 
whilst prohibiting insurance contracts. This was objected to by other Islamic 
scholars, such as Mustafa Alzarqa. He pointed that if you could accept such a 
                                                          
133 Ibid 113. 
134 The Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Altameen’ (2001) 4 Research of 
Council of Senior Islamic Scholars 33, 271-272. 
135 Ibid 211 - 212. 
136 Social Insurance Law 1969 by Royal decree M/22 dated 15/11/1969. See further discussion in 
Mohammed Ahmed Alsaleh, Altameen Bain Alhazr O Alebaha (Al-Riyadh 2004) 189 - 191. 
137 The Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Altameen’ (1987) 20 The Journal 
of the Islamic Research 17, 44 - 46. 
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system as the Retirement Pension System, you should also accept insurance 
contracts.138  
The Holy Quran states that ‘O ye who believe! Squander not your wealth among 
yourselves in vanity, except be it a trade by mutual consent’139. It is clear that 
conventional insurance, which is based on commercial dealing, relies on this verse 
that creates an exception for commercial contracts. Further, the Quran provides that 
‘mutual consent’ between the contracting parties in commercial contracts is 
permissible in terms of the latter part of the verse. Noticeably, Islamic scholars who 
prohibited conventional insurance do not notice this exception applies. Conversely, 
the exception does not apply to Takaful insurance, because the basis of Takaful is 
donation and the application of the exception is only envisaged in respect of 
commercial contracts. As a result, Takaful insurance faces further challenge in 
applying this Quran provision. 
Second, conventional insurance includes a type of maysir or ‘gambling’.140 This is 
because the insured benefits by chance, and, in the case of non-occurrence of the 
risk, the insurer is not obliged to return the premium to the insured.141 However, it 
would be unsuitable to measure insurance contracts based on the principles of 
gambling because of two reasons. Gambling is based on parties wishing to have the 
other suffer a loss in order to win unlike an insurance contract. Because of the 
requirement for insurable interest, if either the insured or beneficiary has no 
insurable interest, the insurance policy will be void. Saudi regulations also apply 
the principle of insurable interest by article 55(1) of IRLSCIC, which challenges 
the reason to prohibit conventional insurance.  
Even though, insurance generally includes risks, insurance plays an important role 
in the society, and each insurance company applies statistical, legal, and actuarial 
studies to deal with insurance contracts, and it is not relying totally on luck at any 
stage.142 Further, the nature of commercial contracts is that they include various 
                                                          
138 Ibid. 
139 The Holy Quran, 4:29. 
140 The Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Altameen’ (1987) 20 The Journal 
of the Islamic Research 17, 44 - 46. See also, Fatwas of the Permanent Committee for Scholarly 
Research and Ifta', ‘Albio’a 3’, Group 1, Volume 15, 275, Fatwa No.18047. 
141 For further discussions see Mohammed Ahmed Alsaleh, ‘Alta’amin Bain Alhazr O Alebaha (Al-
Riyadh 2004) 130 - 133. 
142 Ayman Saleem & Jamal Abdulrhman, Aloqood Almadania: Albai’a, Alejar, O Altameen (Dar 
Hafiz 2009) 670. 
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levels of risks during the performance of the contract; however, those contracts are 
not considered as gambling even if they include risks or luck.143 
Third, conventional insurance indicates Riba or 'usury'144. Significantly, according 
to the holy Quran and Sunnah Islamic schools, Riba is prohibited.145 Based on 
Islamic scholars who prohibited conventional insurance, Riba occurs when the 
insurer provides insurance cover of a greater value than the premium paid by the 
insured.146  
On the other hand, even though one of the major principles of insurance contracts 
is indemnity, the insurance contract is not about paying money to collect money or 
to repay a loan with interest. The insurance contract is about security. Insurance in 
Arabic is ‘tameen’ from ‘amman’ which defines in the Arabic dictionary as 
providing security and leave fear and guarantee security and protection.147 If the 
case is understood this way, the insurance contract would not include Riba. 
Additionally, the insured pays premiums based on the insurance cover provided by 
the insurer that are determined depending on the probability of occurrence of the 
loss and surrounding circumstances. Accordingly, the insured pays to feel secure 
having the expectation of two possible outcomes, either the loss may or may not 
happen. Furthermore, the premium usually increases with the increasing level of 
the security provided by the insurance cover with the understanding of the 
probabilities of occurrence of the losses. Moreover, the premium may increase 
because of the surrounding circumstances of either the insured himself or the 
subject of the insurance. Therefore, insurance contracts are not including both types 
of Riba because it is not money for money, such as an interest-based-loan. All in 
all, in brief, these are the three major reasons given allowing prohibition of 
conventional insurance from the Islamic perspective. 
                                                          
143 Such as, shipping and cargo contracts, where the shipment could reach the agreed destination or 
could not be based on surrounding circumstances.  
144 Barbara L Seniwaski, ‘Riba Today: Social Equity, the Economy, and Doing Business under 
Islamic Law’ (2000-2001) 39 Columbia Journal Transnational Law 701, 709.  
145 Fatwas of the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Albio’a 3’, Group 1, 
Volume 15, 275, Fatwa No.18047.; and Islamic Fiqh Academy, decision no 9(9/2)[1], 1st session of 
10/08/1398, 15/07/1978. 
146 For further discussions see Mohammed Ahmed Alsaleh, Altameen Bain Alhazr O Alebaha (Al-
Riyadh 2004) 116 - 126. 
147 Arabic Language Academy, Almujaam Alwaseet (Maktabat Dar Alshroug Aldawlia 2004) 28. 
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The majority of Islamic scholars agreed with the fatwa for prohibition of 
conventional insurance. However, others disagreed with this Fatwa and issued their 
reservations about allowing conventional insurance based on two significant 
reasons.148   
First, the most important reason is the Fiqh rules which state ‘necessity knows no 
laws and a need is considered as a necessity’, and second, ‘rules change with the 
change of time, place, and conditions’.149 The last rule is based on the ‘doctrine of 
necessity’, which means that if there was a provision about prohibition of a 
transaction, but the surrounding circumstances of society regarding this transaction 
had changed, and this issue had been considered as a current need and necessity to 
people and the society, then the provision may change to comply with these changes 
and peoples’ needs. Moreover, these Fiqh rules could be used with the conventional 
insurance contracts because of the current requirements of insurance contracts 
which meet the social needs in any modern society. 150  
In conclusion, Saudi legal system generally is following Islamic provisions. This 
reflects further on insurance contracts. Conventional insurance is prohibited in 
Saudi Arabia; while Takaful insurance is permitted from the Islamic perspective 
due to several reasons. However, the debate continuous to adopt the conventional 
insurance.  
2.3.3. Permission of Takaful Insurance  
The PCSRI issued a fatwa that permitted ‘cooperative insurance’ or ‘Takaful 
insurance’ in 1977, as a permitted insurance contract in Saudi Arabia, and IFA, in 
1978, agreed with this Fatwa. Takaful insurance defines a system based on 
cooperation between groups of people to indemnify losses with no interest to make 
any profit.151 Based on Malki madhab and Hanafi madhab, the basis of this type of 
insurance is a ‘donation’ between participants (insureds), and it follows the type of 
                                                          
148 Including a member of the Council of the Senior Scholars, Alshaikh Abdullah Almunai', Alshaikh 
Ali Alkhafif, and Alshaikh Mustafa Alzarqa. See Mustafa Alzarqa, Aqd Altameen O Mawaqefh fe 
Alsharia (Damascus University 1962) 29; and Ali Alkhafif, ‘Altameen’ (1966) 8 Alazhar Journal 
480. 
149Ali Alnadawai, Alqawa’ed Alfeqhia (Dar Alqalam 1998) 101. 
150 Renat Bekkin, ‘Islamic Insurance: National Features and Legal Regulation’ (2007) 21(3) Arab 
Law Quarterly 3. 
151 Mher Hussain & Ahmad Pasha, 'Conceptual and Operational Differences between General 
Takaful and Conventional Insurance’ (2011) 1(8) Australian Journal of Business and Management 
Research 24. 
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contract which is ‘starting with a donation, ending with a commercial contract152’. 
Moreover, based on the Hanbali madhab, this contract which is ‘starting with a 
donation, and ending with a commercial contract’, takes the same provisions of 
sales contracts, which means commercial contracts, when the donation requires to 
be a specified fixed payment.153 However, if the payment is not specified, the 
contract will be void.154 IFA concluded the Fatwa by applying provisions of 
donation to insurance contracts. This then leads to the question, relying on this 
theory, about what is the obligation on the insurer to indemnify losses if any?  
The Islamic perspective prohibits gharar and uncertainty prior to the conclusion of 
the contract or during the performance of the contract as is the case in conventional 
insurance contract. Therefore, Takaful insurance contract would be void, from this 
perspective, because of uncertainty and gharar, as Takaful contracts include gharar 
and uncertainty at the second part, as it is ending with commercial provisions.155  
Another strong criticism of Takaful insurance is the need to be reinsured. 156 Though 
there are many Takaful insurance companies, there are no experienced Takaful re-
insurance companies.157 Consequently, the majority of reinsurance activities will 
be operated by conventional reinsurance companies. Based on the Islamic 
perspective which prohibits conventional insurance, conventional reinsurance 
contracts are prohibited, as well. Thus, Takaful insurance companies are required 
to reinsure under conventional insurance policies. Indeed, this issue had not been 
discussed by Islamic scholars when they issued the permission for Takaful 
insurance and prohibited of conventional insurance. As a result, there was no real 
need to establish a new system such as Takaful insurance with its many practical 
                                                          
152 For Malki Madhab, see Ahmed Aldardir, Alsharh Alkabir maa’ Hashiat aldesoqi (Dar Ihiaa 
Alkotob Alarabia 1996) part 4, 116.  For Hanafi Madhab, see Alaa’ Aldin Alkasany, Badae’ 
Asanaea’ (Dar Alkotob Alelmaia 1986) part 8, 130. 
153 Mohammed Ibn Othaimeen, Alsharh Almomtea’ Ala Zad Almostaqne’a (Dar Ibn Aljauzi 2002) 
part 11, 67; and Ahmed Alqari, Magallat Alahkam Alsharia (Tihama Publications 2005) 307, code 
881. This publication includes Islamic provisions in specific codes depending on Hanbali madhab. 
154 Mohammed Ibn Othaimeen, Alsharh Almomtea’ Ala Zad Almostaqne’a (Dar Ibn Aljauzi 2002) 
part 11, 67; and Ahmed Alqari, Magallat Alahkam Alsharia (Tihama Publications 2005) 307, code 
881. This publication includes Islamic provisions in specific codes depending on Hanbali madhab. 
155 Abdulsattar Abu Gudda ‘Nezam Altameen Altakafuli mn Khilal Alwaqf: Badeela an Altameen 
mn Khilal Eltizam Altabura’ (International Symposium for Takaful Insurance through Waqf 
System, International Islamic University, Malaysia, March 2008) 8. See also, Abdulazim Abuzaid 
‘Albenaa' Alsharaie Alaslam Lealtameen Aleslami’ (8th International Conference on Islamic 
Economics and Finance, Qatar, 2011) 10. 
156 Mohammed Anas Alzarqa, ‘Khamsa Kadaya fe Altameen Altawani’ (Takaful Insurance 
Conference: Abaadoh, Afaqoh, O Mawqef Alsharia menh, Jordan, April 2010) 5. 
157 Ibid. 
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obstacles when another experienced and professional system such as conventional 
insurance already existed. 
The Saudi government applies some types of mandatory Takaful insurance, such as 
motor insurance. However, this, as a result, is deemed to be a commercial contract 
not a donation, because a donation contract should be agreed without any force on 
any party.158 It is well-established under Islamic contract law that duress on a 
contractual party to enter into a contract invalidates the contract, especially, in the 
case of donation.159 As a result, in relation to the mandatory insurance contracts, if 
a person does not desire to enter into a donation contract, the contract should be 
invalid.  
Another criticism of the general Islamic contract law is that donation contracts 
consider generally the personality of the contracting parties.160 This means that a 
grantor would specify a recipient either on a personal basis, such as relatives or a 
relationship, or a personal desire to give a grant to a specific person or institution, 
which is unlike the status of Takaful insurance contracts where neither the insurer 
nor the insured choose to enter into the contract based on personal aspects. 
Furthermore, the Takaful insurance contracts neither provide nor mention mutual 
grants between the insured and the insurer but premiums and the insurance cover.  
Takaful insurance is based on a mutual donation between the grantor (insured) and 
the recipient (insurer). The theory of donation says that it is another donation from 
the insurer to the participant (insured). It is accepted that a Takaful contract, as a 
donation contract, should be void, because the grantor pays the donation 
(premiums) based on the possible occurrence of a future condition (to be covered 
by the insurer).161 On the other hand, the recipient pays its donation (insurance 
cover) in respect of the occurrence of a future uncertain condition (occurrence of 
the risk) based on the surrounding circumstances and the extent of the insurance 
                                                          
158 Abdulazim Abuzaid ‘Albenaa' Alsharaie Alaslam Lealtameen Aleslami’ (8th International 
Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, Qatar, 2011) 10. 
159 Ibid 10. See also Mohammed Anas Alzarqa, ‘Khamsa Kadaya fe Altameen Altawani’ (Takaful 
Insurance Conference: Abaadoh, Afaqoh, O Mawqef Alsharia menh, Jordan, April 2010) 6; and 
Ahmed Alqari, Magallat Alahkam Alsharia (Tihama Publications 2005) 305, code 879 states that ‘it 
is invalid any donation contract of forced person’. Further, see Ali Afandi, Dorar Alhokam fi Sharh 
Majallat Alahkam (Dar Aljail 1991) part 6, 158. 
160 Abdul RazzaK Alsanhouri, Alwaseet fe Sharh Alqanoon Almadani (Munsha'at Alma'aref 2004) 
part 1 'Masader Aleltizam', 136. 
161 Ahmed Alqari, Magallat Alahkam Alsharia (Tihama Publications 2005) 307, code 883. 
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cover.162 However, it is clear in an insurance contract that each party has no desire 
to provide donations but rather agree commercial obligations between the 
contracting parties. Furthermore, according to the Hanafi163, Hanbali164, and 
Shafie165 madhabs, commenting the donation on such condition is prohibited unlike 
Malki madhab. This is because a donation has to be made in the present not the 
future, and the donation must be well-known in amount at the time of the contract, 
which does not exist in the case of Takaful insurance contracts.166 However, Malki 
madhab observes that a donation contract is permitted to include gharar and 
uncertainty unlike commercial contracts.167 Accordingly, this is still a view of one 
of the Islamic schools, and indeed the majority of schools found Takaful includes 
gharar. 
A few of the Islamic scholars, such as Mohammed Almutaii 168 denied any type of 
insurance contracts, including Takaful Insurance. This is because, from their 
perspective, any type of insurance is may contain riba and gambling.169 Another 
reason to support this view is that Muslims should pay for their financial issues or 
mistakes, such as medical errors, without seeking any support from either 
commercial or cooperative institutions170. This perspective is supported by the view 
of the famous Islamic scholar Mustafa Alzarqa who said that ‘who would vary 
between commercial insurance and Takaful insurance would not understand any 
issue of Islamic Fiqh’171. Significantly, it is important to note that Mustafa Alzarqa 
adopted the permission of conventional insurance and he made many observations 
against Takaful insurance. Further, Alzarqa tried to destroy any distinction between 
Takaful insurance and conventional insurance, because both contracts apply almost 
the same principles. This is to support the position of conventional insurance. 
However, this perspective, which denies any type of insurance, does not adopt 
                                                          
162 Ibid. 
163 Alaa’ Aldin Alkasany, Badae’ Asanaea’ (Dar Alkotob Alelmaia 1986) part 6, 119. 
164 Mowafaq Aldeen Almakdesi, Almoghni (Dar Alketab Alaarabi 1983) part 6, 46 - 47. 
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168 Mustafa Alzarqa, Nezam Altameen O Mawqif Alsharia Menh (Alrisalah Institution 1984) 25. He 
discussed the perspective of Alshaikh Mohammed Almutaii, the past Egyptian Chairman of Senior 
Islamic Scholars, who objected any type of insurance.  
169 Ibid.  
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Alzarqa approach; it does not appreciate the current role of insurance; and it does 
not consist with the society's needs. 
2.4. The Doctrine of Good Faith in the General Law of Contracts in Saudi 
Arabia  
Sharia law applies the doctrine of good faith as 'Eltizam Husn Alniyah' which 
means that any act must be done with good intention or faith. Quran provisions and 
Prophet Traditions (Sunnah) obliged Muslims to deal honestly, especially, in 
contracts. The Holy Quran states that ‘O you believers! Do not betray Allaah and 
the Messenger, nor knowingly, betray your trusts’172, ‘O you who have believed, 
fulfill [all] contracts’173, ‘cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate 
in sin and aggression and fear Allah’174, and ‘give in full the measure and do not be 
of those causing loss; and weigh with scales that are straight; do not defraud people 
of their things, and do not commit corruption in the earth’175. In addition, the 
prophet's traditions (Sunnah) focus on this doctrine, as well. The Prophet stated that 
‘if anyone has four characteristics, he is a pure hypocrite, and if anyone has one of 
them, he has an aspect of hypocrisy until he gives it up: whenever he is trusted, he 
betrays his trust; whenever he speaks, he lies; whenever he makes an agreement, he 
breaks it; and whenever he quarrels, he deviates from the truth speaking falsely’176, 
and ‘O you traders, beware of telling lies in (your business) transactions’177. 
Moreover, a very famous Prophet's tradition in this respect is that ‘he is not one of 
us who deceives us’178. The importance of this tradition in Sharia context is broad 
in application to protect contracting parties from any kind of cheating, lies, or bad 
faith acts. Accordingly, the doctrine of good faith applies in several forms and at all 
stages of the contract including the negotiation stage, during formulating the 
contract, and finally, during the executing of the contract.179 
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Defects of satisfaction are the most significant consideration in regard to the origin 
of the doctrine of good faith.180 In addition, any defects whether by intention or not 
by a contractual party impact on the other party who entered into the contract in 
good faith with no appreciation of the real facts and status.181 Accordingly, 
contracting parties are responsible for disclosing information related to the contract 
and any defects that may impact on the contract. Thus, concealment and lack of 
honesty and non-disclosure would challenge the doctrine of good faith.182 Under 
Sharia provisions, several defects of satisfaction are recognised. Significantly, this 
includes deceit and fraud (tadlees) and mistakes (ghalat).183 Indeed, in some cases, 
contractual terms may not be valid when these terms challenge the doctrine of good 
faith, based on Sharia law. This is because adhering to the contractual terms leads 
to damaging the other party, which does not comply with Sharia provisions about 
the doctrine of good faith.184  
Based on Sharia provisions, deceit and fraud can take three forms that are: Firstly, 
fraud by using words, for example, by lying to the other party, providing misleading 
information, deliberately careless of providing accurate information, and promising 
or holding an obligation with knowledge of the inability to fulfil this promise. 
Secondly, deceit or fraud may occur by acting fraudulently, for example, falsified 
evidence or documents, as positive acts. Thirdly, deceit or fraud may occur by 
failure to disclose significant facts including misrepresentation and concealment.185  
It is well-known under Sharia provisions that deliberate concealment counts as 
deceit when it is known that the other party would not have concluded the contract 
if he had been informed of all relevant facts and surrounding circumstances.186 
Moreover, Fiqh provisions set four requirements to apply the fraud or deceit 
provisions. These requirements are, firstly, misrepresentation and using fraudulent 
methods to mislead the other party; secondly, the intent to defraud; thirdly, this 
fraud induced the other party to enter into the contract; finally, causing damage to 
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the other party because of the fraud and imbalance of the position of the contracting 
parties.187   
Mistake in the context of Sharia law refers to a misunderstanding of an issue or 
issues regarding the basis of a contract, express and implied terms that the 
contracting parties do not agree, based on the same level of understanding.188 
Indeed, where a mistake could occur because of misunderstanding of the nature of 
the contract, its essential terms or conditions, or its object, the contract simply will 
be invalid because of the significance of the mistake. However, where the mistake 
is in respect of a non-essential condition or term, the contract will be rescinded by 
a request of the contracting parties.189 
There are examples of the general application of the doctrine of good faith in 
practice. The Saudi courts have well-considered the doctrine of good faith for all 
contracts including commercial, civil, and administrative contracts based on Sharia 
provisions. For example, according to Aldiyabi, who reported two cases based on 
the doctrine of good faith in Saudi Arabia, the case number 566/3 of 1421H that 
was held by 29th sub-tribunal of the Board of Grievances was about a lease contract 
between a company and the government.190 The government party amended the 
contract with no previous discussion about these amendments with the other party 
because of its power. However, the court concluded its decision by saying that each 
party should consider any changes and share their views of these amendments with 
the other parties. Further, even if the government was a party to this contract, and 
did not enter into the contract by relying on its power; the government would be 
considered as a civilian party in a regular lease contract. Significantly, the court 
held that the interpretation and amendments of a contract must be considered based 
on the joint will of the contracting parties depending on the need to adhere to the 
requirements of the principle of good faith in any contract whether prior to the 
conclusion of the contract or during the performance of this contract. This is a clear 
application of the principle of good faith where a disclosure of essential information 
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in regard to the changes of the contract was relevant to the other contractual party 
was induced the other party to proceed in such contract.  
Another case, which was reported by Aldiyabi, was supported by the fact that Sharia 
principles apply the doctrine of good faith in a broad way. The case number was 
721/1 of 1408H that was held by 3rd sub-tribunal of the Board of Grievances.191 The 
dispute was based on a supply contract between a company and a governmental 
ministry. The company was to provide cables to the governmental ministry. A royal 
order was then issued to increase the custom fees from 5% to 7% which was not 
taken into account when the policy was entered into. Then, the company asked for 
collection of these fees from the ministry because of an unexpected issue arising, 
but the ministry refused, because the company should maintain the same price 
during the performance of the contract. The Primary Court did not accept the claim 
of the company to collect these fees. However, the Court of Appeal issued its 
decision number 61/T/2 of 1413H by saying that a reservation must be marked on 
this judgment because it was contrary to the approach of the Board of Grievances 
and Sharia. Furthermore, the Prophet's tradition should be considered which said 
that 'there should be neither harm nor ‘malice’’192. This means that this tradition 
sets a general Islamic rule for all dealing including commercial transactions to not 
harm the other party or in general sense to not harm any person even without any 
contractual relationship based on the principle of good faith. Additionally, the 
Prophet’s tradition particularly is always considered in the context of the principle 
of good faith and fair dealing in Sharia. Accordingly, the company’s claim was 
successful, based on this doctrine.  
The next chapter explores the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the 
UK and Saudi jurisdictions. Critical analysis is provided about the meaning of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith, the continuity of the doctrine of utmost good faith, 
and its legal remedies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MEANING OF THE DOCTRINE OF  
   UTMOST GOOD FAITH 
 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter considers the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK 
and Saudi jurisdictions. In order to achieve the aim of this study, understanding the 
status of the doctrine of utmost good faith in light of related issues such as the 
meaning, scope, and continuing impact of the doctrine of utmost good faith, and its 
consequent remedies for breach shall allow the development of recommendations 
for each jurisdiction.  
This is an important exercise also to clarify the implications and possibilities of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith especially after the reform in the UK based on IA. 
Significantly, two questions shall be answered in this chapter: Firstly, what are the 
meaning, limitations, and possibilities of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the 
UK and Saudi insurance laws and regulations, and secondly, what are the legal 
remedies for breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK and Saudi laws 
and regulations. Accordingly, this chapter shall consider three main areas that are 
firstly, the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith; secondly, continuing the 
doctrine of utmost good faith; and, thirdly, remedies upon breach of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith. 
3.2. Origin and Meaning of Utmost Good Faith 
Insurance contracts have relied on the doctrine of utmost good faith in both the UK 
and Saudi Arabia based on different premises. The early leading case Carter v 
Boehm193 established the doctrine of good faith in insurance contracts in the UK. 
This case was based on an insurance policy to cover any loss for taking Fort 
Marlborough on Sumatra by any foreign enemy. Within a year of the policy, the 
fort was taken by a French attack, and the insurer refused the claim made by the 
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insured, Mr. Carter, the Governor of Fort Marlborough. The insurer attempted to 
void the insurance policy due to essential information regarding the weakness of 
the fort and the possibility of an expected French attack not having been disclosed 
to the insurer. Lord Mansfield in his decision established the doctrine of good faith 
and clarified the principal elements of insurance contracts194, as follows195: 
Insurance is a contract based upon speculation. The special facts, upon which the 
contingent chance is to be computed, lie most commonly in the knowledge of the 
insured only; the underwriter trusts to his representation and proceeds upon the 
confidence that he does not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead 
the underwriter into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and to induce him to 
estimate the risk as if it did not exist. The keeping back of such a circumstance is a 
fraud, and therefore the policy is void. Although the suppression should happen 
through mistake, without any fraudulent intention; yet still the under-writer is 
deceived, and the policy is void; because the risque run is really different from the 
risque understood and intended to be run, at the time of the agreement… Good faith 
forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into a 
bargain from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary. 
Distinctions between the doctrine of good faith and the doctrine of ‘utmost’ good 
faith were not based on the judgment of Lord Mansfield but came later. Indeed, 
Lord Mansfield never mentioned ‘utmost good faith’ but simply ‘good faith’.196 
Furthermore, identifying insurance contracts as a contract of uberrimea fidei came 
after 32 years of Carter v Boehm197, specifically in Wolff v Horncastle198. Later, in 
1906, the doctrine of ‘utmost good faith’ was codified by s 17 of MIA, which states 
that ‘insurance is uberrimæ fidei: a contract of marine insurance is a contract based 
upon the utmost good faith’.  
There was uncertainty surrounding identifying either the doctrine of good faith, 
perfect good faith, or utmost good faith. However, significant distinctions were 
drawn in the English common law authorities. While the doctrine of good faith 
requires honest dealing with sincere intention; the doctrine of the 'utmost' good faith 
should not just mean the simple understanding of the doctrine of good faith.199 
While the doctrine of good faith, in ordinary contracts, means that all contracting 
parties must refrain from making a misrepresentation; the doctrine of utmost good 
faith means that contracting parties must refrain from making a misrepresentation 
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and also make full disclosure.200 It is also accepted that the doctrine of utmost good 
faith extends further than the obligation of honesty.201 Consequently, the doctrine 
of utmost good faith may be breached without dishonesty. However, dishonesty can 
contribute to a breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith.202  
For example, in CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd203, the High 
Court of Australia found that ‘the criteria of dishonesty, caprice and 
unreasonableness more accurately express the ambit of what constitutes a breach 
of s 13’204. Accordingly, the recognition of the meaning of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith is not only about abstaining from bad faith situations.205 This is because 
the doctrine of utmost good faith is not a negative obligation, it requires positive 
obligations. However, bad faith situations do contribute to the breach of the doctrine 
of utmost good faith.206 As a result, the interpretation of the doctrine of ‘utmost’ 
good faith is not only about abstaining from bad faith acts, but it includes also 
notions of reasonableness207, and ‘commercial standards of decency and 
fairness’208. 
To identify the degree of good faith in insurance contracts requires identifying the 
meaning of good faith and the significance of adding ‘utmost’ to good faith.209 
‘Utmost’ good faith means most extensive not the greatest good faith.210 This needs 
the insurers and insureds to act in good faith ‘as far and as best as they can’211. For 
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this purpose, Lord Hobhouse significantly recognised developments in the phrase 
‘utmost’ good faith in the Star Sea212, as follows213: 
It was probably the need to distinguish those transactions to which Lord Mansfield's 
principle still applied which led to the coining of the phrases "utmost" good faith and 
"uberrimae fidei", phrases not used by Lord Mansfield and which only seem to have 
become current in the 19th century. Storey used the expression "greatest good faith", 
Wharton's Law Lexicon 14th ed (1938) , p 1020 "the most abundant good faith"; a 
Scottish law dictionary (Trayner, Latin Maxims and Phrases, 2nd ed (1876) , p 590) 
used "the most full and copious" good faith; some English judges referred to "perfect" 
good faith (Willes J in Britton v Royal Insurance Co (1866) 4 F & F 905 ) and Lord 
Cockburn CJ to "full and perfect faith" ( Bates v Hewitt, LR 2 QB 595, 606 ). But 
"utmost" became the most commonly used epithet and its place was assured by its use 
in the 1906 Act. The connotation appears to be the most extensive, rather than the 
greatest, good faith. The Latin phrase was likewise a later introduction.  
Similarities between the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK 
insurance law and the Saudi approach in insurance contracts can be recognised. 
Committees for Insurance Disputes and Violations (CRIDV) made several 
decisions that considered the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith.214 Based 
on these decisions, the doctrine of utmost good faith means that each contractual 
party is obliged to disclose all material facts that are related to the insured risk and 
induced the other party to enter into the contract whether these material fact were 
asked by the other party or not.215 Additionally, the doctrine of utmost good faith 
requires each party to refrain from fraud and acting in bad faith.216 Furthermore, the 
doctrine of utmost good faith requires maintaining integrity, reasonableness, 
fairness, and balancing contracting parties’ powers.217 Noticeably, CRIDV have 
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followed the doctrine of utmost good faith unlike the Islamic sources which 
recognise the doctrine of good faith.218  
Since the scope of the doctrine of utmost good faith has a reciprocal application219, 
four possibilities are recognised which fall into two categories that are pre-
contractual duties and post-contractual duties. The four possibilities are insured’s 
pre-contractual duties, insurer’s pre-contractual duties, insured’s post-contractual 
duties, and insurers’ post-contractual duties. In the UK, these possibilities are based 
on the wording of s 17 of MIA as s 17 does not limit the doctrine of utmost good 
faith to a specific party; while in Saudi Arabia, these possibilities are based on the 
Islamic provisions. Further, CRIDV committees apply these possibilities in their 
decisions based on the Islamic approach.220  
The following section considers the continuation of the doctrine of utmost good 
faith. This section shall figure out the impact of utmost good faith during the 
performance of the contract for both parties as utmost good faith is not limited to 
the pre-contractual stage. 
3.3. Continuing of the Doctrine of Utmost Good Faith  
The doctrine of utmost good faith consists of pre-contractual and post-contractual 
stages. Norma Hird considered that 'section 17 is drafted in wide enough terms to 
admit the possibility of a post-contractual duty of utmost good faith'.221 However, 
                                                          
218 This issue is considered in the next chapter. 
219 See for example, Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd and Others (the star 
sea) [2003] 1 AC 469. 
220 For example for post-contractual duties for both parties, decision no 285/R/1435H (2014) of the 
Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; decision no 9/R/1429H  
(2008) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; decision no 
131/R/1433H (2012) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 346/a/1435H (2014) of the 
Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; decision no 81/R/1435H 
(2014) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 181/a/1435H (2014) of the Committees for 
Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; decision no 27/D/1437H (2016) of the 
Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Dammam; decision no 
70/D/1435H (2014) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in 
Dammam; decision no 223/J/1431H (2010) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes 
and Violations in Jeddah; decision no 76/J/1429H (2008) of the Committees for Resolution 
Insurance Disputes and Violations in Jeddah; and decision no 93/J/1429H (2008) of the Committees 
for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Jeddah. 
221 Norma Hird, ‘The Star Sea - The Continuing Saga of Utmost Good Faith’ [2001] JBL 311, 316.  
   60 
 
other views found it unlikely that s 17 of MIA refers to the post-contractual stage 
of the contract.222 This is based on four reasons. 
Firstly, Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, the drafter of MIA, did not mention post-
contractual obligations or even consider the two stages of the obligations of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith.223 Secondly, the avoidance of the contract upon 
breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith is a consequence of the breach of the 
doctrine during the formation of the contract of insurance rather than a consequence 
of the post-contractual breach.224 Thirdly, s 17 was under the disclosure and 
representations part of the Act which included four other provisions about 
disclosure at the pre-contractual stage and nothing about the post-contractual stage. 
Thus, s 17 dealt only with the obligations at the pre-contractual stage.225 Fourthly, 
the wording of s 17 should be limited to the pre-contractual stage because it says 
the contract of insurance is ‘based on’, and the basis of a thing should refer to the 
establishment of it. Accordingly, this refers to the formation of the contract and the 
pre-contractual stage.226 
Although this is an interesting interpretation of s 17 of MIA, especially, the 
interpretation of the wording ‘based on’, the interpretation by the common law 
jurisdictions went further than the wording of s 17.227 Likewise, for example, s 13 
of ICA refers similarly to the doctrine of utmost good faith as it is a basis of the 
contract, but it goes further than s 17 of MIA as under Australian law the doctrine 
of utmost good faith refers to any matter under or in relation to the contract of 
insurance. This may easily refer to the post-contractual stage.  
For another example, in New Zealand, there is no recognition of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith in the Insurance Law Reform Act of 1977; however, the High 
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Court of New Zealand considered the doctrine of utmost good faith as it was an 
agreed general common law principle. In Young v Tower Insurance Limited228, 
Gendall J did not only consider the doctrine of utmost good faith as an implied term 
in every contract of insurance229, which was similar to the ICA position rather the 
UK position; but also the continuity of the utmost good faith on behalf of the insurer 
was accepted. The scope of the doctrine of utmost good faith based on this judgment 
was extensive as it was not only about disclosure.230  
Although, s 17 of MIA does not state the same wording as ICA, it has nothing in it 
implying that it should be limited to the pre-contractual stage. As a result, it is an 
accepted interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith in both pre-contractual 
and post-contractual stages, because of two reasons that, first, it is settled by the 
common law authorities. Secondly, the wording of s 17 does not limit the utmost 
good faith to a specific stage of the contract, and the interpretation of ‘based on’ 
may refer to the time that the duty should start as it starts prior the conclusion of the 
contract, but it does not mean ‘only’ to this stage. Significantly, in Manifest 
Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd and others (The Star Sea)231, Lord 
Hobhouse affirmed that 'utmost good faith is a principle of fair dealing which does 
not come to an end when the contract has been made'232. 
The nature of the post-contractual duties of utmost good faith is not obvious and 
specified in the UK jurisdiction. The application of the post-contractual duty is 
different depending on different facts and circumstances.233 Nevertheless, it can be 
noticed now, based on ss 21-22 of IA, which are abolished ss 18 to 20 of MIA, that 
there is no recognition of post-contractual duties. The only duty to be recognised 
was the pre-contractual one.234 Thus, at the post-contractual stage, the post-
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contractual duties are determined based on the circumstances of each case.235 The 
post-contractual duties are governed by the contract itself where this duty can be an 
express or an implied term, and this should help to identify a link between formation 
of the contract and the doctrine of utmost good faith to impose post-contractual 
duties. Further, the post-contractual duties are considered a variation of the contract, 
especially, where increasing risks. Lord Hobhouse stated that ‘where the contract 
is being varied, facts must be disclosed which are material to the additional risk 
being accepted by the variation’236. 
In Saudi jurisdiction, the post-contractual duties of utmost good faith are recognised 
and these duties have wider applications. The interpretation of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith is not limited for the pre-contractual stage but also during the 
performance of the contract.237 Several decisions of CRIDV stated obviously that 
contracting parties acting in bad faith during the performance of the contract would 
breach the doctrine of utmost good faith.238 In decision no 38/J/1429H, the 
Committee held that complying with the contract terms was an obligation for both 
the insured and the insurer; thus, breach of any contract term which harmed the 
position of the other party was an act of bad faith which breached the obligation to 
comply with the doctrine of utmost good faith.239 Moreover, the Committee held 
that, in this case, the insured did not comply with his obligation to provide the 
insurer the required documents after he got his insurance cover to harm the position 
of the insurer, which was considered as acting in bad faith. As a result, similar to 
the UK jurisdiction, the determination of the post-contractual duties is on a case-
by-case basis as these duties are different depending on different facts and 
circumstances.  
The extent of post-contractual duties of utmost good faith in the claims process, 
litigation, and fraudulent claims was questioned prior to the recent reform in the 
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UK.240 In the Star Sea241, it was held that the doctrine of utmost good faith applied 
not only to the pre-contractual stage but also to the post-contractual stage of the 
insurance contract and the scope of the continuity of the doctrine of utmost good 
faith existed up to the presentation of claims and to the beginning of the legal 
proceedings. Furthermore, fraudulent claims should be interpreted in light of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith as the doctrine of utmost good faith is an interpretative 
principle.242 However, the duty not to make fraudulent claim is now an independent 
duty not reliant on the doctrine of utmost good faith in terms of s 12 of IA. In 
comparison, Saudi jurisdiction does not separate fraudulent claims from the 
doctrine of utmost good faith as fraudulent claims reflect acts of bad faith which 
breach the doctrine of utmost good faith.243 However, the similarity between Saudi 
and the UK jurisdiction before the Act of 2015 is to interpret fraudulent claims in 
light of the doctrine of utmost good faith.  
Other arguments discussed the extent of the doctrine of utmost good faith during 
the performance of the contract as it requires, for instance, disclosure and the 
exercise of powers and rights.244 This is based on the interpretation of the word 
‘utmost’ which referred to all aspects of the post-contractual stage.245 According to 
this view, the question raises whether relying on the doctrine of utmost good faith 
is required to determine specific obligations or does it allow consideration of all 
related issues of the contract of insurance? The answer is uncertain, as it needs an 
authoritative interpretation. Thus, the scope of the doctrine is up to the courts to 
determine.  
As a result of the recent position to consider the doctrine of utmost good faith as an 
interpretative principle which is also accepted in Saudi jurisdiction, the doctrine of 
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utmost good faith should not be limited to specific obligations but have a wider 
application for all aspects of the insurance contract. All in all, the doctrine of utmost 
good faith is not limited to a specific stage or a specific obligation on behalf of both 
insurers and insureds, as it reflects the reciprocal application. 
The next section considers remedies upon breach of the doctrine of utmost good 
faith in both the UK and Saudi jurisdictions. This section recognises the 
consequences of breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith and examines 
similarities and differences between both jurisdictions. 
3.4. Remedies upon Breach of the Doctrine of Utmost Good Faith  
In the UK, the only remedy that existed upon breach of the doctrine of utmost good 
faith was avoidance ab initio based on s 17 of MIA prior to IA. The wording of s 
17 before the modification did not give any flexibility to adopt other remedies as it 
stated that ‘a contract of marine insurance is based upon the utmost of good faith, 
and if this is not to be observed by either party, the contract shall be avoided by the 
other party’. Accordingly, no damages might be calculated upon breach of this 
doctrine based on three decisions of the House of Lords that were in Banque 
Financiere de la Cite S.A. (Formerly Banque Keyser Ullmann S.A.) v Westgate 
Insurance Co. Ltd. (Formerly Hodge General & Mercantile Co. Ltd.)246, Pan 
Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co247, and the Star Sea248.  
The remedy was criticised as ‘it would operate unfairly’ and described as 
‘draconian’ in Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc249, where the Court 
of Appeal suggested applying the doctrine of utmost good faith to limit the insurers’ 
right to avoid the policy in case of breach of this doctrine by the insured especially 
for consumer insurance. Rix LJ illustrated this issue by saying ‘not all insurance 
contracts nowadays are made by those who engage in commerce. The existence of 
widespread insurance contracts of a consumer nature presents new problems. It may 
be necessary to give wider effect to the doctrine of good faith’250.  
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Based on s 14 of the IA, s 17 of MIA is amended and the remedy, avoidance ab 
initio, is omitted from the wording. Section 17 is modified to read ‘marine insurance 
contracts are contracts of the utmost good faith’. This amendment could be seen to 
allow the possibility of other remedies upon the breach of the doctrine. However, 
the disadvantage of this amendment is that it left in the doctrine of utmost good 
faith as applying to insurance contracts but did not give any remedy for breach. 
Consequently, it is up to the common law authorities now to decide which proper 
remedy should match to a specific type of breach, whether the breach occurs prior 
to the conclusion of the contract, during the performance of the contract, at renewal, 
on variations, or until the commencement of legal proceedings.  
Remedies that may be offered upon the breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith 
can be damages, termination, estoppel, or others. This will be based on various 
factors. These factors are, for example, the type of breach, occurrence of loss, and 
the time of breach. According to s 14(1) of IA, avoidance cannot be part of the 
available remedies upon the breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith251, as it says 
that ‘any rule of law permitting a party to a contract of insurance to avoid the 
contract on the ground that the utmost good faith has not been observed by the other 
party is abolished’. Accordingly, based on this section, the remedy for breach of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith would differ from the past English common law 
approach. This is an advantage of IA as it stops criticisms of the harshness of 
avoidance especially for the insureds because avoidance was worthless against 
insurers.252 
The Law Commissions discussed several points with regard to the impact of 
avoidance as a remedy in the case of a failure of complying with the doctrine of 
utmost good faith. Firstly, the Law Commissions found that where the failure was 
by the insurers, the avoidance was not appropriate for the insureds.253 This was 
because the purpose of the claim against an insurer was to pay a specific claim not 
to avoid the whole policy.254 Further, the Law Commissions highlighted that the 
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insureds’ wished their claims to be paid in case of the breach of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith by the insurer.255 The Law Commissions preferred to give the 
courts the room to decide the proper remedy upon specific breach. Thus, the 
question arises whether by accepting that the doctrine of utmost good faith is an 
interpretative principle which may generate implied terms, breach of these implied 
terms would result in damages being sought because of breach of the contract. 
However, the Law Commissions discussed the need to consider damages as a 
remedy in case of the insurer’s bad faith256; but they found that s 17 of MIA did not 
give the right to damages against insurers.257 Although the wording of s 17 does not 
give the right to damages, s 17 says nothing against an award of damages. 
Accordingly, as the late payment provisions based on s 28 of Enterprise Act 2016 
give the right to damages in case of a failure to pay claims in a reasonable time, 
breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith may follow the same reasoning to allow 
damages in case of breach, as both situations are about supporting the insured’s 
position against improper behaviour of the insurer, and in some cases for the insurer 
against the insured such as in case of the insured’s post-contractual breach.  
Secondly, where the failure to follow the doctrine of utmost good faith was by the 
insured, avoidance was not appropriate in all cases as a result of the breach.258 This 
discussion was consistent with the majority of criticisms, which were about the 
harshness of avoidance259. The Law Commissions considered the discussion for 
recognition of an independent duty of fair presentation of risks by the insureds and 
its proportionate remedies in case of the breach, which are imposed by IA. This 
recognised that there was no more need for avoidance as a remedy in case of breach 
of the doctrine of utmost good faith.260 
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Thirdly, the Law Commissions found that the remedy upon breach of the doctrine 
of utmost good faith, avoidance, was not consistent with the proportionate remedies 
that were proposed in the case of breach of the duty of fair presentation of risks and 
the remedies available in cases of fraudulent claims.261 This was an interesting point 
because of two reasons. On the one hand, the Law Commissions considered the 
impacts of the remedies for breach of both the duties of fair presentation of risks 
and to not claim fraudulently, and the impact of this in light of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith, on the other hand. This was in order to stress the doctrine of utmost good 
faith as a general and interpretative principle for both duties.262 Consequently, the 
Law Commissions’ approach in respect to remedies was to have a consistent model 
between the duties and the doctrine of utmost good faith. As a result of the Law 
Commissions’ view, avoidance would not be appropriate where there were other 
proposed remedies for breach of other duties.  
Fourthly, the Law Commissions argued the possible effect of s 17 of MIA on the 
insureds’ post-contractual duties that might give insurers the right to avoid the 
insurance contract.263 In this context, the Law Commissions opened the door to the 
courts for further discussion and interpretation for further development. The 
majority of consultees in this context agreed to retain the doctrine of utmost good 
faith as a general principle.264 Although, this might impact negatively on the 
certainty of the interpretation of s 17 of MIA;265 it would give the doctrine of utmost 
good faith a flexibility to be expanded where needed depending on the discretion 
of the courts based on specific circumstances. The expanding of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith as an interpretative principle to impose implied terms is 
consistent with the view of Merkin that ‘anything happening post-contract should 
be the subject of express terms or, if none, implied terms’266.  
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Accordingly, the remedy as a result of a failure of the doctrine of utmost good faith 
at the post-contractual stage shall not be to avoid the contract267, but breach of the 
contract, which may result in a damages claim. However, the Law Commissions 
did not find damages appropriate in the case of breach of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith.268 Indeed, this consequence was not well-reasoned by the Law 
Commissions especially after the abolishment of avoidance as a sole remedy.  
For example, the breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith should be considered 
in case of a failure to notify the insurer about increasing the risk.269 The Law 
Commissions found that according to Commercial Union Assurance Co Ltd v Niger 
Co Ltd270, a failure to notify the insurer did not breach the doctrine of utmost good 
faith.271 Additionally, the Law Commissions did not examine any other remedy in 
case of such breach, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, the Law Commissions 
did not consider any element of the doctrine of utmost good faith as an interpretative 
principle to imply terms in the contract. The interpretation of such an element would 
give a right in damages for breach of an implied term of the contract that is to 
comply with the notification clause in good faith. 
By comparison, in Saudi jurisdiction, breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith 
has no specific remedies based on either the laws or regulations. On the contrary, 
under the Islamic system, general contract law rules are applied in the case of breach 
of the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance contracts. These provisions include 
the right to avoid the contract where the breach is in respect of an essential defect 
which arises prior to the conclusion of the contract; whereas if it occurs after the 
conclusion of the contract, the right of termination may be recognised upon the 
request of the other party.272 For example, CRIDV in Riyadh made a decision to 
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void the insurance policy based on the insurer’s non-disclosure at the pre-
contractual stage.273 Additionally, losing the right to claim also is recognised by 
CRIDV in case of fraudulent claims.274 Furthermore, damages can be awarded if 
harm and a loss are incurred. This is based on Sharia law as the Prophet’s tradition 
said ‘no harm no foul’275. In other words, it means that it is not permitted to harm 
others and if there is harm, there should be compensation based on Fiqh rule ‘harm 
must be removed’276. Damages can be awarded in respect of leagl expenses277, 
accommodation expenses278, travel expenses279, late payment280 and any other 
losses. 
CRIDV applies reconciliation to settle disputes between insurers and insureds based 
on Sharia provisions.281 Based on the Holy Quran verse that ‘reconciliation is 
best’282; and the Prophet’s tradition ‘reconciliation is permitted between Muslims 
except a reconciliation that permits a forbidden or forbids a permitted’283. This 
method of settling disputes is an advantage of the Saudi jurisdiction as it gives 
parties the chance to resolve disputes, add a further term or claim, and negotiate 
solutions amicably. For example, in decision no 248/R/1434H, the insured made a 
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claim under a comprehensive motor insurance policy.284 Further, although the 
insured had a right to claim for 135,000 SR for his vehicle, as it was considered as 
a total loss, the insurer wished to pay 150,000 SR for the cover and to keep the car. 
The insured accepted the insurer’s request to retain the vehicle, and the dispute was 
resolved by a reconciliation.  
However, the CRIDV attitude when resolving disputes by a reconciliation can be 
criticised from two sides. Firstly, CRIDV had a negative role during the settlement 
in several decisions, as CRIDV did not play any role during the settlement such as 
by informing the insured about his right to proceed the claim. Secondly, CRIDV 
did not consider the imbalance of power between the contracting parties and their 
different knowledge and experience in negotiating especially in the case of 
consumer insurance. For example, several decisions settled disputes in favour of 
the insurers; even though the breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith was 
obviously by insurers.285 Breaches were clearly made by insurers, as they negotiated 
to reduce the insured’s cover without any requirement or right to do so.286 As a 
result, this reduction of the insured’s cover is a consequence of the insured’s lack 
of knowledge and experience especially for consumer insurance such as motor 
insurance policies. It appears clearly from these decisions that CRIDV played no 
positive role to advice insureds about their rights during the negotiation between 
parties to achieve a reconciliation.   
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the position of the doctrine of utmost good faith in both the 
UK and Saudi jurisdictions in order to provide a general view of the impact of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith and to provide recommendations that serve the aim 
of this study. This chapter contributes towards answering one of the major questions 
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of this study with regard to what the meaning, limitations, and possibilities of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith are in the UK and Saudi insurance laws and 
regulations. This chapter considered three main sections, the meaning of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith, continuing the doctrine of utmost good faith, and, 
remedies upon breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith. 
The basis of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK was the early case Carter 
v Boehm287 and following s 17 of MIA it has become a statutory rule, whereas the 
basis of the doctrine of utmost good faith is Sharia law in Saudi Arabia. Although 
the doctrine of utmost good faith is based on a different premise in these two 
jurisdictions; it has a similar meaning, and implications. As is shown above, it is 
difficult to specify exactly the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the 
UK and to consider the impact of the meaning of ‘utmost’, reflecting the uncertainty 
in recognising the meaning of it, especially after the enforcement of IA.  
By comparison, in the Saudi jurisdiction and CRIDV decisions, the doctrine of 
utmost good faith has a similar meaning to the wording of the abolished ss 18- 20 
of MIA and English precedent, as this meaning particularly reflects Sharia 
understanding of the doctrine of utmost good faith. Further, the Saudi perspective 
adopts a similar understanding to Lord Mansfield in regard to refraining from fraud, 
which is a bad faith act in breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith. Both 
jurisdictions consider the doctrine of utmost good faith to support fairness, 
reasonableness, and to balance the contracting parties’ powers. 
Criticising the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith is not limited to the 
discussion in this chapter, it should be followed by other discussion to recognise 
the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith as an interpretative principle, and 
to distinguish between the doctrine of utmost good faith and the doctrine of good 
faith discussed in the next chapter. These all together would give valuable 
recognition to the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK, and it would give 
valuable understanding in the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith in Saudi 
Arabia as it is similar to the UK approach. Finally, it should reduce uncertainty of 
the meaning of the doctrine of utmost good faith especially after the recognition of 
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the duty of fair presentation of risks for business insurance by IA and the duty of 
reasonable care to not make misrepresentation for consumer insurance by CIDRA. 
The scope of the doctrine of utmost good faith is not limited to the pre-contractual 
stage, but also extends to the post-contractual stage in both jurisdictions. However, 
the application of the doctrine of utmost good faith at the post-contractual stage was 
questioned and criticised initially by the courts but was later approved based on 
examining different circumstances depending on case-by-case facts in the UK. In 
comparison, this impact is similar to Saudi jurisdiction where the doctrine of utmost 
good faith has a different application at the post-contractual stage as it imposes 
different duties on both parties which shall be considered in the next chapters.  
The UK insurance law does not provide a specific remedy for breach of the doctrine 
of utmost good faith after the abolishment of avoidance in terms of the amendment 
to the law by s 14 of IA. The Law Commissions preferred not to limit the doctrine 
of utmost good faith to specific types of remedies, and they tended to accept the 
doctrine of utmost good faith as a general and interpretative principle. Accepting 
the doctrine of utmost good faith as an interpretative principle may then allow 
implied terms in the contract of insurance which would give a right in damages in 
case of breach of an implied term. Furthermore, understanding the doctrine of 
utmost good faith, as an interpretative principle, gives the common law a flexibility 
to consider more broadly the doctrine of utmost good faith based on different 
circumstances and to specify the proper remedy for a specific breach, which should 
be discussed in-depth in the next chapters.  
Unlike the Saudi jurisdiction, the breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith may 
lead to avoidance, termination, damages, or losing the right to claim based on the 
timing of the breach, the reason for the loss, and the type of breach. Conversely to 
the UK jurisdiction, damages are widely accepted by CRIDV in Saudi jurisdiction 
based on Sharia law. Interestingly, CRIDV apply reconciliation as a method to 
settle disputes. Although there can be criticism of this method, in that this method 
would introduce an unusual route to resolve insurance disputes based on the 
satisfaction of the contracting parties. CRIDV needs to give more positive direction 
rather than relying on the parties’ discretion especially where this discretion is of 
the party who has knowledge and experience. This need will be more significant in 
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consumer insurance to protect consumers from losing their rights through an 
imbalance in negotiation positions. 
The next chapter considers main criticisms to the doctrine of utmost good faith in 
both jurisdictions. The next chapter shall evaluate the possible and main criticisms 
of decision of Carter v Boehm288 in respect of the doctrine of good faith in the UK, 
the impact of the doctrine of good faith on Takaful insurance contracts, the new 
position of the doctrine of utmost good faith as an interpretative principle in the UK 
with a comparison to Saudi jurisdiction, and shall analyse whether there is a need 
to move from the doctrine of utmost good faith to the doctrine of good faith in both 
jurisdiction. 
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Chapter 4 
CRITISMS OF THE DOCTRINE OF UTMOST            
GOOD FAITH  
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter considers criticisms of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK and 
Saudi jurisdictions. The importance of looking at those criticisms is to identify 
major issues that arise in respect to the doctrine of utmost good faith in order to 
assist in developing recommendations to achieve the aim of this study.  
Two questions to be addressed in this chapter are: 1- What are the main criticisms 
of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK and Saudi jurisdictions? 2- How do 
the UK and Saudi jurisdictions distinguish between the doctrine of utmost good 
faith and the doctrine of good faith?  
This chapter will consider four major points that are firstly, the misapplication of 
Lord Mansfield’s judgment in UK insurance law; secondly, an evaluation of 
Takaful insurance based on the doctrine of good faith in Saudi Arabia: Should 
Takaful insurance be a commercial or a donation contract?; thirdly, utmost good 
faith versus good faith: which should be applied?; and fourthly, the adoption of 
utmost good faith as an interpretative principle. It is worth mentioning that 
according to the different premises that the doctrine of utmost good faith based on 
in the UK and Saudi jurisdictions, the first two sections include principal criticisms 
in each jurisdiction which have not mirror in the other jurisdiction. 
4.2. The Misapplication of Lord Mansfield’s Judgment in UK Insurance Law 
The original judgment by Lord Mansfield did not receive full acceptance by the 
courts, but it was subject to significant changes. Several observations can be made 
of the Lord Mansfield’s judgment.  
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First, his Lordship introduced the broad principle of ‘good faith’ not ‘utmost’ good 
faith by proposing this principle of good faith in all commercial contracts.289 This 
view is similar to civil law jurisdictions290, and the Islamic law. Nevertheless, 
generally, this was not the case in the English law except for some contracts 
including insurance contracts.291  
Second, his Lordship interpreted the principle of good faith as a pre-negotiation 
duty for both the insurer and the insured which includes the duty of disclosure and 
to not make a misrepresentation or concealment. As a result, not only the insured 
was required to disclose facts and to not conceal information but also the insurer, 
as his Lordship stated that ‘the policy would equally be void, against the under-
writer, if he concealed; as, if he insured a ship on her voyage, which he privately 
knew to be arrived: and an action would lie to recover the premium’292. 
Accordingly, his Lordship did not introduce the duty for the post-contractual stage.  
Third, based on the Lord Mansfield’s judgment, there was a positive insurer’s role 
by, for example, asking questions, disclosing information as the insurers held the 
duty of disclosure. His Lordship stated that ‘the under-writer at London, in May 
1760, could judge much better of the probability of the contingency’293. Further, he 
stated that 'good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately 
knows'294. 
Fourth, Lord Mansfield looked at the considered insurer’s knowledge and what the 
insurer should know which added to the insurer’s duty to investigate and assess the 
information and what the insured might not disclose.295  
                                                          
289 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1910. This is as he stated that ‘the governing principle is 
applicable to all contracts and dealings’. See also Greg Pynt, Australian Insurance Law: A First 
Reference (3rd edn, LexisNexis Butterworth 2015) 129. John Lowry, ‘Whither the Duty of Good 
Faith in UK Insurance Contracts’ (2009) 16(1) CILJ 97, 107. 
290 John Lowry, ‘Redrawing the Parameters of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts’ (2007) 60(1) CLP 
338, 338.  
291 See for example, Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd and others (the Star 
Sea) [2003] 1 AC 469, [42], as Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough stated that as follows: 
As Lord Mustill points out, Lord Mansfield was at the time attempting to introduce 
into English commercial law a general principle of good faith, an attempt which was 
ultimately unsuccessful and only survived for limited classes of transactions, one of 
which was insurance. 
292 (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1909. 
293 (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1914. 
294 (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1910. See also Susan Hodges, Cases and Materials on Marine Insurance 
Law (Routledge Cavendish 1999) 242. 
295 (1766) 3 Burr 1905,1914 - 1915, Lord Mansfield clarified that as follows: 
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Fifth, this judgement linked the breach of good faith and fraudulent intention.  
Sixth, the basis of the principle of good faith is to avoid fraud, as his Lordship stated 
that ‘the reason for the rule against concealment is to prevent fraud and encourage 
good faith’.296  
Seventh, the effect of the breach of good faith based on this judgement was that the 
contract was ‘void’ not ‘voidable’. Moreover, void means void ab initio, which has 
a retrospective effect to return both contracting parties to the position before the 
contract was concluded. Later, this was codified in s 17 of MIA. However, this is 
changed again based on the coming into force of CIDRA and IA.  
The MIA and the developments of the law through the majority of the common law 
decisions in the UK interpreting the Lord Mansfield’s judgment did not recognise 
those seven observations. The courts tended to interpret the doctrine of utmost good 
faith regarding the insureds’ duty of disclosure and misrepresentation with a 
negative insurer’s role, as, for example, the insurer held no duties to ask questions. 
Further, the insurer’s duty to investigate based on the doctrine of utmost good faith 
was questioned. Then, the courts took significant time to discuss and accept the 
post-contractual duty of utmost good faith and to identify its scope and situations 
where it might apply.  
A significant critique was given by Hasson, due to the judiciary’s interpretation of 
the decision in Carter v Boehm297.298 He argued against the negative nature of the 
insurer’s role; how the principle did not meet with the concept of fairness; how the 
English courts misapplied and misunderstood this principle; how the judges had 
contributed in making the relationship between the insured and insurer ‘lopsided’. 
                                                          
The underwriter at London in May 1760 could judge much better of the probability of 
the contingency than Governor Carter could at Fort Marlborough in September 1769. 
He knew the success of the operations of the war in Europe. He knew what naval force 
the English and French had sent to the East Indies. He knew, from a comparison of 
that force, whether the sea was open to any such attempt by the French. He knew, or 
might know everything which was known at Fort Marlborough in September 1759, of 
the general state of affairs in the East Indies, or the particular condition of Fort 
Marlborough, by the ship which brought the orders for the insurance…Under these 
circumstances, and with this knowledge, he insures against the general contingency of 
the place being attacked by ail European power. 
296 (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1919. See also, Peter MacDonald Eggers & Patrick Foss, Good Faith and 
Insurance Contracts (LLP Reference Publishing, 1998) 45. 
297 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
298 Hasson R, ‘The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law: A Critical Evaluation’ (1969) 32 
MLR 615. 
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Moreover, he attempted to narrow the principle and reach a balance between the 
contracting parties.299 He also commented that MIA did not distinguish between 
bad faith due to deliberate concealment and misrepresentation and innocent non-
disclosure, which was recognised by Lord Mansfield.300 It was clear that both the 
English common law authorities and MIA did not reflect the view of the Lord 
Mansfield.301 
The next section considers an evaluation of Takaful insurance depending on the 
doctrine of good faith in Saudi Arabia. This section shall address the point that 
insurance contracts should follow either commercial or donation provisions in 
Saudi Arabia.  
4.3. Takaful Insurance: Should Be a Commercial or a Donation Contract? 
To understand the importance of weather Takaful insurance contracts are based on 
donation or commercial provisions, it needs to consider the following premises as 
discussed below. 
Donation provisions challenge the nature of insurance contracts, while the 
commercial aspects of insurance contracts create proper legal rights and 
obligations, especially in regard to the doctrine of good faith. For the purpose of 
this study, it is important to determine duties and legal remedies upon the breach of 
the doctrine of good faith. This section, specifically, discusses the Fatwa that 
established Takaful insurance was based on donation provisions in light of the 
doctrine of good faith. Furthermore, based on Saudi insurance law and regulations, 
commercial aspects and conditions are more clearly adopted rather than donation 
elements and provisions. The following ten points are discussed in order to support 
the commercial nature of insurance contracts, and challenge the donation nature.  
Firstly, it is well-known as a general provision of the Islamic donation contracts 
that the grantor is not a warrantor.302 In other words, warranty provisions do not 
                                                          
299 Ibid 615 - 616. 
300 John Lowry, ‘Redrawing the Parameters of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts’ [2007] 60(1) CLP 
338. 
301 John Lowry, Philip Rawlings, & Robert Merkin, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles (3rd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2011) 86. 
302Abdulrhman Aljazeiri, Alfeqh Aleslami Fe Almadaheb Alarba'a (Dar Alkotob Alelmeia 2003) 
part3, 125. 
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exist under donation contracts unlike commercial contracts.303 This follows the Fiqh 
rule that ‘a recipient is either a gainer or a secured304’, which means that the 
recipient may receive a benefit from the donation or get nothing if there is no loss. 
Moreover, both parties, the recipient and the grantor, would not pay damages and 
are secure from loss.  
An exception to this is a contract that includes a donation in exchange for a sum of 
money.305 In addition, related to this scenario, the provisions which should be 
applied are provisions of sale of goods contracts. Furthermore, the Fiqh rule, which 
should be applied, is that ‘the contractual party is either a gainer or loser’306 in the 
context of commercial contracts. Significantly, from a theoretical aspect, this rule 
would be applicable in Takaful insurance contracts, because it is based on mutual 
donation; and, at the end, Takaful applies commercial provisions even if Takaful 
starts with donation.307 However, applying sale of goods provisions means that 
Takaful insurance would then turn into conventional insurance, because the reasons 
to prohibit conventional insurance will exist, at the end, when applying commercial 
provisions. As a result, it seems clear that there is no reason to adopt donation 
provisions, because, on the contrary, the general principles of insurance contracts 
are the opposite of donation such as the principle of indemnity. 
Secondly, according to decision number 200 (21/6) of IFA in regard to Takaful 
insurance provisions, it is acceptable to say that Takaful insurance contracts are 
similar to conventional insurance in some principles including the doctrine of good 
faith, indemnity, subrogation, contribution, proximate cause, and insurable 
interests.308 These similarities reflect that IFA accepted the provisions of 
commercial contracts because some of the above principles are not relevant to 
donation contracts. Furthermore, donation contracts usually do not require the 
contracting parties to have any interest to enter into the contract unlike the case of 
insurance contracts including, Takaful insurance. Moreover, although the doctrine 
                                                          
303 Ali Afandi, Dorar Alhokam fi Sharh Majallat Alahkam (Dar Aljail 1991) part 6, 168. 
304 Mohammed Ibn Othaimeen, Alsharh Almomtea’ Ala Zad Almostaqne’a (Dar Ibn Aljauzi 2002) 
part 11, 68. 
305 Ali Afandi, Dorar Alhokam fi Sharh Majallat Alahkam (Dar Aljail 1991) part 6, 185. 
306 Ibid 76. See also, Khaled Bin Ali Almeshiqeh, ‘Altawaruq Almasrefi an Tariq Baie’ Alma’aden’ 
(2004) 73 Islamic Research Journal 235, 312. 
307 Abdulazim Abuzaid ‘Albenaa' Alsharaie Alaslam Lealtameen Aleslami’ (8th International 
Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, Qatar, 2011) 7, 10. 
308 Islamic Fiqh Academy, decision no 200 (21/6), Session 21 (November 2013) 10 - 11. 
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of good faith exists in all Islamic contracts upon request or without309, it is not 
expected that parties are to disclose information in donation contracts. However, it 
is clear that IFA accepted the technical principles of insurance. Indeed, both the 
Academy and PCSRI did not consider these issues through their decisions, even 
though those principles could challenge donation provisions.  
Thirdly, insurance contracts in Saudi Arabia, in practice, appear to be commercial 
contracts not donation contracts. Indeed, it is clear that there is a similarity between 
conventional insurance and Takaful insurance not at operating levels but at the 
contract levels, including duties and principles. Although the practice of insurance 
in Saudi Arabia is under Takaful insurance, the applicable provisions are similar to 
conventional insurance. This result is consistent with the Fatwa of the PCSRI. This 
Fatwa concluded by saying that even though one of the licensed insurance 
companies in Saudi Arabia was applying Takaful concepts based on donation 
provisions and with the cooperation between Muslims, the reality of the company’s 
work and other companies was applying conventional insurance rules instead.310 
Further, it states that 'the changes in name do not change the fact'311 in the context 
of applying conventional insurance, in reality.   
Fourthly, Saudi laws and other related insurance regulations neither mention nor 
consider donation provisions. Conversely, all of these regulations adopted 
provisions of commercial contracts. For example, article 10 of ICPP, article 37 of 
IMCCR, and article 29 of OIAR divide insurance provisions into two categories, 
before-sale provisions and after-sale provisions. Accordingly, these regulations are 
related to the sale of products, which means applying commercial provisions not 
donation provisions. This is unlike the Fatwa of the Senior Islamic Scholars, which 
accepted the type of insurance that based on only donation. As a result, it appears 
that Saudi regulations follow the Islamic perspective which permitted conventional 
insurance under commercial provisions, although they still called insurance 
products cooperative insurance or Takaful insurance. This leads to the conclusion 
that it is necessary to change Takaful insurance to simply conventional insurance. 
                                                          
309 Decision no 70/R/1433H (2012) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 269/a/1436H 
(2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh. 
310 Fatwas of the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Albio’a 3’, Group 1, 
Volume 15, 275, Fatwa No.18047. 
311 Ibid. 
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Neither Saudi laws nor regulations consider donation provisions. Conversely, all of 
these regulations adopt the provisions of commercial contracts. For example, OIAR 
and IMCCR, refer to insurance services by using commercial terms, such as 
‘products’.312 For instance, article 13 of OIAR states that the ‘company should 
submit a request to SAMA for obtaining an approval on its insurance products that 
will be sold on its website’, and article 28 of the same regulation states that ‘a 
company, wishing to sell its insurance products through a third party website 
licensed to do so, must obtain SAMA’s prior written approval’. This supports the 
view that Saudi regulations adopt commercial concepts as with conventional 
insurance instead of Takaful insurance.  
Fifthly, regulations prior to ICPP consider the insured as customers; but after the 
ICPP, these principles consider these customers as consumers and provided them 
with proper protection. Many Arab legal scholars did not consider the insurance 
contract as a type of consumer contract. However, Abu Orabi described insurance 
contracts as clearly under the provisions of consumer contracts313, and he called to 
provide proper consumer protection.314 His perspective did not vary between 
consumers, and his view is consistent with the recent reform of Saudi Arabia based 
on ICPP unlike the English approach, which differentiates between consumer and 
business insurance by s 1 of CIDRA. 
Consumer protection applies to either commercial or donation contracts.315 In 
addition, while a consumer is ‘any natural or corporate person acquiring a 
commodity or service for a charge or free in order to fulfil a personal need or the 
needs of others316’; the grantor is who ‘grants gratis his money or property to others 
in his lifetime, but if the grantor requests money in exchange, the donation will take 
the provision of sale of goods contracts317’. However, there is an argument that 
                                                          
312 See for example, section D of OIAR: Sale of Insurance Products and Services and section E: 
Post-sale Customer Services, and article 29 - 46 of part 2 of IMCCR. Special Provisions: First: Pre-
Sale Provisions, Second: Sale Rules, Third: Post-Sale Provisions.  
313 Ghazy Abu Orabi, Ahkam Aqd Altameen: Dirasa Moqarana (Dar Wael 2011) 254 - 256. 
314 Ibid 256. 
315 Article 1 of Consumer Protection Regulation, issued by the Council of Ministers' decree No (120) 
dated 15/12/2014. 
316 Article 1 of Statute of Consumer Protection Association Regulation, issued by the Council of 
Ministers' decree No (3) dated 20/01/2008.   
317 Mohammed Ibn Othaimeen, Alsharh Almomtea’ Ala Zad Almostaqne’a (Dar Ibn Aljauzi 2002) 
part 11, 65 - 67. 
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donation contracts cannot include the concept of consumption.318 Consequently, 
grantors cannot be consumers. This leads to the conclusion that, according to this 
perspective, Takaful insurance cannot be covered by consumer protection because 
of its donation nature. 
Sixthly, the nature of the relationship between contracting parties is not charitable. 
According to PCSRI, the insurance contract is a commercial contract from the side 
of the insurance company; and it is a civil contract, when the insured is a civilian.319 
Further, if the insured is a company, it is a commercial contract from two sides of 
both parties.320 Indeed, the insurance contract is a commercial contract, and its 
purpose is to make a profit, according to PCPIS.321 Additionally, the collaboration 
between insureds by sharing risks may exist as one of the characteristic of Takaful 
insurance contracts; however, this is not the major purpose of the contract.322 
Accordingly, this supports the view that existing insurance contracts in Saudi 
Arabia are under conventional insurance provisions, in reality.  
Seventhly, insurance contracts, theoretically, are not only based on donation 
provisions, but also it is prohibited to apply any provisions of conventional 
insurance. From a practical side, Saudi insurance law and regulations impose 
commercial insurance provisions on both parties, insurance companies and 
consumers, and they recently provided an umbrella of consumer protection to 
insurance contracts. The major reason of issuance by ICPP is the insured’s urgent 
need to be protected by the law due to the imbalance of power between the 
contracting parties. Conversely, the insured’s wish, in reality, is that it is going to 
buy an insurance product to feel secured by an insurance cover in case of occurrence 
of risks, and, obviously, the insured does not donate323, and needs to have consumer 
protection.  
                                                          
318 Abdullah Abdulkareem & Faten Hussain, ‘Consumer Protection in Arabic Jurisdictions: Between 
the Reality and Practice’ (Consumer Protection for Arabic Consumer between the Reality and 
Application Procedures, Lebanon, 2014) 8. 
319 The Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Altameen’ (1987) 20 The Journal 
of the Islamic Research 17, 39. 
320 Ibid. 
321 The Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Altameen’ (2001) 4 Research of 
Council of Senior Islamic Scholars 33, 76. 
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323 Ibid 70. 
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In addition, it is accepted that there is a dispute between the practice and the theory 
of Takaful insurance. Consequently, there is a particular need to amend the Islamic 
insurance theory to comply with the practice side. Thus, the existence of Takaful 
insurance is challenged based on these observations.  
Eighthly, legal definitions of insurance adopt commercial terms. For example, 
article 1(7) of IRLSCIC defines insurance as ‘transfer of the burden of risk from 
the insured parties to the insurer and payment of compensation by the insurer to 
persons that incur loss or damages’. Furthermore, insurance policy is defined by 
article 1(17) of IRLSCIC as ‘a contract whereby the insurer agrees to compensate 
the insured party in the event of loss or damage covered by the policy, in exchange 
for the premium paid by the insured party’, and the premium is defined by article 
1(18) as ‘the amount paid by the insured party to the insurer in exchange for the 
insurer’s agreement to compensate the insured party for any loss or damage 
resulting directly from an insured risk’.324 Additionally, Article 2(13) of 
Cooperative Health Insurance Policy 2014 defines the indemnity as ‘amounts to be 
paid by the company to a third party within the maximum civil liability specified in 
this policy’. It is significant to highlight that none of these definitions recognise the 
donation elements of Takaful insurance. However, these definitions recognise the 
commercial aspects especially when they use and refer to the term 'compensation' 
or ‘indemnity’ rather than mutual donation, as considered in Takaful insurance. 
 Accordingly, no donation provision or element is included in Saudi insurance laws, 
rules, and regulations. On the contrary, the terminology of these legal instruments 
supports the conclusion of chapter three that insurance contracts in Saudi Arabia 
are commercial in structure rather than based on the Takaful system of donation.  
Ninthly, the Saudi insurance market cannot cover some large risks due to the 
market’s capacity, and the Saudi market deals with some brokers from Lloyds in 
London and other foreign companies. In addition, article 14 of the IRLSCIC states 
that ‘companies and professional entities must obtain the prior written approval of 
                                                          
324 See also article 1(32) IRCHIL, which defines the premium as ‘amount paid by the policyholder 
to the insurance company for the insurance coverage provided by the policy during the insurance 
term’. See also, Article 2(14) of Cooperative Health Insurance Policy 2014, which defines the 
premium as ‘amount paid by the insured to the company for its agreement to indemnify the third 
party for damage or loss whose direct cause is a risk covered under this policy’. All of these 
definitions of the term ‘premium’ have the same meaning of conventional insurance with no 
consideration of the donation element.  
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SAMA before doing business with insurance brokers from Lloyds or foreign 
companies to cover risks that cannot be covered in Saudi Arabia’. Significantly, 
this article is an explicit recognition of not only the shortage of the Saudi market 
and the international Takaful market, but also the possibility of dealing with foreign 
companies requires that Saudi insurance market must comply with the principles of 
the global conventional insurance market without worrying about the distinctions 
of insurance theory between conventional and Takaful insurance.  
Tenthly, insurance and reinsurance intermediaries are obliged to provide 
reinsurance offers to, first, domestic reinsurance companies and, then, to foreign 
companies by article 26(2) of IRLSCIC. Again, this acknowledges the need to work 
with foreign reinsurance companies. This is obviously because of the small capacity 
of the Saudi insurance market which is not able to accommodate some large risks 
especially in reinsurance. This is one of the major critique of Takaful insurance, 
which is the need to be reinsured, commonly, by foreign companies that apply 
conventional commercial insurance. This critique, however, has not received any 
reasonable response by IFA.  
The approach adopted by Saudi regulations is unlike the Fatwa of the Senior Islamic 
Scholars, which accepted the type of insurance that is based only on donation. As a 
result, it appears obvious that Saudi regulations follow the Islamic perspective 
which permitted conventional insurance under commercial principles, although 
they still named insurance products cooperative insurance or Takaful insurance. 
Indeed, this leads to conclude that it is necessary to transform Takaful insurance to 
conventional insurance. 
The next section is going to discuss whether to adopt the doctrine of good faith or 
utmost good faith in insurance contracts analysing both English and Saudi 
jurisdictions. This should be achieved by evaluating and analysing the significant 
criticisms of the doctrine of utmost good faith and good faith in both jurisdictions.  
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4.4. Utmost Good Faith versus Good Faith: Which Should be applied in 
Insurance Contracts? 
4.4.1. In the UK 
The Law Commissions asked consultees to consider which should be applied either 
the doctrine of good faith or utmost good faith, but there was no consensus among 
consultees. While the majority (56%) favoured 'good faith', (44%) of the consultees 
found 'utmost good faith’ more appropriate.325 Significantly, the consultees did not 
agree about the difference between these two principles.326 International 
Underwriting Association (IUA), Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance plc (RSA), AXA 
Corporate Solutions Assurance (AXA), and Marsh Limited found the two principles 
interchangeable; while Association of British Insurers (ABI), Howard Bannett and 
NFU Mutual found that adding 'utmost' stressed the significance of the doctrine.327 
Additionally, Bannett considered that the importance of 'utmost' was that it 
differentiated insurance law and general commercial law.328  
This was a significant argument because of two issues. First, according to this 
argument, the real distinction between ‘utmost good faith’ and ‘good faith’ is not 
clear among some members of the insurance industry. Further, the justification for 
relying on 'utmost' is only to emphasise the significance of the doctrine, but this is 
already achieved because it is based on statute. However, no further justification 
was provided about the impact of relying on ‘utmost’, and how the impact could 
vary between ‘good faith’ and ‘utmost good faith’.  
Second, it is not obvious why Bannett considered the need to distinguish between 
insurance law and commercial law, where general commercial law does not accept 
the doctrine of good faith for contracts expect specific types of contracts where the 
doctrine is currently under debate.329 Furthermore, if the doctrine of ‘good faith’ 
becomes that as is imposed by MIA, this would distinguish insurance law further 
from general commercial law because it would be imposed by the legislation, while 
no other commercial contracts would be covered by the same regime. 
                                                          
325 The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Summary of 
Responses to Third Consultation Paper: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of 
Warranties, Chapter 1: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure (March 2013) para 6.6. 
326 Ibid para 6.7. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Ibid. 
329 As discussed earlier in chapter 2. 
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The Law Commissions considered the need to change the law to ‘good faith’ instead 
of ‘utmost good faith’, and demanded the consultees' views about this issue. 
Disagreement among the consultees was about the need to change. Some of the 
consultees found no need to change ‘utmost good faith’ to ‘good faith’.330 This is 
because, for example, the IUA found that these two principles are interchangeable, 
whereas The Lloyd's Market Association adopted ‘good faith’. The risk managers’ 
association Airmic found ‘utmost good faith’ should not be changed, although 
Airmic was not sure about the distinction between ‘good faith’ and ‘utmost good 
faith’331, which illustrated lack of reasoning in its decision. Strong arguments were 
made by the international law firms Allen & Overy LLP (A&O), K&L Gates LLP 
(K&L), and RSA that supported the change to ‘good faith’ due to two basic reasons 
that 'utmost good faith has become overloaded with history' and ‘good faith’ is easy 
to understand.332 This is important because it reflects the industry view in seeking 
clarification of the application of ‘utmost good faith’. Significantly, the British 
Insurance Brokers' Association found that the most clients or insurance personnel 
cannot understand the differences between these two principles.333  
The Law Commissions did not consider these reasons strong enough to change the 
law, although the above reasons to change to ‘good faith’ were significant in term 
of the practice of insurance especially where the confusion was found among the 
insureds. In addition, the Law Commissions did not seek any clarification of the 
law in regard to ‘utmost good faith’ despite the recognition of the difficulty to 
understand the variation between ‘utmost good faith’ and ‘good faith’. As a result 
of s 17 of MIA and the abolishment of ss 18 to 20, s 17 left the doctrine of utmost 
good faith as a sole principle with no specific meaning which may lead to further 
confusion among the contracting parties, especially consumers. 
The distinction between the doctrine of utmost good faith and good faith was 
recognised by the courts, which reflected further uncertainty between the meaning 
and effect of these doctrines. For example, in the Star Sea334, where the House of 
Lords argued the existence of the post-contractual duties of utmost good faith, the 
                                                          
330 The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Summary of 
Responses to Third Consultation Paper: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of 
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331 Ibid. 
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argument was complicated due to the doubts about the breach of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith as it is far ‘from any ordinary understanding of lack of good 
faith’335. Furthermore, the interpretation of uberrimae fidei and the expression of 
‘utmost good faith’ was illustrated in the Star Sea336 by stating that               
‘Blackstone's Commentaries… states that the very essence of contracts of marine 
insurance "consists in observing the purest good faith and integrity", but in Carter 
v Boehm… Lord Mansfield refers simply to "good faith"’337. 
Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough illustrated the distinction between ‘utmost good 
faith’ and good faith as the courts had varied the use ‘utmost’ good faith especially 
as it was not based on the judgment Lord Mansfield.338 Further doubt was 
recognised in regard the continuity of the doctrine of utmost good faith, and the 
degree of utmost good faith in the context of insurance contracts. This would reflect 
further uncertainty in the interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith. Lord 
Clyde considered the degree of openness required of the parties to comply with their 
requirements of good faith especially during the performance of the insurance 
contract as it was not ‘absolute’339. His Lordship stated that ‘it is reasonable to 
expect a very high degree of openness at the stage of the formation of the contract, 
but there is no justification for requiring that degree necessarily to continue once 
the contract has been made’340. 
The Court of Appeal, in Societe Anonyme d'Intermediaries Luxembourgeois (SAIL) 
v Farex Gie341, justified the lack of utmost good faith compare to good faith, and 
hesitated to extend the meaning of ‘material circumstances’. This, significantly, 
reflected the complexity of the concept of utmost good faith.342 
Another example from a commonwealth authority of Australia, in CGU Insurance 
Limited v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd343, the High Court of Australia debated 
the definition of utmost good faith and the phrase ‘uberrimae fidei’. This was 
because it was not defined in ICA, and it overlapped with the meaning of good faith; 
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however, the High Court of Australia emphasised ‘utmost’ good faith rather than 
good faith. Even then this approach did not indicate a clear difference between these 
two principles and justification of the need to use ‘utmost’ was not strong. The High 
Court of Australia illustrated this issue by stating that ‘emphasis must be placed on 
the word "utmost". The exhibition of good faith alone is not sufficient. It must be 
good faith in its utmost quality’344. 
Finally, it is accepted that most of the previous interpretations of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith were usually in light of the duty of disclosure and 
misrepresentation.345 In addition, as a result of the abolishment of ss 18 to 20 of 
MIA, there is a particular and urgent need to identify situations involving the 
doctrine of utmost good faith, specifically, to avoid uncertainty and to find out a 
potential scope for the doctrine. This need is because the recent English model 
based on the latest reform is unlike the rest of common law jurisdictions, for 
instance, Australia and Canada which both include the duty of disclosure as a part 
of the doctrine of utmost good faith.  
According to the Law Commissions, the doctrine of utmost good faith shall be 
considered as an interpretative principle, and this principle may impose further 
implied terms. However, the doctrine of utmost good faith, based on s 17 of MIA, 
is not an implied term, which is unlike, for example, the Australian model. All in 
all, it is all about time to interpret the doctrine of utmost good faith based on the 
English common law authorities and to determine the scope, situations, and specific 
remedies. However, it is significant to consider and apply that the doctrine of utmost 
good faith may impose further implied terms these terms can be for the insurer and 
insured; hence, these terms would balance the relationship between contracting 
parties. As well as, breaching implied terms can be sound in damages.  
4.4.2. In Saudi Arabia 
Theoretically, although Saudi laws and regulations do not apply the doctrine of 
‘utmost’ good faith; the doctrine of ‘utmost’ good faith is recognised and applied, 
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in practice, by CRIDV.346 Instead, the doctrine of good faith does exist as a general 
doctrine over Islamic contract provisions.347  
Important Islamic legal sources recognised a high standard of good faith with no 
restrictions. Indeed, the majority of Islamic sources do not recognise the duty of 
‘utmost’ good faith and do not see a need to vary between those doctrines unlike, 
for example, the UK jurisdiction. Moreover, while the doctrine of utmost good 
faith, in relation to insurance contracts, is to volunteer and disclose material facts, 
which induce the insurer to enter into the contract in specific terms and premiums, 
prior and during the performance of the contract348; the doctrine of good faith is a 
wider concept entailing dealing honestly and fairly as well as including the duty of 
disclosure and to not misrepresent in all contracts, including insurance contracts. 
However, CRIDV applied the doctrine of utmost good faith similarly to the doctrine 
of good faith. 
A minority of Islamic legal scholars noted the doctrine of utmost good faith, but 
with the same explanation as the doctrine of good faith, which is to provide 
faithfully, honestly, and clearly needed facts, to the other contractual party.349 
According to Abu Orabi, the importance of the doctrine of utmost good faith in the 
context of insurance contracts is because of the differences in the severity of 
remedies compared with other contracts, such as termination of the insurance 
contract, the loss of the right to claim for the insurance cover, and avoidance of the 
insurance contract.350 Although, Abu Orabi’s argument distinguishes between legal 
remedies in respect of insurance contracts and other contracts requiring a need to 
recognise the distinction between the doctrine of good faith and the doctrine of 
                                                          
346 See for example, decision no 127/J/1429H (2008) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance 
Disputes and Violations in Jeddah; decision no 94/D/1429H (2008) of the Committees for 
Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Dammam; and decision no 73/D/1435H (2014) 
which was affirmed by the appeal decision no 391/a/1436H (2015) of the Committees for Resolution 
Insurance Disputes and Violations in Dammam. 
347 Saad Aldiyabi, 'Mabade Husn Alneya fe Alnezam Alqanoni Alsaudi O Alanzema Almoqarana' 
(2014) 23 Journal of Sharia and Law and Islamic Studies 15, 32. 
348 Decision no 89/R/1433H (2012) which was affirmed by the appeal decision no 398/a/1435H 
(2014) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; decision no 
70/R/1433H (2012) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 269/a/1436H (2015) of the 
Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; and decision no 
38/J/1429H (2008) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Jeddah. 
349 Ghazy Abu Orabi, Ahkam Aqd Altameen: Dirasa Moqarana (Dar Wael 2011) 253. See also, Ali 
Badawi, Altameen: Dirasa Tatbeqia (Dar Alfikr Aljamei' 2009) 8.  
350 Ghazy Abu Orabi, Ahkam Aqd Altameen: Dirasa Moqarana (Dar Wael 2011) 254. 
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utmost good faith, those legal remedies, indeed, already exist and are applied under 
Islamic contracts, for breach of the doctrine of good faith.351 
SAMA’s regulations do not recognise the doctrine of utmost good faith nor any 
distinction between the doctrine of good faith and the doctrine of utmost good faith. 
However, SAMA’s website illustrates the principles of insurance, including the 
doctrine of utmost good faith, in its role of keeping consumers informed.352 
However, SAMA neither presents any distinction between the doctrine of utmost 
good faith and the doctrine of good faith, nor relies on any insurance regulations to 
specify and clarify this doctrine.353 As a result, it appears that this is adopting the 
interpretation from other legal jurisdictions.  
It is more appropriate to consider the doctrine of good faith from the Islamic 
perspective.354 This is because it does not recognise any differences between the 
utmost good faith and the doctrine of good faith. The majority of Islamic legal 
scholars do not mention the doctrine of utmost good faith as being different from 
the doctrine of good faith, and they tend to adopt only the doctrine of good faith.355 
Furthermore, there is no recognition of a particular need to adopt such doctrine. In 
Sharia law, there is no recognition of the doctrine of utmost good faith, and, notably, 
the concept of the doctrine of good faith incorporates the doctrine of utmost good 
faith.  
According to a research by the Islamic Research Journal, the insurance contract is 
based on the doctrine of good faith, as a required element along with trust, and 
faithfulness for this contract and any consensual contracts.356 This provision is 
based on the verse of the Holy Quran: “O you, who have believed, do not betray 
Allah and the Messenger or betray your trusts while you know the consequence”.357 
                                                          
351 See Mahmoud Mozafar, Nazerayet Alaqd (Dar Hafiz 2002) 121 - 125.   
352 Saudi Arabian Mandatory Agency, ‘Frequently Asked Questions in regard to awareness guide 
for clients with the General Secretariat of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations’ <http://www.sama.gov.sa/ar-sa/ConsumerProtection/Pages/FaqAG.aspx> accessed 1st 
May 2018. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Ghazy Abu Orabi, Ahkam Aqd Altameen: Dirasa Moqarana (Dar Wael 2011) 254. 
355 Such as, Abdul RazzaK Alsanhouri, Alwaseet fe Sharh Alqanoon Almadani (Munsha'at Alma'aref 
2004) part 7(2) 'Aqd Altameen'; Ayman Saleem and Jamal Abdulrhman, Aloqood Almadania: 
Albai’a, Alejar, O Altameen (Dar Hafiz 2009); and Ali Badawi, Altameen: Dirasa Tatbeqia (Dar 
Alfikr Aljamei' 2009) 8. 
356 The Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Altameen’ (1987) 20 The Journal 
of the Islamic Research 39. 
357 The Holy Quran, 8:27. 
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This study pointed out, specifically, that the fundamental requirement of the 
doctrine of good faith is that it applies to both contracting parties, because insureds 
and especially consumers, generally, neither know nor have full understanding of 
features of insurance contracts.358 On the contrary, the insurer does not know about 
specific circumstances around each insured.  
However, IFA mentioned the doctrine of good faith as one of the significant 
principles of Takaful insurance contracts, as with conventional insurance contracts, 
and with no consideration of the doctrine of ‘utmost’ good faith. Additionally, the 
Academy adopted that this principle is based on volunteering important information 
to the other party either upon request or not359, which is similar to several decisions 
of CRIDV that do accept the doctrine of utmost good faith.360  
Based on Islamic contract provisions, the importance of the doctrine of good faith 
presents not only prior to the conclusion of the insurance contract, but also during 
the performance of the contract.361 Indeed, the importance of this doctrine under 
Islamic contracts law is to give the other party the chance to enter into the contract 
without any defect in the party’s intention. Moreover, silence or hiding any relevant 
essential information or facts indicates the probability of bad faith, which will 
impact on the validity of the contract.362 However, this impact is different in 
commercial contracts and donation contracts. This is because under, Islamic 
contract provisions, the grantor should not be asked about withholding or hiding 
any information.363 Further, no claim can be made against the grantor based on a 
donation contract. Accordingly, this argument also supports the view that insurance 
contracts should be considered as commercial contracts not based on donation. 
                                                          
358 The Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta', ‘Altameen’ (2001) 4 Research of 
Council of Senior Islamic Scholars 33, 76. 
359 Islamic Fiqh Academy, decision no 200 (21/6), Session 21 (November 2013) 11. 
360 Decision no 70/R/1435H (2014) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 269/a/1436H 
(2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; decision no 
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94/D/1429H (2008) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in 
Dammam; and decision no 195/R/1434H (2013) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 
231/a/1436H (2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh. 
361 Mohammed Saleh, Altameen Bain Alhalal O Alharam (King Fahad National Library 2004) 86. 
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It is common to consider bad faith as a breach of the doctrine of good faith in Islamic 
contracts law. Bad faith situations, which occur upon breach of the duty of good 
faith, are well-considered under Sharia provisions. If the bad faith occurred prior to 
the conclusion of the contract and has been proved by the claimant, who is 
responsible to prove the bad faith, the contract could be void. On the other hand, if 
the bad faith occurred during the performance of the contract, and the bad faith act 
has been proved, the contract could be terminated.364 Because Saudi laws and 
regulations do not mention any details of legal remedies particularly of bad faith 
cases, general Islamic contract principles and provisions are applied to fill this gap. 
The next section discusses the adoption of the doctrine of utmost good faith as an 
interpretative principle in both Saudi and the UK jurisdictions. This point shall 
consider the impact of the doctrine of utmost good faith on other terms and duties.  
4.5. The Adoption of Utmost Good Faith as an Interpretative Principle  
The English and Scottish Law Commissions found that there is no need to change 
or abolish the doctrine of utmost good faith  but to maintain it as a general principle 
and specifically as an 'interpretative principle'365 based on the significant support of 
the majority of the respondents 71% agreed, while the minority of the respondents 
(8%) disagreed.366 After the recognition of the duty of fair presentation of risks and 
remedies for fraudulent claims, the position of the doctrine of utmost good faith  as 
an interpretative principle is important as both fraudulent claims and the duty of fair 
presentation of risks are 'examples of good faith'367. However, as MIA did not 
provide any further provisions to assist in the interpretation of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith, clarity of the doctrine is questioned.  
In Saudi Arabia, applying the doctrine of utmost good faith as an interpretative 
principle for insurers’ and insureds’ duties is commonly based on the Islamic 
provisions. Additionally, this application can be found often in CRIDV decisions 
where the Committees interpret parties’ obligations in light of the doctrine of 
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utmost good faith.368 This is because the doctrine of utmost good faith is flexible 
and provides a balance to the contract of insurance in order to protect integrity, 
fairness, and honesty.369 
The role of the doctrine of utmost good faith as an interpretative principle was 
recognised by the Law Commissions.370 Firstly, good faith gives a basis to imply 
specific terms when necessary in light of the ‘business efficacy test’371. By 
comparison, CRIDV applies such an approach in resolving insurance disputes by 
implying further duties based on the doctrine of utmost good faith in Saudi Arabia. 
This is because the doctrine of utmost good faith has various applications for 
example imposing the duty to notify and the insured’s duty to clarify the exceptions 
of the policy.372 
Secondly, the Law Commissions found that good faith provides ‘judicial flexibility’ 
to solve rare and hard difficulties, which may contribute to the development of this 
principle. For example, it can be relied on to balance the relationship between 
parties where the insurer may be relying on its right to reject paying a claim when 
exercising this right is unfair.373 Similarly, a decision was issued by CRIDV to 
rebalance the contracting parties’ positions based on the doctrine of utmost good 
faith.374 In this decision, the Committee found relying on the policy’s terms would 
harm the insured unfairly. Thus, the Committee decided to interpret the term as an 
arbitrary term, and, consequently, invalidated it.375  
                                                          
368 See for example, decision no 89/R/1433H (2012) which was affirmed by the appeal decision no 
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Third, as the parties should act in good faith exchanging information, the 
interpretation of the duty of fair presentation should be in light of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith.376 The Law Commissions provided an example for this situation, 
for instance, if the court found that the insured failed to disclose some material facts 
intentionally, and the insured was not expected to make further inquiries about this 
information.377 This would be counted as breach of the duty of fair presentation 
because the interpretation of this duty includes to act in good faith when providing 
information.378  
Similarities between the duty of fair presentation in the UK and the duty of 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia can be recognised as both include elements of disclosure 
and to not misrepresent.  In light of this, CRIDV made many decisions as a breach 
of the duty of disclosure based on the interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good 
faith.379 Further, the doctrine of utmost good faith was used by CRIDV to measure 
whether the breach was harmful to the other party or not, and if yes to what 
extent.380 However, if the breach was not harmful or did not increase the loss, 
CRIDV did not consider that as a breach.381   
By analysing those three possible applications of the ‘interpretative principle’ of 
good faith, it is clear that good faith is favoured in Saudi and the UK jurisdictions. 
In addition, the interpretation of the three possibilities seems not to be limited to 
those situations. Significantly, good faith is at the heart of the duty of fair 
presentation and it seems to determine fraudulent claims, as well. It is as a factor in 
the determination of the breach. As a result, the distinction between the doctrine of 
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utmost good faith and good faith, fraudulent claims, and the duty of fair presentation 
of risks are seen mainly by examining the remedies available upon breach, rather 
than looking at them as the basis of the duty of fair presentation of risk or duty not 
to make a fraudulent claim.  
Another significant point is that although the doctrine of utmost good faith 
generates implied terms in the contract of insurance, the doctrine of utmost good 
faith itself cannot be seen as an implied term. For example, the insured shall act in 
good faith but cannot prevent the insurer exercising its powers, such as of 
subrogation.382  
However, this further raises the question whether the existence of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith itself is based on an implied term in the contract of insurance. 
Indeed, The Law Commissions reviewed the Australian model, which adopts the 
doctrine of utmost good faith as an implied term, but did not accept the doctrine of 
utmost good faith as an implied term. However, according to Kate Lewins, the 
Australian position is a ‘neat solution’383 that gives the doctrine of utmost good 
faith two major benefits that are384:  
1) A juristic base, which assists the courts and commentators in its development; 
2) A flexibility of remedy, including but by no means limited to damages for breach. 
All contractual remedies are possible, including specific performance and 
declarations. Therefore the duty can be of some use to an insured who wishes to 
complain of the conduct of its insurer. 
The Law Commissions did not adopt the Australian model or make any suggestion 
for changes similar to the Australian model; consequently, the interpretation of s 17 
of MIA should be limited to the impact of the doctrine in generating implied terms. 
This should be limited to ‘extremely rare’385 and ‘especially hard case or emergent 
difficulty’386 rather than the consideration of the doctrine of utmost good faith as an 
implied term. 
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Conversely, in contrast to Saudi jurisdiction, the doctrine of utmost good faith 
affects other obligations in light of good faith, as shown above, and not only for 
rare or hard cases but for all cases as the doctrine of utmost good faith is required 
for all insurance contracts and would give a possibility to collect damages if a 
breach occurred, which is similar to the Australian model.387 
Other views found that the use of the doctrine of utmost good faith should be 
considered in the ‘interpretation of the wording’ of insurance contracts.388 
Supporting this view was the Law Commissions’ example to use the doctrine of 
utmost good faith to interpret the duty of fair presentation. The significance of this 
view is because it extends the scope of the doctrine of utmost good faith; 
accordingly, the doctrine of utmost good faith can become more flexible and 
practical than under the previous the English approach especially after the 
abolishment of avoidance as a remedy by s 14 of IA. Thus, the interpretation of 
either the duty of fair presentation of risks in business insurance or the duty of 
reasonable care to not make misrepresentation for consumer insurance should be in 
light of the doctrine of utmost good faith. In addition, based on the Law 
Commissions’ report, the first use of the doctrine of utmost good faith to interpret 
the duty of fair presentation of risks, was to exchange information in good faith389, 
which had been codified in s 3(3)(c) of IA. Other examples may be considered in 
future by courts.   
Two disadvantages can be identified considering the doctrine of utmost good faith 
as an interpretative principle. First, it may be preferable to recognise a wider scope 
for the doctrine in both Saudi and the UK jurisdictions. This may result a wider 
application than, for example, the English common law position. Second, as a 
consequence of the first point, there can be uncertainty in understanding the 
doctrine of utmost good faith by the contracting parties, especially insureds. This 
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would be more significant for consumer insurance. This confusion is a strong 
possibility as was identified by the Law Commissions as consultees recognised that 
the differentiation between good faith and utmost good faith was questioned by 
clients and insurance personnel. Consequently, further confusion among insureds 
might still arise, specifically, for insureds who have lack of knowledge and limited 
or no experience in consumer insurance in both jurisdictions. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter examines four major issues to answer the two major questions of this 
study and to achieve the objectives and, eventually, the aim of the study. These 
major questions are what the major criticisms are that meet the doctrine of utmost 
good faith in the UK and Saudi jurisdictions and how the UK and Saudi jurisdictions 
distinguish between the doctrine of utmost good faith and the doctrine of good faith. 
Answering the first question is achieved in two points, as following: 
First, this study found that there is a significant misapplication of the decision of 
Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm390. The English courts and MIA did not either 
recognise or adopt Lord Mansfield’s perspective on good faith in all contracts. 
Instead they had their own interpretation to follow the doctrine of utmost good faith 
instead of good faith in insurance contracts and other specific and limited contracts. 
This study makes seven principal observations to identify the main differences 
between the judgment in Carter v Boehm391 and the interpretation of the courts, as 
well as the impact of MIA. Significantly, Lord Mansfield recognised the doctrine 
of good faith not the doctrine of utmost good faith. Other significant academic 
criticisms based on the Lord Mansfield’s view were made in trying to narrow, 
clarify, and interpret the doctrine of utmost good faith. Finally, the English 
insurance law and courts should reconsider the Lord’s view in regard to apply the 
doctrine of good faith instead of the doctrine of utmost good faith.   
Second, the determining which provisions Takaful insurance should rely on, 
whether donation or commercial provisions, helps to specify which further 
applicable rules and legal remedies are available in the case of breach. There was 
discussion of seven issues which present challenges to apply donation provisions in 
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Takaful insurance. Recommendation was made to apply commercial provisions to 
Takaful insurance or to simply apply the conventional insurance. This is because 
there are significant difficulties when excluding commercial provisions from 
Takaful insurance. After all, insurance contracts basically should be dealt with in 
light of the commercial principles under Saudi legal regulations especially for 
consumer protection. This is based on the fact there is a disagreement among 
Islamic scholars regarding the prohibition of conventional insurance. Accordingly, 
applying commercial provisions would permit the application of the general 
insurance principles and obligations, significantly, the doctrine of good faith and its 
related duties, as donation provisions do not consider concealment or non-
disclosure as a breach of the contract.  
The second question is answered by considering three points, as follows: First, 
although the Law Commissions did not make a modification from the doctrine of 
utmost good faith to good faith, difficulties of understanding the doctrine of utmost 
good faith still exist. The Law Commissions did not recognise the doctrine of 
utmost good faith as either a specific and limited duty or an implied term, but set 
the doctrine of utmost good faith as a general principle. Accordingly, this may be a 
reason for further confusion particularly in consumer insurance. This study 
proposes that the doctrine of utmost good faith needs to be specific and well-
understood by contracting parties. Further interpretation by the UK authorities to 
specify or widen its scope is needed as the doctrine of utmost good faith is already 
making confusion among professional, the clarification is significant especially for 
ordinary consumer and moving to the doctrine of good faith is favourable. 
The advantages of moving to applying the doctrine of good faith are, firstly, to 
decrease the uncertainty of the doctrine of utmost good faith among insurance 
clients whether consumers or businesses, and secondly, doubts about the distinction 
between the doctrine of utmost good faith and good faith still exist whereas moving 
to good faith would limit these doubts. 
Second, based on PCSRI and IFA, the Academy adopted the view that Takaful 
insurance contracts apply the doctrine of good faith with no regard to the doctrine 
of utmost good faith. However, scholars, who adopted the doctrine of ‘utmost’ good 
faith, did not recognise the actual importance of this variation in the context of 
Sharia law. Although CRIDV recognised utmost good faith, the committees did not 
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distinguish between the doctrine of utmost good faith and good faith, and they did 
not rely on any laws or regulations. Accordingly, the lack of justification for the 
existence of the doctrine of utmost good faith is significantly recognised. 
Additionally, all remedies, which have been mentioned by some as distinguishing 
the doctrine of utmost good faith from that of good faith, already existed and were 
well-known in Islamic contracts. It appears that the application of the doctrine of 
good faith under Sharia law is broad enough to include the provisions of ‘utmost’ 
good faith. This is because of the concepts taken from the main sources of law such 
as the Holy Quran and Prophet’s traditions. This, as a result, supports the view that 
there is no need to recognise the doctrine of ‘utmost’ good faith under the Islamic 
perspective.   
Third, according to the Law Commissions, the doctrine of utmost good faith shall 
be considered as an interpretative principle, and this principle may impose further 
implied terms, help interpret the wording of the contract, and to interpret the duty 
of fair presentation of the risks and duty not to make fraudulent claims. However, 
the doctrine of utmost good faith, based on s 17 of MIA, is not an implied term. 
CRIDV applies a similar position as the doctrine of utmost good faith might impose 
further terms, used to interpret other duties and to rebalance contractual obligations 
based on invalid terms. Noticeably, both Saudi regulations and the Law 
Commissions did not consider the case of consumer insurance which needs clearer 
obligations due to the lack of knowledge and experience of consumers. Because of 
this, a strong advantage of recognising the doctrine of utmost good faith would be 
that it is very flexible to help find further solutions to support integrity and balance 
the power between the contracting parties in an insurance contract.  
The next chapter considers the insured’s pre-contractual duties in consumer 
insurance. This chapter shall examine the new revolution in the UK insurance law 
which separates the insurance industry into consumer and business insurance. This 
shall be analysed in comparison with the Saudi jurisdiction which adopts the 
consumer insurance regime. Criticisms of how to determine who the consumer is 
in both jurisdiction are very significant to provide recommendations and 
suggestions. In addition, analysing and criticising the consumer’s duty of 
reasonable care to not make misrepresentation and the related remedies for breach 
of that duty based on the consumer insurance regime in the UK in comparison to 
Saudi jurisdiction are also necessary.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONSUMER’S PRE-CONTRACTUAL DUTIES  
 
5.1. Introduction  
As chapter two explains the four possibilities of the doctrine of utmost good faith 
depend on two categories as insureds and insurers’ pre-contractual duties and 
insurers and insureds’ post-contractual duties. According to the modern insurance 
regime in the UK, the insured’s pre-contractual duties are now independent from 
the doctrine of utmost good faith. This chapter considers consumers’ pre-
contractual duties in the UK with a comparison to Saudi jurisdiction. 
CIDRA imposes the duty of reasonable care to not make a misrepresentation and 
abolishes the duty of disclosure for consumer insurance contracts. Based on the 
duty of reasonable care to not make misrepresentation, consumers have no 
commitments to voluntarily disclose material facts but to answer the insurers’ 
questions. CIDRA provides different remedies upon the breach of this duty based 
on the intention of the insured whether there is reckless or deliberate 
misrepresentation or careless misrepresentation. In addition, insurers cannot avoid 
the policy in case of breach of this duty. Although the duty of disclosure is totally 
abolished based on CIDRA in consumer insurance contracts in the UK, the 
doctrine of utmost good faith may still influence the interpretation of the insureds’ 
pre-contractual duty in consumer insurance.  
This chapter shall examine significant changes which are related to the modification 
in remedies provided by CIDRA upon the breach of the consumers’ pre-contractual 
duty in the UK. This is in keeping with the aim of the thesis to develop 
recommendations to Saudi jurisdiction based on the UK experience.  
To achieve the objectives of this study, three main questions shall be answered in 
this chapter that are: Who is the consumer in the UK and Saudi jurisdictions? What 
is the duty of reasonable care to not make misrepresentation and its limitation and 
remedies? How do Saudi regulations apply consumer insurance?  
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To answer these questions, this chapter is divided into three sections that are within 
the scope of consumer insurance: who is the consumer? The duty of reasonable care 
to not make misrepresentation, and legal remedies upon breach of that duty. 
5.2. The Scope of Consumer Insurance: Who is a Consumer? 
As MIA did not refer to consumers in particular, there were significant attempts to 
relieve the harshness of the consequences of the duty of disclosure and 
misrepresentation. There were several attempts to relieve this harshness by the 
adoption of Statements of Insurance Practice by the ABI in 1977; and, later, by 
Insurance Ombudsman in 1981 which became the Financial Ombudsman Service 
(FOS).392 FOS was established by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
which deals with disputes in terms of the Insurance Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (ICOBS), which are now contained in the Financial Conduct Authority 
Handbook.393 However, FOS is restricted to dealing with only disputes that are 
£150,000 or less and for consumers only as well as micro-enterprises which have 
an annual income of £1 million or less.394  
The difference between consumer and business insurance was considered by the 
Law Commissions based on several facts. These facts included, for consumers, the 
differences in expertise, knowledge, bargaining powers, and the absence of expert 
advice such as the broker’s advice.395 By comparison, business insurance is 
competitive and the negotiation are balanced between more equal contracting 
parties.396  
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There was an argument given to include micro-businesses, ‘smallest businesses 
with nine or fewer staff’397 in consumer insurance by the Law Commissions.398 The 
Law Commissions found that micro-businesses are unsophisticated businesses. 
This view would allow ‘a more balanced approach for business insurance’399. The 
Law Commissions found that, based on the feedback of consultees, micro-
businesses use their insurance policies similarly to consumers400 in respect of there 
being lack of broker’s advice401; they buy ‘standard-form insurance policy’ as they 
do not negotiate terms402. Accordingly, it seems that there was a particular need to 
cover micro-businesses under the consumer insurance regime. 
Despite the seriousness of the debate to include micro-businesses, all attempts to 
do so were unsuccessful and all types of businesses are excluded. This is due to 
several reasons. Firstly, respondents to the Law Commissions’ consultation paper 
found there was a level of uncertainty in adopting ‘standard-terms’ contracts for 
both insurers and policyholders for micro-businesses.403 Secondly, micro-
businesses covered by FOS for disputes less than £100,000.404 Thirdly, according 
to FOS, it is difficult to define micro-businesses.405  Fourthly, micro-businesses 
defined by the size of the businesses, annual turnover or the number of staff.406 
Fifthly, it was difficult to draw a clear distinction between small businesses and 
micro-businesses.407 Finally, there was no evidence of any disadvantage of micro-
businesses under the current insurance law.408 
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Although there may be several difficulties in recognising micro-businesses to be 
included in consumer insurance law, these difficulties can be treated by the law 
itself. It seems that it was all about a clear definition between micro-businesses and 
small businesses which can be overcome by specifying a clear definition for micro-
businesses. According to FOS, it was complicated to define micro-businesses, but 
it was not impossible. Clear legislation should play a role to assist with complicated 
issues surrounding certain concepts such as by defining micro-businesses based on 
all factors including the size of the business at the time of the contract, turnover, 
and the number of staff.  
Section 1 of CIDRA states a consumer is ‘the individual who enters into a consumer 
insurance contract, or proposes to do so’. Further, consumer insurance contracts are 
made by ‘an individual wholly or mainly for purposes unrelated to the individual’s 
trade, business or profession’ by s 1(a) of CIDRA. CIDRA applies to all contracts 
made on or after 6th April 2013 or varied on or after 6th April 2013. This means that 
CIDRA applies to new contracts, renewals, and variations. Significantly, as a 
consequence of the use of the term ‘mainly’, it could be that an insurance policy 
may have ‘a dual purpose’.409 The definition includes the case that the consumer 
may seek a motor insurance for a ‘mainly’ non-business purpose; however, it could 
be used rarely for business purposes.410  
Based on the definition, there is a difficulty in some cases to distinguish between 
consumer and business insurance. For example, a fire insurance policy for a 
building which includes a store over a house.411 In this case, the question is whether 
the insurance policy is under the consumer regime or the business regime. The third 
scenario would be to have a different policy for the house and another policy for 
the store. Another example would be home insurance which insured the contents 
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that are for personal use ‘mainly’, but it could include a few contents for a business 
use.412  
Examining the purpose of the policy is the key issue in applying CIDRA on the dual 
purpose insurance policy. This issue should be dealt with carefully as the ‘mainly’ 
purpose may be challenged by the insurer. The importance of the scope of this 
provision is to distinguish the case of a consumer insured who has business and 
individual uses. A further issue not recognised by CIDRA is which test should be 
adopted to apply whether an objective test or a subjective test. It is awaited an 
authoritative decision about what evidence would be required and how to prove the 
purpose of the policy based on the prudent insurer, reasonable insured, or actual 
insured. 
The determination whether the insured was a ‘consumer’ was the key issue in 
Ashfaq v International Insurance Co of Hannover Plc413. In this case, the insured 
had a ‘residential let property owners’ policy to cover a property that he was letting 
to students. When the insured completed the proposal with his broker, it was stated 
that the insured had no pending prosecutions for offences except motoring offences. 
Later, the property was damaged by fire, and the insured claimed for indemnity. 
The insurer discovered that the insured was awaiting trial on an assault charge, 
which meant a breach of the duty of disclosure. The insurer, accordingly, avoided 
the policy. Although the insured tried to apply CIDRA in this case, the trial judge 
applied the common law, found that the insured breach of his duties and did not 
consider the insured as a consumer. The Court of Appeal recognised the argument 
made by the trial judge on this point that ‘those Acts [CIDRA and IA] did not apply 
because they were not in force at the date of the inception of this Policy… it 
[CIDRA] only applied to consumer insurance contracts entered into after 6 April 
2013 and the Act was not retrospective’414. 
The ground of the appeal was that the insured alleged that he had contracted as a 
consumer within the meaning of Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999 (UTCCR) and ICOBS as he was working as a director of a number of 
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information technology companies. However, the Court of Appeal found that there 
was no prospect to establish this grounds of appeal, and the insured was not a 
consumer.  
The appeal was dismissed because of the following reasons: Firstly, the insured was 
not covered by the meaning of consumer by either UTCCR or ICOBS, which meant 
the policy was a business insurance policy not a consumer insurance policy.415 The 
Court of Appeal illustrated that, as follows: 
Regulation 3(1) of UTCCR 1999 in force at the relevant time provided that a consumer 
is: "any natural person who, in contracts covered by these Regulations, is acting for 
purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession."416 
ICOBS at para 2.1.1(3), in the section dealing with Client categorisation contains a 
similar definition of consumer: “ A consumer is any natural person who is acting for 
purposes which are outside his trade or profession. " Paragraph 2.1.3 then deals with 
cases of customers covered in both a private and a business capacity in these terms: 
“(1) Except where paragraph (2) applies, if a customer is acting in the capacity of both 
a consumer and a commercial customer in relation to a particular contract of insurance, 
the customer is a commercial customer. (2) For the purposes of ICOBS 5.1.4 G and 
ICOBS 8.1.2 R, if, in relation to a particular contract of insurance, the customer entered 
into it mainly for purposes unrelated to his trade or profession, the customer is a 
consumer.” 417 
Paragraph 2.1.4 then provides: “In practice, private individuals may act in a number 
of capacities. The following table sets out a number of examples of how an individual 
acting in certain capacities should, in the FCA’s view, be categorised”. One of the 
examples given in the “Capacity” section of the table is pertinent in the present context: 
“Person taking out a policy covering property bought under a buy-to-let mortgage”. 
In the “Classification” section of the table against such a person is stated: “Commercial 
customer”.418 
Secondly, the purpose of obtaining the policy was for the insured’s trade.419 Flaux 
LJ considered that the issued policy was under the Residential Let Property Owners 
Scheme and not an ordinary house insurance. This reflected that the policy was for 
the insured’s business.420  Thirdly, as the insured described his work as a director, 
this meant that he may be involved in other businesses as he was a ‘building owner 
letting out property for profit’421. Fourthly, the insured had described the property 
as his home; however, the Court of Appeal did not consider the property as the 
insured’s home and pointed out that ‘the property was not the insured’s home, since 
it is accepted that he lived elsewhere, so it can only be the “home” of the tenants 
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living at the property… Thus the reference to “home” does not convert what is 
business insurance into consumer insurance’422. 
The Court of Appeal was correct in its decision as the insured tried to rely on 
consumer insurance provisions whereas the policy was clearly for business 
purposes. The terms of CIDRA could not be relied on therefore. The court’s 
interpretation of the wording of the insured’s proposal for allowed the conclusion 
that this was a business insurance policy not a consumer insurance policy.  
Although this type of dispute may be rare in future as the Act of 2012 is now in 
force, other disputes may arise regarding consumer dual-purpose insurance policies. 
Determination of the main purpose of the policy may raise difficulties; however, 
the conduct of the courts by interpreting the insured’s words in the proposal form 
and the surrounding circumstances such as in Ashfaq423 can limit these difficulties 
to identify the main purpose of the policy and for applying appropriate provisions 
whether consumer or business insurance.  
Under Saudi jurisdiction, by comparison, which is based on ICPP, there is no 
limitation on applying consumer provisions to the whole Saudi insurance market. 
Based on article 2 of ICPP, a consumer defines as ‘every natural or juristic entity 
that contracts, directly or indirectly, with an insurance company for issuance of a 
policy’. However, lessons could be learned from the UK as ICPP needs urgent 
reform to distinguish between business insurance and consumer insurance.  
Several points can be recognised which could limit consumer protection by 
changing the definition of ‘consumer’ in Saudi jurisdiction. ICPP should consider, 
first, the difference in bargaining powers between businesses and non-businesses 
insurance customers; second, non-businesses insurance applicants cannot negotiate 
terms as they enter standard-form contracts; third, non-business insureds have lack 
of information or may have some challenges to achieve information or understand 
their duties; fourth, non-business customers may have no broker’s advice; fifth, 
non-businesses generally have lack of expertise in insurance regulations 
particularly; finally, businesses often have their own legal consul for advice on their 
obligations and rights. Accordingly, it is proposed that Saudi jurisdiction should 
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take advantage of the UK approach by dividing the Saudi insurance market into 
consumer insurance and business insurance on the one hand, and, on the other, 
including micro-businesses in consumer insurance in Saudi Arabia.  
The next section critiques and analyses the duty of reasonable care to not make 
misrepresentation in consumer insurance in the UK jurisdiction. This section 
recognises the difficulty of applying the duty of disclosure in consumer insurance, 
how to prove the breach of the duty, when the misrepresentation is made 
reasonably, and the gaps in CIDRA.  
5.3. The Duty of Reasonable Care to not Make Misrepresentation  
In terms of CIDRA, the duty of disclosure is totally abolished in consumer 
insurance contracts. This is due to several historic criticisms of the duty of 
disclosure in consumer insurance contracts. Firstly, consumers were unaware of the 
duty of disclosure and misrepresentation.424 Secondly, the test of materiality 
required consumers to predict the information that was required by a prudent 
insurer, who had a negative role, whereas the insurer had no obligation to ask 
questions or to draft questions clearly and unambiguously in the insurance proposal 
form. Thirdly, the harshness of the remedy of avoiding the policy as the sole 
available remedy in consequence of a breach is incongruous if the breach is made 
innocently. As a consequence of avoidance, all claims must be rejected and 
consumers may encounter difficulties in obtaining insurance cover in the future.425  
The duty of reasonable care to not make a misrepresentation under s 2 of CIDRA 
abolishes the duty of disclosure or representation that existed under ss 18-20 of 
MIA. The duty of reasonable care to not make misrepresentation includes 
answering the insurer’s questions or to complete the paper proposal or online 
proposal form before the conclusion of the contract or on renewal.426 However, 
CIDRA does not provide a definition of ‘misrepresentation’. Consequently, to 
interpret the meaning of ‘misrepresentation’ is left now to common law. In addition, 
dishonesty should be considered as misrepresentation by s 3(5) of CIDRA. Thus, it 
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is not required to volunteer information but only answering insurers’ questions 
honestly. According to s 3 of CIDRA, the duty of reasonable care to not make 
misrepresentation is determined in light of relevant circumstances. Several 
examples of relevant circumstances are provided by s 3(2) to be taken into account, 
as follows: 
(a) The type of consumer insurance contract in question, and its target market,  
(b) Any relevant explanatory material or publicity produced or authorised by the 
insurer,  
(c) How clear, and how specific, the insurer’s questions were,  
(d) In the case of a failure to respond to the insurer’s questions in connection with the 
renewal or variation of a consumer insurance contract, how clearly the insurer 
communicated the importance of answering those questions (or the possible 
consequences of failing to do so),  
(e) Whether or not an agent was acting for the consumer. 
There are three ways misrepresentation may arise in consumer insurance. Firstly, 
providing a false statement in response to a question; secondly, providing a false 
statement voluntarily where no question is asked by the insurer; thirdly, not 
confirming or modifying a given statement that is already made.427 The second case 
is interesting as CIDRA says nothing about it, and it is up to the common law 
whether to include this as being covered under the duty of reasonable care.428 The 
question is whether such facts should be permitted in light of the reasonable 
consumer test or whether the old law, the prudent insurer test, should be applied 
instead. In addition, it is for the insurer to prove the facts provided are relevant. This 
is because there is no question requiring demonstration of the significance of the 
fact. 
To prove the breach of the duty of reasonable care to not make misrepresentation, 
it is significant to specify which test should be applied whether an objective test 
based on the reasonable consumer, or a subjective test using the actual consumer. 
The standard of reasonable care is determined by an objective test, the reasonable 
consumer test with an average knowledge, by s 3(3).429 Moreover, the objective test 
should consider relevant circumstances such as the type of policy and the manner 
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of advertisement.430 However, if there is particular knowledge that the insurer 
knows or ought to know, a subjective test of the actual consumer should be 
considered. In other words, no specific knowledge about the actual consumer, as 
for the subjective test, is required, generally, unless the characteristics of the 
proposer are relevant to the insurer, by s 3(4).  
The Law Commissions Report of 2009 recognised several situations where 
consumers are acting reasonably.431 Where the insurer’s question is general the 
reasonable consumer may not have appreciated that the insurer is asking for specific 
information. Accordingly, the more obvious and directed the insurer’s question is 
the more chance the insurer has to prove the consumer’s breach of the duty of 
reasonable care.432 Further, there are cases where the consumer has a reasonable 
ground to believe a particular fact is true. It may also be the case the reasonable 
consumer would not be aware of the significance of the fact to the insurer. Finally, 
the reasonable consumer may assume that the insurer would obtain particular 
information by itself or form a third party. In these situations, the misrepresentation 
is deemed to be reasonable. However, these situations are not exhaustive; therefore, 
the courts may add further wider interpretations. 
In a recent case, Ageas Insurance Ltd v Stoodley433, the insurer sought to avoid the 
insurance policy depending on a deliberate misrepresentation information about a 
previous accident and the claim resulting from the accident. 434 The insurer alleged 
that the failure counted as a breach of the duty of reasonable care under s 2(2) of 
CIDRA by misrepresenting the claims history deliberately or recklessly as the 
insurer would not enter into the contract if the insurer knew this information.435 In 
this case, it had been seen that the insured answered the question without referring 
to the accident. The insured said that the question was ‘rolled up’ and confusing 
him referring to the guidance of ABI.436 His Honour Judge Cotter QC explained 
that the primacy should be for complying with s 3 of CIDRA rather than other 
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guidance.437 The position of the Judge is correct and reasonable as referring simply 
to the ABI guidance by the insured would be inappropriate where the provision is 
legislatively recognised by CIDRA. Examining the clarity of the answer as it is part 
of the insurer’s duty was significant to determine the breach. The Judge found that 
the test was satisfied and no breach was occurred as the question was clear and the 
answer was appreciated.438 Further, the insured’s argument was rejected.439  
Under Saudi jurisdiction, as ICPP considers the whole market as consumers with 
no distinction between consumers and businesses, the insured’s pre-contractual 
duty is totally based on the doctrine of utmost good faith.440 The Saudi approach 
therefore is similar, on the one hand to the old law in the UK based on the abolished 
ss 18-20 of MIA, which include the duty of disclosure and misrepresentation; and, 
on the other hand, to the duty of fair presentation of risks. Even so, the duty of 
disclosure and misrepresentation is maintained under the Saudi jurisdiction; article 
5(1) of ICPP requires consumers to provide honest, full, and accurate answers about 
material facts when filling forms and the proposal, which is similar to CIDRA but 
includes the obligation of disclosure. Based on article 2 of ICPP, it requires 
consumers to refrain from concealment and misleading the insurer. The recognition 
of the market as consumers by including the business and individual insureds 
should be reconsidered similar to the UK experience, as there are many differences 
between individual insurance and business and professional one. The adoption of 
the duty of reasonable care to not make misrepresentation is necessary in the Saudi 
jurisdiction because the different level of knowledge, experience, and awareness 
between consumers and businesses. 
Accordingly, the next chapter shall critically examine the Saudi jurisdiction in 
regard to the insured’s pre-contractual obligation and compare it with the UK 
business insurance instead of consumer insurance due to the similarities between 
the Saudi approach overall and the UK business insurance rather than the UK 
consumer insurance.  
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The next section in this chapter considers the legal remedies available on breach of 
the duty of reasonable care to not make misrepresentation for consumer insurance 
in the UK.  When looking at the Saudi jurisdiction, it is more appropriate to compare 
the Saudi approach with legal remedies in terms of business insurance in the UK 
because of two reasons. First, there is no mirror of the UK difference between 
consumer and business insurance in Saudi Arabia. Second, similarities can be seen 
between the insured’s duties under Saudi jurisdiction and business insurance in the 
UK jurisdiction, especially, regarding the duty of disclosure and misrepresentation, 
material facts, waiver, the requirement of inducement; and, consequently, legal 
remedies are matched to these duties.  
5.4. Legal Remedies  
Avoidance is no longer the sole available remedy as a result of the abolishment of 
the duty of disclosure. Instead, remedies available upon breach of the duty of 
reasonable care to not make misrepresentation apply where there is ‘qualifying 
misrepresentation’. The qualifying misrepresentation is defined differently 
depending on whether the breach is deliberate or reckless misrepresentation, or the 
breach is careless misrepresentation. A reasonable misrepresentation does not 
qualify as breach of the duty by CIDRA. Moreover, CIDRA does not include the 
case of innocent misrepresentation. Accordingly, in case of innocent 
misrepresentation, the insurer is left with no remedy, the claim should be paid, and 
the policy must remain.441 In addition, damages under the Misrepresentation Act 
1967 are no longer available to consumer insurance as CIDRA does not permit the 
right to damages.442  
The qualifying misrepresentation is based on the breach of the duty of reasonable 
care to not make misrepresentation before the contract is entered into, renewed, or 
varied. Similar remedies apply in case of variations with a limitation to that part 
that has been varied. Hence, if the variations affect the whole contract, the insurer 
may seek a remedy based on the whole contract.  
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There are two requirements before the insurer can seek a remedy on this basis. 
Firstly, there should be a recognised misrepresentation. Secondly, the insurer must 
show how this misrepresentation impacted on the insurer’s decision to enter into 
the contract at all or if they would have only on different terms, based on s 4 of 
CIDRA, which forms the inducement requirement. As mentioned above, CIDRA 
provides two types of qualifying misrepresentation that are deliberate or reckless 
misrepresentation and careless misrepresentation which shall be considered below. 
5.4.1. Deliberate or Reckless Misrepresentation 
Deliberate or reckless misrepresentation occurs in terms of s 5(2) of CIDRA, when 
the consumer ‘knew that it was untrue or misleading, or did not care whether or not 
it was untrue or misleading, and knew that the matter to which the misrepresentation 
related was relevant to the insurer, or did not care whether or not it was relevant to 
the insurer’. In this case, the insurer has the right to avoid the contract, retain the 
premiums paid, and reject all claims.443 Exercising avoidance should be in good 
faith, as part of the insurer’s post-contractual duty of utmost good faith.444 
Consequently, this limitation on the exercise of the insurer’s right to avoid the 
policy can relieve the harshness of the avoidance remedy.445  
The burden of proof is on the insurer, and the insurer may benefit from the 
presumption that the misrepresentation is deemed careless unless the insurer proves 
that it was reckless or deliberate, based on s 5(4) of CIDRA. By s 5(5), this should 
be done by proving that the consumer has reasonable consumer knowledge, and the 
consumer knows that the facts are material and relevant to the insurer who has asked 
a specific and clear question.446 For example, if the consumer failed to response to 
a specific question about his health status and he has suffered a heart attack. This 
information is reasonably relevant to the insurer; accordingly, the insurer’s position 
is supported in terms of s 5(5) as this is a presumption of law. Consequently, 
CIDRA applies the ‘actual insurer’ test by s 5(2)(b) instead of the ‘prudent insurer’ 
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test. Thus, it is for the consumer to prove that he either does not understand the 
question, as there is a problem in the wording or the construction of the question, 
or that the insured does not have the knowledge which considers this fact relevant 
to the insurer.447 This knowledge is based on an objective test based on s 5(5), as 
discussed earlier. 
For a recent example, in Ageas Insurance Ltd v Stoodley448 , the insurer had sought 
to avoid the policy because of deliberate or reckless misrepresentation; however, 
the insurer failed to prove that the insured acted deliberately or recklessly.449 
Although the insurer alleged the misrepresentation was reckless or deliberate, the 
insurer refunded the premium to the insured, and the Judge found that the insurer 
was ‘confused’450. This was because refunding the premium would be for careless 
misrepresentation not reckless or deliberate misrepresentation.451 The Judge’s was 
correct in his observations as he took the insurer’s actions into account which was 
important to prove and determine the type of misrepresentation and the impact of 
breach on the insurer.  
For another example, in Southern Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Hafeez452, the insurer 
sought to avoid a consumer’s motor insurance policy because of his deliberately or 
recklessly misrepresenting his address, as he had two addresses. However, the 
insurer was not entitled to avoid the policy on this ground because the insurer could 
not prove recklessness on behalf of the consumer. Four points should be recognised 
from this case.  
Firstly, the proposer could not provide further information which might have been 
of interest to the insurer as the proposal did not contain enough space.453 Secondly, 
there was a problem with the online proposal that was to have a printed-copy or 
even an electronic-copy. This problem may arise frequently as consumers use basic 
online research to set up insurance policies through websites that work as a collector 
for insurance policies by several brokers or insurers to make a comparison between 
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the prices of the policies. Particularly, in this case, the insured did an online search 
through ‘moneysupermarket.com’ and ‘comparethemarket.com’ which required 
him to fill in an online form.454 Further, as ‘moneysupermarket.com’ gave the 
insured a quote, he proceeded to deal with insurance brokers ‘GoSkippy’, and he 
was not aware of who was his insurer till the time of the accident.455  Although the 
problem of communication is obvious in respect of online insurance policies, 
communication between the insured and the insurer should be maintained and the 
proposal should be clear as this is the insurer’s responsibility to draft clear questions 
in the proposal, according to CIDRA. Accordingly, it was important for the court 
to know the specific wording of the insurer’s questions. However, the proposal 
questions could not be provided to the court. Although, it could be envisaged that 
the consumer might not be able to provide a copy of the proposal due to software 
issues or even a problem with his device; there could be no reason why details of 
the proposal was not held by the insurer. This issue was key in this recent case 
because the construction of the insurer’s questions was considered by the court as 
to whether the question was ‘what is the address where you live?’ or ‘What is the 
address at which the car will ‘mainly’ be stored?’456 Accordingly, the advantage of 
the absence of the proposal form was in favour of the consumer. This was 
reasonably as the failure to provide the proposal by the insurer was not justified. 
Thirdly, online websites do not provide consumers proper appreciation of the 
significance of providing accurate information when asked.457 Fourthly, to prove 
the recklessness in this case, it was important to prove that the consumer did not 
live ‘at all’ in the provided address. However, it was shown, in this case, that the 
consumer used to live ‘mainly’ in the provided address, and he had another 
address.458 Moreover, giving the main address did not satisfy the test of recklessly 
or deliberately misleading the insurer.459 Lady Paton acknowledged this point by 
saying that ‘nor was it enough if the court were to conclude that the defender was 
living at Dinard Drive.... The pursuer had to go so far as to prove that the defender 
was not, on any view, living at Dinard Drive’460. 
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Under Saudi jurisdiction, Saudi regulation provides further protection to the 
consumer when applying for online insurance policies. Articles 36 and 37 of OIAR 
requires insurers when issuing online insurance policies in Saudi Arabia to provide 
insureds with their insurance proposal, terms and conditions, cover limits, and 
endorsements. A complete copy of the insurance policy must be sent via email, 
based on article 36 of OIAR. The regulation requires insurers to ensure that insureds 
are able to view, print and download their insurance policy copy, based on article 
37 of OIAR. This approach would provide proper protection for consumers who do 
not know in particular which information that they are required to give. This 
approach would provide protection for consumers by obliging insurers to provide 
them with this information after issuing the policy and to avoid the key problem as 
in Southern Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Hafeez461, where the insurance proposal was 
not available. 
All in all, reckless or deliberate misrepresentation gives the insurer the right to avoid 
the insurance policy. However, this right is restricted by requiring it to be exercised 
it in good faith and the insurer must prove recklessness or deliberate 
misrepresentation. Further, a failure by the insurer to prove the reckless or 
deliberate misrepresentation should be found in favour of the consumer. 
5.4.2. Careless Misrepresentation 
There are three situations where the misrepresentation is careless. Firstly, if the 
insurer showed that it would not enter into the contract completely, the insurer has 
the right to avoid the contract, reject all claims, and return the premiums paid.462  
Secondly, if the insurer would enter into the contract but on different terms, the 
insurer has the right to impose these terms and treats the contract as if it has been 
entered into on these terms.463 For example, if the insurer would include an 
exclusion clause in regard to a specific loss, the policy would exclude this specific 
loss as if the insurer had known this before the conclusion of the contract.464 It is 
clear that the insurer should pay a claim where the claim is not related to the loss 
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occurred.465 Finally, if the insurer would enter into the contract but on a higher 
premium, the insurer has the right to reduce proportionately the amount that should 
be paid on a claim.466 This is by applying the following formula:  
 
X =
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
× 100 
For example, if the premium paid was £1000, the premium would have been £1500 
where there was no misrepresentation. Further, if the consumer claims £5000 for 
his loss, the sum to be paid is (1000/1500) × 5000 = £3333.33.  
This proportionality should be applied even in the case of subrogation. The reduced 
amount should be returned to the insurer as the amount is applied after the 
reduction, and the rest of the sum is retained by the consumer. Although CIDRA 
does not consider the case of subrogation, the Law Commissions covered this point 
in the 2009 Report.467 However, it is open to the courts to provide further 
interpretation in the case of subrogation. 
The change to proportionate payment was criticised. This was because if avoidance 
as a sole remedy had led many disputes, the proportionate method might give rise 
to further disputes around proving what the insurer would have done if the 
information had been revealed.468 This may be partially right; however, this 
perspective does not consider and appreciate the existence of the termination 
provisions under CIDRA which would give both parties a chance to choose to 
continue the policy prospectively or not. This protection is needed especially for 
consumer insurance policies as the parties are not in the same bargaining position. 
Thus, proportionality and termination together would give consumer insurance 
remedies a proper balance.  
Termination by any party differs from avoidance ab intio for three main reasons. 
Firstly, the insurer must return all premiums paid in respect of the policy post 
termination.469 Secondly, all premiums paid before the termination are retained. 
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Thirdly, the liability is on the insurer for all genuine and valid claims before the 
time of termination.470 
The insurer must give notice to the consumer about changes in terms or the 
premium.471 Accordingly, if the consumer does not agree on these changes, the 
consumer has the right to terminate the contract by giving reasonable notice to the 
insurer.472 Otherwise, the insurer has the right to terminate the contract by giving 
reasonable notice to the consumer.473 The exception to termination is where the 
contract is wholly or mainly one of life insurance, where the insurer cannot 
terminate the contract.474    
5.5. Conclusion 
According to the modern regime in the UK, the insured’s pre-contractual duties are 
now dealt with separately from the doctrine of utmost good faith, as independent 
duties. CIDRA imposes the duty of reasonable care to not make a misrepresentation 
and the duty of disclosure for consumer insurance contracts is totally abolished. In 
case of a breach of the duty of reasonable care to not make a misrepresentation, 
insurers are not able to directly avoid the policy unless if the breach is reckless or 
deliberate misrepresentation.  
According to CIDRA, all types of businesses are excluded from consumer 
protection including micro-businesses. The argument to include micro-businesses 
was significant for the same reasons given to protect consumers; although some 
difficulties were recognised to define and determine micro-businesses. However, in 
the same way consumers met significant obstacles under the duty of disclosure and 
misrepresentation based on the abolished ss 18- 20 of MIA and the lack of brokers’ 
advice, micro-businesses meet the same difficulties in regard to the duty of 
disclosure, on the one hand, and, on the other, the duty of fair presentation. Thus, it 
is significant to include micro-businesses under the umbrella of consumer 
protection. All difficulties recognised by the Law Commissions in respect the 
determination of micro-businesses need further investigation instead of leaving 
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micro-businesses without recognition as a consumer and with obstacles in their 
way. 
Consumers however should be careful when specifying the purpose of the policy, 
if it is a dual purpose policy. This is because consumers must be aware of the main 
purpose of the policy, as this will determine whether it is under CIDRA or IA. 
However, the question arises whether there is any duty on the insurer to make the 
consumer aware of the meaning of dual purpose policies. CIDRA provides nothing 
about the insurers’ duties at the pre-contractual stage. Thus, the courts should 
consider the insurer’s pre-contractual duties clearly and specifically as the role of 
insurers and their responsibilities are uncertain. Further clarification should be 
considered by courts where many consumer policies are made online. 
In comparison to Saudi jurisdiction, Saudi approach is different than the UK 
approach as it considers the whole market as consumers. This is a weakness of 
Saudi jurisdiction as there are significant differences between dealing with an 
individual and with businesses based on different bargaining powers between 
contracting parties. The UK approach has a significant advantage than Saudi 
approach; consequently, Saudi jurisdiction should learn from the UK experience to 
differentiate between consumer insurance and business insurance. The UK 
jurisdiction recognises significant points to distinguish between consumers and 
businesses; although this study suggests to include micro-businesses under the 
umbrella of consumer protection for the reasons state above. As a result of this 
critical and analytical comparative between both jurisdictions, there is a strong 
recommendation to separate business insurance from consumer insurance and adopt 
the consumer regime including the duty of reasonable care to not make 
misrepresentation and its matched remedies as in Saudi Arabia. This regime 
provides a proper balance in the relation between insurers and consumers, abolishes 
the duty of disclosure, sets the burden of proof for reckless or deliberate breach on 
the insurer, and limits the impact of avoidance as a sole remedy by providing 
avoidance, proportionate remedies, and termination.  
The next chapter considers the insured’s pre-contractual duties for business 
insurance in the UK and Saudi jurisdictions. It compares the duty of disclosure and 
misrepresentation in both jurisdictions, and the impact of the duty of fair 
presentation in the UK. This chapter critiques and analyses other related issues 
including material facts, inducement, waiver, remedies, and contracting out.    
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CHAPTER 6 
INSURED’S PRE-CONTRACTUAL DUTIES FOR 
BUSINESS INSURANCE  
 
6.1. Introduction  
The IA 2015 sets out new special provisions for business insurance in the UK. 
Further, the duty of fair presentation of risks is imposed as the insured’s pre-
contractual duty. This chapter is going to analyse and critique relevant issues in 
regard to the insured’s pre-contractual duties in the UK and Saudi jurisdictions. 
This shall include misrepresentation and the duty of disclosure as these duties are 
retained in the UK and already exist in Saudi Arabia. This chapter shall indicate 
where there are similarities between the old law in the UK and IA, on one hand, 
and, on the other between the UK and Saudi jurisdictions. Further, this chapter 
identifies criticisms of the prudent insurer test, materiality, the knowledge of the 
insured, and avoidance as a sole remedy upon the breach of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith under the UK’s old law. Other important changes can be seen in respect 
to the requirement of inducement, material facts, and the ‘basis of contract clauses’ 
in terms of IA. Further comparison with Saudi jurisdiction is required to recognise 
the differences and similarities between these jurisdictions. Significant changes to 
the insurance regime in the UK are seen in the modification of the remedies for 
breach of the duty of fair presentation of risks. Although, uncertainty still exists as 
this area of law is still developing, IA provides a significant balance to the 
relationship between the insured and the insurer.  
There are three major questions to be addressed in this chapter to achieve the 
objectives of this study. These questions are: What are the similarities and 
differences between consumer and non-consumer insurance contracts in relation to 
the doctrine of utmost good faith? What is the position of the duty of disclosure, 
misrepresentation, and the duty of fair presentation of risks in business insurance in 
the UK and Saudi Arabia? Is there any need to differentiate between the provisions 
of consumer and non-consumer insurance contracts in Saudi Arabia? This chapter 
shall answer these questions by use a critical analysis of these issues in the 
   119 
 
following sections: the separation of the doctrine of utmost good faith and the duty 
of fair presentation of risks; the duty of disclosure, misrepresentation, the duty of 
fair presentation, material facts, the requirement of inducement, waiver, related 
remedies, and contracting out and ‘basis of contract clauses’. 
6.2. Separation of the Insured’s Pre-Contractual Duties from the Doctrine of 
Utmost Good Faith 
Since the enforcement of CIDRA and IA, the doctrine of utmost good faith is 
separated from the insureds’ pre-contractual duties. While CIDRA imposes the 
duty of reasonable care to not make misrepresentation for consumer insurance 
contracts; IA imposes the duty of fair presentation of risks for business insurance 
contracts. These duties now are entirely different than the doctrine of utmost good 
faith.475 Although the duty of disclosure is retained in business insurance, the duty 
is based on enquiry rather than the insured’s voluntary disclosure. Thus, the 
insured only needs to disclose material facts ‘fairly’ and make ‘signposts’ to give 
the insurer a chance to make further enquiries.476 Further, IA provides various 
remedies upon the breach of the duty of fair presentation of risks based on the 
intention of the insured. Moreover, insurers are not permitted to directly avoid the 
policy. 
Significantly, depending on the terms of the contract, s 16 of IA contains 
contracting out provisions. Consequently, based on what is agreed by the parties, 
the duty of fair presentation of risks may be entirely excluded as long as the 
requirement of s 17 of IA is satisfied, and this reflects the old law of the duty of 
disclosure and misrepresentation as excluding the duty means that there needs to be 
voluntary disclosure by the insured and reliance upon the doctrine of utmost good 
faith. In addition, there should be careful drafting of insurance contracts. This is 
especially because no remedy of avoidance will be available for breach of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith in terms of s 14(1) of IA. 
The next section considers the duty of fair presentation of risks in the UK. This 
section analyses and criticises provisions in related to this duty and major relation 
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issues. Further, it compares IA and the old law by looking at the abolished ss 18-20 
of MIA.  
6.3. The Duty of Fair Presentation  
In February 2015, IA reformed the law of disclosure and misrepresentation for 
business insurance. IA came into full force on 12th August 2016. Section 21 of IA 
repeals ss 18-20 of MIA. The duty of disclosure is still retained for business 
insurance policies under the duty of fair presentation by s 3 of IA, unlike consumer 
insurance policies.477 Remedies are currently based on IA which means that it is not 
now possible to rely on the general law of contracts or Misrepresentation Act 
1967.478 However, many similar points of the old law can be recognised. 
Following Birds views, the ‘traditional law’ should be taken into consideration due 
to five reasons.479 Firstly, CIDRA came into force on 6th April 2013; thus, any 
disputes arising before this date, especially in life insurance disputes, should apply 
the ‘traditional law’.480 Secondly, similarly, IA came into force on 12th August 
2016, and all disputes arising before this date should apply the ‘traditional law’. 
Thirdly, it is important to understand the new law in light of the ‘traditional law’. 
Fourthly, for business insurance, it is possible to apply the ‘traditional law’ and to 
exclude the new provisions by contracting out of IA. Fifthly, looking at IA, no 
major changes fundamentally have been made; hence, the traditional law is still 
relevant. These reasons are significant because the application of the modern 
regime must be interpreted in light of the doctrine of utmost good faith481, as the 
doctrine of utmost good faith has now become an interpretative principle. 
Section 4 of IA provides different provisions for individual and non-individual 
insureds; the insured can be a sole trader or a small, medium, or large businesses. 
This point has been criticised as to whether it is fair to recognise the insured in this 
way by including all types of businesses due to the difference between dealing with 
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an individual trader, micro-businesses, small businesses and medium and large 
businesses.482 This is a significant criticism to IA because of two reasons that micro-
businesses and individual traders such as an electrician or painter may need further 
protection similar to the insured under consumer insurance; and the lack of 
knowledge and experience about the law of insurance, they may have, especially, 
about the remaining duty of disclosure included in the duty of fair presentation. 
However, the Law Commissions found difficulties in defining micro-businesses, 
and rejected any demands to distinguish between micro-businesses and large 
businesses.483 Even though these difficulties were recognised in respect of micro-
businesses, there were no difficulties in excluding individual traders from business 
insurance provisions as their position is similar to consumers.  
By s 3 and s 7, IA demonstrates that the duty of fair presentation includes both the 
duty of disclosure and the duty to not make a misrepresentation in any documents 
or any oral presentations before the contract is entered into, or on renewal, or on 
variation.484 S 3(3) shows that the disclosure is required to be reasonably clear and 
accessible to the prudent insurer for every material representation. ‘Materiality’ 
means a circumstance or representation that would influence the judgment of a 
prudent insurer to either take the risk or on which terms, based on s 7(3). Similarities 
can be determined between s 7(3) of IA and s 18(2) of MIA as both use the term 
‘influence the judgment’. Accordingly, any debate about what is the ‘reasonable 
insured’ test is no longer relevant because the wording of s 7(3) adopts the prudent 
insurer test instead.485  
Significant illustration was provided by the Law Commissions in this respect to 
determine whether it should be the ‘reasonable insured’ test or ‘prudent insurer’ 
test. The ‘reasonable insured’ test would lead to difficulties because of different 
types of insured, different types of insurance policies, and uncertainty with what 
was required or expected. It would be complex to identify such probabilities. The 
Law Commissions considered the difficulties of proposing a ‘reasonable insured’ 
test as it would lead to further doubts and uncertainty in how to prove the breach of 
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the duty. The Law Commissions stated that ‘[M]any criticised it for being 
uncertain… We accepted that a “reasonable insured” test would introduce an 
unknown and untested concept into the law’486. 
S 7(4) of IA provides examples which are not exhaustive for what will be 
considered as material circumstances. The courts may consider other examples in 
the future. Specifically, s 7(4) states that: 
(a) Special or unusual facts relating to the risk,  
(b) Any particular concerns which led the insured to seek insurance cover for the risk,  
(c) Anything which those concerned with the class of insurance and field of activity in 
question would generally understand as being something that should be dealt with in 
a fair presentation of risks of the type in question. 
The duty of fair presentation is required to be followed by the insured to each 
insurer in the case where there are several insurers insuring one risk. It is recognised 
that the insured’s duty of fair presentation of the risk should be relevant for each 
insurer on the assumption that each insurer shares this information with other 
insurers or insurer. It follows then that where one insurer has asked a particular 
question about a fact that has been disclosed, it does not exempt the insured from 
disclosing this fact to another insurer as long as this fact is relevant.487 
Significant changes to the duty of disclosure have been made by s 3 of IA; although 
similarities between MIA and IA can be seen.488 Firstly, s 3(3) differentiates 
between the case of a representation of a fact and a representation of an expectation 
or belief as the representation of a fact must be substantially correct, but the 
representation of an expectation or belief must be in good faith, which is similar to 
s 20(5) of MIA. The difference between MIA and IA is that IA requires disclosed 
circumstances to be ‘substantially’ correct and ‘accessible’ to the prudent insurer. 
Two issue may arise. 
On the one hand, s 3(3)(b) deals with the problem of providing a mass of 
information i.e. ‘data-dumping’ which may be a breach of the duty of fair 
                                                          
486 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business 
Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Summary 
(Law Com No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014) para 5.45, 5.47 – 5.48. See also Peter MacDonald 
Eggers, 'The Past and Future of English Insurance Law: Good Faith and Warranties' [2012] UCLJLJ 
211, 226. 
487 David Kendall & Harry Wright, A Practical Guide to the Insurance Act 2015 (Practical 
Insurance Guides) (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 81. 
488 Robert Merkin & Özlem Gürses, ‘The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer 
and Assured’ (2015) 78(6) MLR 1004, 1011. 
   123 
 
presentation.489 This is because the facts are not fairly accessible to the insurer.490 
Thus, the insured’s should signpost the insurer’s attention to relevant information, 
and the insurer may ask follow-up questions if necessary.491 However, if the insurer 
knew about the ‘data-dumping’, the insurer may not able to allege that the duty of 
fair presentation had been breached. Further, the insurer’s knowledge would be 
considered as affirmation. To prove the breach, the objective test, the prudent 
insurer test, should be adopted.492  
On the other hand, s 3(3) states that not all the information nor details need to be 
‘correct’ but ‘substantially’ correct.493 This should be interpreted in light of s 7(5) 
of IA, as this section indicates that ‘a material representation is substantially correct 
if a prudent insurer would not consider the difference between what is represented 
and what is actually correct to be material’. This section is criticised as it seems to 
signify ‘less exacting rules than other commercial contracts under which all 
material statements of fact must be true’494. This criticism is significant because 
insurance contracts are contracts based on utmost good faith unlike the rest of 
general law of contracts.  
In fact, the wording of this section may give rise to another issue. In the situation 
where the representation is ‘correct’ but it misleads the insurer495, a breach of the 
duty of fair presentation may occur because the prudent insurer cannot distinguish 
the correct information due to the insured’s misleading conduct. The burden of 
proof is on the insurer but the insured may defend his position by referring to the 
wording and construction of the insurer’s questions, for example, by proving that 
the insurer’s question was unclear. However, if the insurer’s question is deemed to 
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be clear, the insured, accordingly, is in breach of the duty of fair presentation of 
risks. 
Further, s 3(4)(b) points out that the disclosure is required only for every material 
circumstances that the insured knows or ought to know or the ‘disclosure which 
gives the insurer sufficient information to put a prudent insurer on notice that it 
needs to make further enquiries for the purpose of revealing those material 
circumstances’. While s 3(4)(a) re-enacts the wording of s 18 of MIA; s 3(4)(b) 
illustrates the differentiation between MIA and IA as the duty is based on enquiry 
rather than disclosure. Accordingly, if the insurer does not make these enquiries, no 
further disclosure is required by the insured. In addition, if the insured provides 
‘signposts’ to the insurer to comply with the duty of fair presentation496, these 
‘signposts’ require the insurer to make further enquiries.497 Moreover, the insurer 
would waive his right to avoid the contract or to have proportionate remedies by a 
failure to ask follow-up questions.498 Accordingly, if the insurer enquires about 
specific information, the insured cannot allege that the insurer ought to know this 
information or this information is not material to the insurer.499  
In the 2014 Report, the Law Commissions commented on the wording of s 3(4) to 
clarify the positive role of the insurer in the disclosure and fair presentation process 
as the insurer ‘should not underwrite at the claim stage’500. This leads to the 
conclusion that it is now the insurers’ pre-contractual duty to ask clear questions, 
and insurers have a significant role prior the conclusion of the policy unlike the old 
law based on the MIA approach, as follows501:  
Even where a material circumstance is not itself disclosed, the insured may still have 
done enough to satisfy the disclosure duty. The question is whether it has given the 
insurer sufficient “signposts” which would lead a prudent insurer to make further 
enquiries which, when answered, would reveal material circumstances… If a prudent 
insurer, reviewing the disclosed information, would be prompted to ask further 
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500 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business 
Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Summary 
(Law Com No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014) para 7.37-8. 
501 Ibid. 
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questions or to seek further information, a failure on the part of the actual insurer to 
do so should not prejudice the insured at a later stage. 
The significant implication of the meaning of the doctrine of good faith in the 
interpretation of s 3(4) is mentioned by the Law Commissions so as not to give 
benefit to the insured where the insured acts intentionally to provide limited facts 
‘hoping that the insurer would fail to make further enquiries to reveal the full 
picture’502. This would reflect a breach of the insureds’ pre-contractual duty of fair 
presentation of risks by providing unclear and inaccessible information. Although 
the requirement of s 3(3) is clearly important to determine the breach, it is important 
to find out the insured’s intent to act in good faith.503 
In addition, s 3(5) of IA provides exceptions to the duty of disclosure in case of lack 
of enquiry in five situations that are if the fact ‘(a) diminishes the risk, (b) the insurer 
knows it, (c) the insurer ought to know it, (d) the insurer is presumed to know it, or 
(e) it is something as to which the insurer waives information’. This subsection re-
enacts s 18(3) of MIA. 
Finally, in terms of s 7(6), which re-enacts s 20(6) of MIA, IA gives the proposer 
the right to withdraw or correct a representation before the contract is entered into. 
Consequently, based on this section, it is presumed that by the conclusion of an 
insurance contract, the information may be substantially correct not in every detail, 
but all material circumstances must be correct.  
Under the Saudi jurisdiction, there is no mirror to the duty of fair presentation of 
risks in Saudi insurance law and regulations as there is no separation between the 
insured’s pre-contractual duties and the doctrine of utmost good faith similar to the 
old law in the UK. The duty of disclosure is well-set in Saudi jurisdiction. The next 
section criticises and analyses the duty of disclosure in both the UK and Saudi 
jurisdictions as the duty of disclosure is retained for business insurance.  
 
 
                                                          
502 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business 
Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Summary 
(Law Com No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014) para 7.40. 
503 Ibid. 
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6.4. The Duty of Disclosure  
The root of the duty of disclosure in insurance law goes back to Carter v Boehm504. 
Lord Mansfield did not in fact identify a duty of disclosure but the duty of good 
faith and the position regarding concealment of information instead.505 Later, the 
duty of disclosure was developed by the courts and codified by MIA.506 Insurance 
policies have commonly bound the insured to the duty of disclosure particularly as 
a pre-contractual duty before conclusion of the contract.  
The rationale behind this duty is to put the insurer in a position to know the 
circumstances that may impact on his decision to take the risk or assess it.507 Mence 
LJ illustrated the philosophical basis of the duty of disclosure as ‘a true and fair 
agreement for the transfer of risk on an appropriate basis depending on equality of 
information’508. The facts, which are provided by a proposer at the pre-contractual 
stage, impact on the insurer’s decision to enter into the insurance contract, and on 
which terms and at what level of premium.  
The duty of disclosure faced many criticisms due to the protection of insurers at the 
expense of the insured, and the duty of disclosure did not recognise the differences 
between the bargaining positions of individuals and businesses. Moreover, the duty 
did not allow a balance between the contracting parties based on the notion of 
fairness, proportionality, or actual inducement.509 There were four main 
criticisms.510  
                                                          
504 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
505 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co v Pine Top Insurance Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501, 528. 
506 John Lowry & Philip Rowling, ‘That Wicked Rule, that Evil Doctrine: Reforming the Law on 
Disclosure in Insurance Contracts’ (2012) 75(6) MLR 1099, 1101. 
507 John Lowry, ‘Redrawing the Parameters of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts’ (2007) 60(1) CLP 
338, 339. 
508 Brotherton v Aseguradora Colseguros (No.2) [2003] EWHC 335 (Comm), [2003] 2 CLC 629, 
[24]. 
509 John Lowry, ‘Redrawing the Parameters of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts’ (2007) 60(1) CLP 
338, 340. 
510 See for an important discussion, Hasson R, ‘The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law: 
A Critical Evaluation’ (1969) 32 MLR 615, 615 - 616. See also The Law Commission and the 
Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' 
Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Summary (Law Com No 353, Scot Law Com 
No 238, 2014) para 3.11.  
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Firstly, some insureds might not appreciate that they should volunteer material facts 
to the insurer.511 Secondly, some insureds might not be aware which facts would be 
considered as material. Thirdly, the remedy, avoidance ab initio, was an ‘all or 
nothing’ remedy, which protected the insurer. Finally, there was no specific 
protection for consumers. Thus, there was an urgent need in the insurance sector to 
determine who would be defined as a consumer. The common law and FOS have 
successfully limited the harshness of the duty of disclosure by requiring 
inducement.512 Further, proportionality was adopted by FOS in respect of remedies 
for consumers and micro-enterprises, and in modern cases the duty of disclosure 
moved to the duty of ‘fair’ presentation.513 
In terms of MIA, avoidance ab initio with retrospective effect was the legal remedy 
for breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith including breach of the duty of 
disclosure and misrepresentation.514 In terms of s 84(3)(a) of MIA, premiums 
should be returned on avoidance unless there had been fraud. However, the remedy 
relied on the will of the aggrieved party, who had a choice either to waive the right 
of avoidance or avoid the policy,515 as s 17 of MIA only stated that ‘the contract 
may be avoided’516. The effect of this remedy is to reset the insurer’s position to 
one not based on the non-disclosure of facts.517 
Accordingly, the remedy of avoidance faced many criticisms. Significantly, in the 
Star Sea518, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough stated that ‘the remedy of avoidance 
can sometimes be draconian’519. This was due to three reasons. Firstly, this remedy 
was the only available remedy upon the breach of the duty of disclosure. Secondly, 
                                                          
511 John Lowry, ‘Redrawing the Parameters of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts’ (2007) 60(1) CLP 
338, 339. See also Aittilio Costabel, ‘The UK Insurance Act 2015: A Restatement of Marine 
Insurance Law’ (2015) 27 St Thomas L Rev 133, 151. 
512 John Lowry, ‘Redrawing the Parameters of Good Faith in Insurance Contracts’ (2007) 60(1) CLP 
338, 340. 
513 See for example, Garnat Trading & Shipping (Singapore) PTE Ltd, Vung Tau Shipbuilding 
Industry Joint-Stock Company v Baominh Insurance Corporation [2010] EWHC 2578 (Comm), 
[2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep 589, [2011] Lloyd's Rep IR 366. 
514 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd and others (the star sea) [2003] 1 AC 
469, 474. See also, HiH Casualty and General Insurance Co v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 230, [85]. 
515 See in this regard, Black King Shipping Corp v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
437, 515.   
516 See also, s 18(1) of MIA stated that ‘...if the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer 
may avoid the contract’.S.20/1‘...If it (every material representation) be untrue the insurer may avoid 
the contract’. 
517 [2003] 1 AC 469, 478. 
518 Ibid. 
519 Ibid 474. 
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the remedy did not rely on the insurer’s option but the law. Finally, the cruelty of 
this remedy was where there had been innocent non-disclosure where there had 
been no intention of the insured to make non-disclosure.520 
Based on the conclusion of the substantial discussion in La Banque Financiere de 
la Cite v Westgate Insurance521, damages were not available as a remedy for breach 
of the duty of disclosure as the doctrine of utmost good faith did not have the impact 
of an implied term. In this case, there was an attempt to develop damages as a new 
remedy for such breach but the Court of Appeal rejected it, and asserted that there 
was no other remedy but avoidance.522 However, the effect of s 2(2) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 was noticed which allows the insurer to collect 
damages in lieu of rescission or avoidance. However, the courts had not previously 
considered this remedy in commercial insurance because parties knew the 
consequences of breach, following the authority of Highlands Insurance Co v 
Continental Insurance Co523. Damages are still unavailable as a remedy under IA 
for breach of the duty of fair presentation of risks nor now for misrepresentation 
unlike under the previous law.  
There are two principal ways in which the duty of disclosure and misrepresentation 
can be limited. Firstly, the duty of disclosure can be restricted or limited as a result 
of an exclusion clause under some types of insurance policies. For example, some 
policies may include a ‘statement of truth’ clause such as film finance insurance 
policies. Such insurance policies include a term that the insured does not hold any 
duty to disclose material facts or make any representation as this duty is waived by 
the insurer. 524 Accordingly, the insurer does not hold any right to avoid the policy 
upon non-disclosure. Secondly, the requirement of inducement was introduced by 
the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co v Pine Top Insurance Ltd 525 as 
                                                          
520 Ibid 478. 
521 [1990] 3 WLR 364, [1991] 2 AC 249. 
522 Ibid 264. It was stated that: 
As was stated by Scrutton J. in Glasgow Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. William 
Symond son & Co., 16 Com Cas 109, 121, non-disclosure is not a ground for damages 
but only a ground for rescission of the contract. This is the only statement in the cases 
asserting to the fact that damages are not recoverable for non-disclosure, for it has 
always been understood that rescission is the only remedy. 
523 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 109. See also HIH Casualty and General Insurance Co v Chase 
Manhattan Bank [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 230, [116] as Rix LJ supported this conclusion. 
524 For instance, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 230. 
525 [1995] 1 AC 501. 
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another limitation of the duty of disclosure, which has to be shown in order to prove 
breach of the duty of disclosure or misrepresentation.  
By comparison under Saudi jurisdiction, according to article 2 and 5.1 of ICPP, the 
duty of disclosure means not only providing complete information honestly, 
accurately, and clearly with transparency and credibility, but also abstaining from 
hiding or misleading any significant, influential, incomplete, wrong, and related 
information to any contracting parties, specifically, insured and insurer. 
Significantly, this is an improvement regarding the definition of the duty of 
disclosure as it was previously defined by article 55 of IRCICCL as a duty to 
disclose relevant information in the proposal of an insurance policy, and this 
proposal should be taken completely into account in case of any dispute regarding 
the information provided. Currently, the duty of disclosure is comprehensive 
especially as it is an obligation on both parties.  
The information that should be disclosed to the insurer is limited to the information 
that a ‘reasonable person’ thinks relevant to disclose, based on article 42 of 
IMCCR.526 One difficulty of applying the reasonable person test is that article 4 of 
ICPP requires insurers to provide 'special care' for special needs, limited education 
and elderly consumers, such as, providing advice, clarifying differences between 
insurance policies, and ensure full understanding of terms and conditions.527 
Consequently, it can be said that although ICPP considers differences between 
consumers, ICPP does not propose a definition of a ‘reasonable person’ in light of 
these differences. Accordingly, the question is whether these special cases of 
consumers are considered as a limit on the reasonable person test, or as an exception 
to test. Importantly, the burden of proof is on the insurers to show that the insured 
has not acted as the reasonable consumer in order to prove the breach of the duty of 
disclosure. 
The next section shall give a critical analysis of the law of misrepresentation in both 
the UK and Saudi jurisdictions. This section considers the differentiation between 
innocent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and representation of an 
expectation or belief. 
                                                          
526 See, for example, decision no 1603/R/1432H (2011) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance 
Disputes and Violations in Riyadh. 
527 See also, article 31 of IMCCR. 
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6.5.  Misrepresentation 
Although there are rules regarding misrepresentation imposed for general contracts 
law in the UK, specific provisions exist for insurance law.528 The difference 
between non-disclosure and misrepresentation is recognised in insurance contracts. 
While disclosure is about volunteering material facts, misrepresentation is where a 
false statement is made by one party to the other who is then induced by this 
statement to enter into the contract.529 This difference has not usually been clear, 
and it was common in the case of breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith to 
consider both non-disclosure and misrepresentation. To claim for pure non-
disclosure was ‘relatively rare’ as the House of Lords pointed out in HIH Casualty 
and General Insurance Co v Chase Manhattan Bank530. Accordingly, non-
disclosure and misrepresentation were used commonly as a defence by the insurer. 
For example, while a blank answer may be deemed a negative answer which would 
be considered as a misrepresentation; however, silence would be considered as non-
disclosure.  
Under Saudi jurisdiction, the intent to act fraudulently and in bad faith by 
misrepresenting some material facts is the essential distinction between 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure. The burden of proof of the insured’s intent to 
defraud and misrepresent is on the insurer531 and if not proven, good faith is presumed. 
The requirement of inducement forms another requirement in proving fraud, which is 
the insured’s intent to harm the insurer or impact on the insurer's decision whether to 
enter into the policy or on which terms or at what level of premium.  
There are two breaches of the duty to not make misrepresentation in terms of IA 
being fraudulent misrepresentation, and innocent or negligent misrepresentation 
which are considered below. However, it is important to clarify the old law in the 
case of business insurance because the parties may contract out the duty of fair 
presentation of risks and rely on the old law. Currently, fraudulent and innocent 
                                                          
528 See the repealed s 20 of MIA 1907; and John Birds, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law (10th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 117.  
529 John Lowry, Philip Rawlings, & Robert Merkin, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles (3rd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2011) 127. 
530 [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 230. 
531 Bahaa Shukri, Altameen fe Altatbeeq O Alqada w Alqanon (Dar Althaqafa 2011) part 2 ‘Aqd 
Altameen’, 721. 
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misrepresentations relate to the duty of fair presentation and the breach of this duty 
will be either deliberate or reckless breach or non-deliberate or reckless breach. 
6.5.1.  Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
Fraudulent misrepresentation is when the insured makes a false statement having 
no regard to whether it is true or not.532 Thus, where there is absence of dishonest 
intent or intent to fraud, the fraud cannot be proved.533 On the other hand, fraudulent 
non-disclosure occurrs when the insured intentionally conceals material facts which 
the insurer should know.534 The House of Lords in Derry v Peek535 illustrated 
fraudulent misrepresentation by saying that ‘first, in order to sustain an action of 
deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, 
fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) 
knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be 
true or false’536. As a consequence of fraudulent misrepresentation, the insurer, 
based on the old law, had the right to avoid the contract, retain the premium paid, 
and claim damages based on the tort of deceit.537  
There is a similarity between the UK and Saudi approach. Under Saudi jurisdiction, 
fraudulent misrepresentation is dealt with by articles 2 and 5(1) of ICPP as the 
insured is required to abstain ‘from providing misleading any significant, 
influential, incomplete, wrong, and related information’ to the insurer. Further, 
article 45(a) of AFR states that ‘policyholder fraud is committed by policyholders… 
mainly… at the policy setup stage: withholding or providing incorrect personal or 
background information’. Accordingly, this definition combines fraudulent non-
disclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation similar to the UK approach. 
Specifically, the key here is the insured’s intent to provide a false statement when 
the insured knows that this information is not true. 
                                                          
532 John Birds, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 118.  
533 John Lowry, Philip Rawlings, & Robert Merkin, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles (3rd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2011) 128. 
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535 (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337. 
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Lowry, Philip Rawlings, & Robert Merkin, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles (3rd edn, Hart 
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According to a CRIDV decision no 89/R/1433H (2012) in Riyadh, which was 
affirmed by the appeal decision no 398/a/1435H (2014) where motor insurance 
policy was issued and the insured was asked clearly about any previous accidents, 
the insured answered that there had been no accidents. However, after a claim for 
indemnity had been made by the insured, the insurer discovered that there had been 
an accident before the conclusion of the policy. The insurer tried to avoid the policy 
based on breach of the doctrine of good faith, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
according to breach of a term of the policy as the policy stated it would be void in 
the event of misrepresentation or providing any false material facts. Although, the 
insured’s misrepresentation was proved, CRIDV did not consider this 
misrepresentation as breach of the insured’s pre-contractual duties because 
materiality was not proved, and there was no harm on the insurer as the previous 
accident was modest and had no impact on the insurer’s decisions.538  
This decision seems incorrect because of four reasons. Firstly, the insured was 
required to answer the insurer’s questions correctly based on articles 2 and 5.1 of 
ICPP. Secondly, the insured acted intentionally by not providing the correct answer 
even in front of the Committee itself, which reflected his fraud and bad faith. 
Thirdly, both the doctrine of good faith and clear contractual terms are required in 
all insurance policies. However, CRIDV failed to consider either the insured’s duty 
to act in good faith or the contractual terms. Finally, CRIDV looked only at whether 
the fact had been material as there had been no harm to the insurer or impact on the 
insurer’s decision to reject the insured’s act as a misrepresentation. This was wrong 
as the insurer’s questions should be considered as requiring material facts to be 
revealed in order to assess the insured risks. The insurer clarified this point by 
highlighting that the insurance policy included a term that defined material 
information as facts that impact and induce the insurer’s decision to accept the risk 
and at which terms and premium. Although the insurer’s point was clear on how 
the decision was induced by misrepresentation, CRIDV did not consider all of these 
points enough to treat the insured’s act as fraud, regardless of the fact that the 
insured had deliberately concealed the existence of the accident. 
 
                                                          
538 Similar to a decision no 125/D/1435H (2014) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance 
Disputes and Violations in Dammam. 
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6.5.2. Innocent Misrepresentation 
Innocent misrepresentation is a false statement that has been made by an insured 
with no intention to make a false statement539, and the insured does not know the 
truth, whereas innocent non-disclosure occurs when the insured does not appreciate 
the significance of the facts in question.540 Based on the old law, the insurer had the 
right to avoid the contract on the ground of breach of the doctrine of utmost good 
faith.541 Again, damages might be awarded based on tort and if the contract was not 
commercial, it may be rescinded, by s 2(2) of Misrepresentation Act 1967. 
Innocent misrepresentation is not recognised in particular by Saudi insurance law 
and regulations. However, several CRIDV decisions consider that the burden of 
proof is on the insurer to show innocent misrepresentation.542 In decision no 
38/D/1429H (2008) in Dammam, the insurer claimed to avoid the insurance policy 
because the insured had breached the doctrine of good faith by making a 
misrepresentation of material facts regarding his medical history in the proposal. 
The insurer asked about the insured’s medical history, but the insured denied any 
previous health problems, which induced the insurer to enter into the contract. The 
Committee found that the insured did not misrepresent material facts as the insurer 
could not specifically prove that the insured had known these facts prior to the 
conclusion of the policy.543 However, in decision no 35/R/1435H (2014) in Riyadh, 
the Committee accepted the insurer’s refusal to pay the insured’s indemnity as the 
insurer proved that the insured made a misrepresentation about his medical history. 
Accordingly, the Committee found the insured was in breach of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith by making an innocent misrepresentation.  
 
                                                          
539 Section 20 of MIA 1906. See also John Birds, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law (10th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2016) 119. 
540 John Birds, ‘The Current Law’, in Peter Tyledysley (ed), Consumer Insurance Law: Disclosure, 
representation, and the Basis of Contract Clauses (Bloomsbury 2013) 28. 
541 S 17 of MIA before CIDRA and IA become valid laws. See also John Birds, Birds’ Modern 
Insurance Law (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 119. 
542 Decision no 38/J/1429H (2008) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations in Jeddah. 
543 There are similar decision, decision no 73/D/1435H (2014) which was affirmed by the appeal 
decision no 391/a/1436H (2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations in Dammam, and decision no 167/R/1435H (2014) of the Committees for Resolution 
Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh. 
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6.5.3. Representation of Opinion or Belief 
There is a difference between a representation of a fact and a representation of a 
belief or opinion. In terms of the abolished s 20(5) of MIA, the requirement was to 
make a statement of fact; however, a statement of opinion should be made honestly 
and in good faith.544 Significantly, s 3(3) of IA imposes wording similar to MIA. 
Good faith is still relevant for the interpretation of the duty of fair presentation. This 
entails examining relevant aspects of good faith such as honesty and 
reasonableness, which should be determined in terms of the objective test. For 
example, in Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Games Video Co (GVC) SA (The Game 
Boy)545, the insured got an insurance cover for the vessel which was bought for 
£1,800,000 whereas the invoice for the payment was for £101,197. The insured 
presented that the vessel was profitably chartered and the value was increasing; 
however, the documents were found fake. The judge found that the insured could 
not satisfy the requirements of s 20(5) as the representation of the opinion must be 
in good faith as the insured has no true belief that the value of the vessel was 
£1,800,000. Remarkably, the judge’s conduct similar application should be applied 
by s 3(3) of IA.  
Based on the common law, an opinion must be honest; and even if the proposer is 
an expert, this will still be seen as an opinion not a fact.546 There is nothing in IA 
challenging the common law interpretation requiring honesty. Thus, this 
requirement is still relevant. For example, in life insurance, a proposer may fail to 
indicate a health issue as the proposer is not an expert; thus, this representation or 
disclosure is a statement of opinion unless the proposer did consult a physician for 
a specific medical matter, such as the decision in Joel v Law Union and Crown 
Insurance Co547. For another example, in Economides v Commercial Union 
Assurance Co Plc548, the Court of Appeal questioned whether the insured’s answer 
was honest rather than true or false. The insured was required to answer questions 
in the proposal form to the best of his knowledge and belief regarding the value of 
                                                          
544 Robert Merkin & Özlem Gürses, ‘The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer 
and Assured’ (2015) 78(6) MLR 1004, 1011. 
545 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 238. 
546 Joel v Law Union & Crown Insurance Co [1908] 2KB 863.  
547 Ibid. 
548 [1997] 3 All ER 636. 
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the contents. In this case, the honesty satisfied the insured’s duty and no breach was 
found.549 This decision was affirmed in Limit No.2 Ltd v Axa Versicherung AG550.  
There was a difference identified however between commercial or consumer 
insurance. While a representation of belief in an individual insurance policy such 
as in Economides v Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc551 was acceptable; the 
representation of belief was not accepted for a commercial insurance policy in 
Kamidian v Wareham Holt552, where the policy was to cover valuable fine art. 
Kamidian v Wareham Holt553 acknowledged the differences between this case and 
the decision in Economides554. In Kamidian555, the insured was required to be aware 
about the value of the fine art not based on his opinion as in Economides556. Judge 
Tomlinson stated in the context of specialised fine art insurance that ‘it would be a 
wholly uncommercial and unlikely approach for underwriters to agree an insured 
value upon the basis of a belief for which there might be no reasonable grounds’557.  
The question is currently whether the common law is going to adopt the same 
position after the enforcement of IA. As a result of the uncertainty about the position 
of the common law to adopt the position of Economides558 or Kamidian559, it is 
more appropriate for business insurance to adopt the position of Kamidian560 as the 
facts more reflect the case of business insurance whereas applying Economides561 
in case of consumer insurance. However, there is a doubt about how honest is the 
insured’s belief if the insured has deliberately ignored information that may change 
his belief, based on the old law.562 Thus, the insured’s act in these circumstances 
should be considered as breach of the duty of good faith.563  
                                                          
549 See also, Sirius International Insurance Corp v Oriental Assurance Corp [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 
343. 
550 [2008] EWCA Civ 1231, [2009] Lloyd’s Rep IR 396, [4]. 
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Based on s 6(1) of IA, ‘an individual’s knowledge include not only actual 
knowledge, but also matters which the individual suspected, and of which the 
individual would have had knowledge but for deliberately refraining from 
confirming them or enquiring about them’. Accordingly, this section of the Act is 
helpful because such conduct therefore is to be considered as a deliberate or reckless 
breach of the duty of fair presentation.  
Although there is no mirror in Saudi jurisdiction to the provisions of representation 
of an expectation or belief, any act should be done in good faith and honestly based 
on the Islamic rules. However, it is recommended that the Saudi jurisdiction could 
learn from the UK experience and have a specific provision about representation of 
an expectation or belief by differentiating between consumer and business 
insurance.   
The next section provides a critical analysis of what constitute material facts in the 
UK and Saudi jurisdictions. This section considers materiality, moral and physical 
hazards, knowledge of the insured, knowledge of the insurer, and waiver.  
6.6.  Material Facts  
Based on s 7(3) of IA, which re-enacts s 18(2) of MIA, a circumstance is material 
if it would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer to either accept the risk or 
on which terms or at what level of premium. This definition has three key elements 
that are ‘influence’, ‘judgment’, and ‘a prudent insurer’. The hypothetical insurer is 
deemed to be ‘experienced, rational, ordinary, prudent, intelligent, fair and 
reasonable.564 The’ judgment’ means formation of the opinion.565 In addition, the 
significant of the prudent insurer test is to determine the materiality of a fact and its 
impact on the reasonable insurer.566 Attempts to develop this particular test were 
recognised by adding a test of reasonable insured’s opinion567; however, these 
attempts were not developed further in the modern cases.568 The reasonable insured 
test meets many difficulties as it differs based on the type of insured, the size of 
                                                          
564 Peter MacDonald Eggers, 'The Past and Future of English Insurance Law: Good Faith and 
Warranties' [2012] UCLJLJ 211, 221. 
565 Container Transport International Inc v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) 
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edn, Hart Publishing 2011) 89. 
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568 For example, Pan Atlantic Insurance Co v Pine Top Insurance Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501. 
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business, knowledge, and experience. Thus, in business insurance, it is supposed to 
maintain prudent insurer test; however, insured may provide expert evidence in case 
of any complex cases.  
The meaning of ‘influence’ is not covered by MIA or IA to help determine proper 
materiality test. Thus, there was serious debate in the courts to try and specify the 
proper test in order to prove the ‘influence’ by looking at the differences between 
the decisive influence test, increased risk test, and mere influence test.569 In Pan 
Atlantic Insurance Co v Pine Top Insurance Ltd570, the majority of House of Lords 
affirmed the authority in Container Transport International Inc v Oceanus Mutual 
Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd571 by rejecting the decisive influence test 
and the increased risk test572 in favour of the mere influence test.573 It is more 
appropriate to maintain the same test, the mere influence test, as this provision is 
settled by the common law till now since IA contains nothing to challenge this 
position. 
There have been criticisms regarding how an insured with limited knowledge could 
appreciate which facts were material. This is an important argument because there 
is an imbalance in power between the insurer and insured which was little 
appreciated especially in the case of consumer insurance. However, this has been 
solved by CIDRA coming into force.  
Modern authorities have interpreted materiality in the light of fair presentation, 
agreed on the positive role of the insurer to enquire and ask questions where needed, 
and limited the duty of disclosure in a way that goes further than just looking at the 
meaning of ‘every material circumstance’.574 This interpretation is still relevant 
after IA coming into force. Furthermore, the Law Commissions found that ‘it is 
                                                          
569 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) [7-081]. See 
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572 It was also rejected in St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co (UK) Ltd v McDonnell Dowell 
Constructors Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 116. 
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now common for the courts to describe the policyholder’s duty in term of making 
a fair presentation of the risk rather than ‘every material circumstance’.575 In Garnat 
Trading & Shipping (Singapore) PTE Ltd v Baominh Insurance Corporation576, 
Clarke J provided a significant interpretation about materiality, as follows577: 
A minute disclosure of every material circumstance is not required. The assured 
complies with the duty if he discloses sufficient to call the attention of the underwriter 
to the relevant facts and matters in such a way that, if the latter desires further 
information, he can ask for it. A fair and accurate presentation of a summary of the 
material facts is sufficient if it would enable a prudent insurer to form a proper 
judgment, either on the presentation alone, or by asking questions if he was sufficiently 
put upon enquiry and wanted to know further details, whether to accept the proposal, 
and, if so, on what terms. Underwriters should listen carefully to what they are being 
told; they cannot complain if they do not grasp the detail or the implications of it. 
Questions that are raised by an insurer in a proposal should be considered as 
requiring material facts to be disclosed. This is because the insurers' concern is to 
obtain accurate answers that reflect material issues in order to estimate the premium 
and to form the policy's terms. The other importance of the direction of the 
questions is to examine of materiality. This is especially important after IA coming 
into force because disclosure is now based on enquiry. Thus, any enquiry that is 
made by the insurer should be counted as in respect of a material fact.  
Materiality test is required to be met in business insurance since the duty of 
disclosure is obviously not abolished even though the basis is changed from a 
disclosure basis to an enquiry basis. Unlike business insurance, in consumer 
insurance materiality test is not required to be met as the duty of disclosure is totally 
abolished and the duty of reasonable care to not make misrepresentation is set 
instead. Once the insurer ask a question, it is presumed that this question is material 
to the insurer.  
An example is seen in Dawsons Ltd v Bonnin578, where there was a dispute 
regarding an answer given in the proposal form that was for 'premier cover' under 
a comprehensive policy against four risks, public liability, damage or loss by 
accident, by fire, and by theft. The question was with regard to where the vehicle's 
was garaged. While the answer to this question referred to Cadogan Street, 
                                                          
575 The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: The Business 
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Glasgow; the vehicle was garaged in a wooden shed on a farm near Glasgow. The 
insurer tried to void the policy because such a non-disclosed fact was material and 
would induce a prudent underwriter to enter into the contract. However, the House 
of Lords held that the fact was immaterial.579 Although this authority may support 
the impact of material facts on the setting of the premium; the case did not consider 
the fact that the insured did not disclose the place where the vehicle was garaged 
even during the performance of the policy. This is because when questions were 
asked, insurers expect specific and clear answers. These answers may change 
during the performance of the policy, which should be disclosed as a part of the 
insured’s post-contractual duties. However, the insureds had not disclosed the facts 
nor corrected the answer even during the performance of the contract to comply 
with the doctrine of utmost good faith. Since IA, questions should now be 
considered as material because it covers business insurance and both parties are 
deemed to have appropriate knowledge and experience unlike the case of 
consumers. By comparison, in Saudi Arabia, CRIDV have made similar decisions 
to Dawsons Ltd v Bonnin580 concluding that the insurers’ questions were not to 
obtain material facts as the responses made no impact on the insurer’s decisions. 581   
The Saudi jurisdiction considers material facts as an essential element of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith. Article 2 of ICPP specifies what material facts should 
be disclosed by stating that they can be ‘information that may be significant to any 
of the parties to an insurance policy’. Further, article 5(1) states that the insured 
should ‘always present full and accurate information when filling out any form 
required by a company. Do not give any misleading, false or incomplete 
information or conceal important and material information’. However, some facts 
do not directly match the insurer's questions but still need to be disclosed to meet 
the requirement of the doctrine of utmost good faith. There are four main types of 
these facts to be considered as material. 
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Firstly, any facts which show either an unexpected risk or that the covered risks 
may include some unusual features.582 This is because the purpose of the duty is to 
make both parties have the same level of knowledge about the potential risk, to then 
allow this risk to be evaluated, to form the contractual terms, and to set the premium. 
Examples would be where the insured has an inherited disease, a chronic disease, a 
vehicle is second hand, or machinery is modified or refurbished.  
Secondly, facts which would influence the terms of the insurance policy.583 For 
example, if a number of thefts occurred in the same area where the proposer lived, 
the proposer should mention that when entering into an insurance policy against 
theft. In the UK case of Bufe v Turner584, an insured had a warehouse next to a boat 
builders’ shop which caught fire. Following the fire, the insured requested a fire 
insurance policy for the warehouse. The insured did not disclose the original fire in 
the insurance proposal. As a result, the court concluded to void the policy because 
the insured concealed a material fact which influenced the insured to request the 
policy.585 
Thirdly, facts should be disclosed that may impact on the insurer's right of 
subrogation.586  For a mere example, in Tate & sons v Hyslop587 where a marine 
insurance policy issued on goods including crafts and lighters. The insured had an 
arrangement about lighterage and the liability of the lightermen was to be less than 
that of common carriers, specifically, for negligence. This arrangement which 
impacted on the insurer’s right of subrogation was not disclosed to the insurer. 
Consequently, the Court of Appeal held that this fact was material to the prudent 
insurer to estimate the premium, and the non-disclosure was the reason to void the 
policy.588  
Fourthly, the insured may not have disclosed facts that would have been obvious 
during an ordinary inspection.589 Accordingly, non-disclosure of these facts does 
                                                          
582 Bahaa Shukri, Altameen fe Altatbeeq O Alqada w Alqanon (Dar Althaqafa 2011) part 2 ‘Aqd 
Altameen’, 56. 
583 Ibid 57. 
584 (1815) 6 Taunt 338, 128 ER 1065. 
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587 (1885) 15 QBD 368. 
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not count as breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith except where these facts 
are related to other matters which could not be discovered through ordinary 
inspection.590 From the Islamic perspective, 'khiyar al-‘ayb', an option caused by 
defect, is relevant. Mahat well-recognised ‘khiyar al-ayb’, based on Islamic law, 
where the contract is formed after inspection of goods in commercial transactions, 
and there is a defect that was not revealed by ordinary inspection, the contract may 
be rescinded as a consequence of ‘khiyar al-ayb’.591  
CRIDV consider the right to inspect by the insurer. In a decision no 31/R/1434H 
(2013) which was affirmed by the appeal decision no 667/a/1435H (2014) in 
Riyadh, the Committee found that the insurance policy gave the insurer the right to 
have an inspection in order to establish the real status of the warehouses to be 
covered by the insurance policy. However, the insurer did not make this inspection 
in reasonable time, and issued the insurance policy. The Committee denied the 
insurer’s argument to not accept one of the warehouses as it was not in an acceptable 
condition. This was because the insurer had not made the inspection which was 
considered a waiver of the insurer’s right by the Committee. The Committee 
reasoned that if the insurer had carried out the inspection, the insurer would have 
discovered the warehouse’s conditions. Further, the insured acted in good faith and 
provided all material facts which included a description about the condition of the 
warehouses. However, the insurer did not examine these facts closely and did not 
specifically ask the insured any more about the poor condition of the warehouse. 
There are similarities between the English and Saudi approaches about the role of 
inspection in providing evidence to prove the real status of the object of the contract 
to the satisfaction of the contracting parties. For example, the English case, In Re 
Universal Non-Tariff Fire Insurance Company v Forbes & Co.592, was about 
materiality and the status of the building that had been inspected by an agent of the 
insurer regarding a fire insurance policy. There was a dispute about the inspection 
report and an allegation of misdescription had been made by the insurer; and, 
consequently, the insurer claimed to void the policy. Even though the policy 
included a condition that the policy would be void in case of non-disclosure of any 
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material facts about the insured properties, the court held that the fact was 
immaterial. However, if the fact had been material and had been inspected by the 
insurer's agent, the insured would not have been in breach, as a consequence. 
Significantly, these decisions are still relevant after the enforcement of IA as IA 
does not challenge these authorities. 
Material facts may be recognised as physical or moral hazards. However, the 
knowledge of both insurers and insureds is significant to determine which material 
facts should be revealed by the insured. Therefore, the following section examines 
four subsections that are physical and moral hazards, the knowledge of the insured, 
the knowledge of the insurer, and waiver. 
6.6.1. Physical and Moral Hazards 
It is still relevant to analyse physical and moral hazards after the coming into force 
of IA in order to determine materiality of a circumstance. In general, the materiality 
of a fact related to either physical or moral hazards. Physical hazard includes ‘any 
factors that concern the likelihood or degree of a loss’593. An example of physical 
hazard is the nature of the property, the usage of the property, whether the property 
has been exposed to risks in the past, or the surrounding risks. For example, in 
health insurance, consumption of alcohol594 and smoking are types of physical 
hazards. In car insurance policies, unusual modifications to the vehicle are 
considered as physical hazards. In life insurance, physical hazards are age, 
occupation, and unusual or risky hobbies, and health. For a significant clarification, 
in Joel v Law Union and Crown Insurance Co595, Fletcher-Moulton LJ illustrated 
which facts should be disclosed, providing an example for physical hazards in light 
of the knowledge of a reasonable man. Thus, insurers must be specific when asking 
questions and willing to ask further questions to reveal the real position of the 
insured, as follows596:  
I will suppose that a man has, as is the case with most of us, occasionally had a 
headache. It may be that a particular one of those headaches would have told a brain 
specialist of hidden mischief. But to the man it was an ordinary headache 
undistinguishable from the rest. Now no reasonable man would deem it material to tell 
an insurance company of all the casual headaches he had had in his life, and, if he 
knew no more as to this particular headache than that it was an ordinary casual 
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headache, there would be no breach of his duty towards the insurance company in not 
disclosing it. He possessed no knowledge that it was incumbent on him to disclose, 
because he knew of nothing which a reasonable man would deem material or of a 
character to influence the insurers in their action. It was what he did not know which 
would have been of that character, but he cannot be held liable for non-disclosure in 
respect of facts which he did not know. 
Similarly, under Saudi jurisdiction, physical hazards are considered as material 
facts as under the UK jurisdiction. In a decision no 146/R/1434H (2013) which was 
affirmed by the Appeal decision no 76/a/1436H (2015) in Riyadh, CRIDV accepted 
the insurer’s argument regarding the materiality of non-disclosure to reject the 
insured’s claim. The basis of the insurer’s argument was that the insured failed to 
disclose changing the vehicle’s engine. The Committee held that this change was a 
material fact to the insurer, and the insured had breached the duty of disclosure. 
On the other hand, moral hazards was defined as ‘an increase in the likelihood of it 
being made to appear falsely that loss or damage had occurred falling within the 
scope of the policy’597. Moral hazards are not recognised specifically in IA similar 
to MIA, which means that the previous case decisions are still relevant after the 
enforcement of IA. The Explanatory Notes to the Act indicate that the future 
interpretation of some of IA provisions ‘is likely to be guided by existing case 
law’.598  
Moral hazards fall into several categories that are the proposer’s insurance history 
including previous refusals and claim history, criminal convictions599 even a 
wrongful conviction600 unless the conviction is qualified as spent601, allegations602 
such as about a criminal conviction or the financial position, dishonesty603, and the 
insured’s financial status604. However, previous insurance history is not considered 
as a material fact by the common law for marine insurance policies.605 The question 
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might arise whether this exclusion from marine insurance policies would apply after 
the enforcement of IA. It seems however that IA does not challenge the common 
law approach. It was accepted that other situations might impact on insurance 
policies as moral hazards such as nationality, sex, religion and gender; however, all 
of these situations are classified as prohibited discrimination after the impact of 
Equality Act 2010. 
As an example of dishonesty, in the recent case Higherdelta Limited v Covea 
Insurance Plc606, where the insurer sought to avoid the contract because of material 
misrepresentation, the key point was the materiality of the dishonesty as a moral 
hazard. Lord Bannatyne linked the honesty of the insured’s answers and the 
construction of the insurer’s questions, on the one hand, and making an ‘innocent 
mistake’ to form a moral hazard, on the other hand, as follows607: 
I accordingly accept that his answers to the questions posed were honest even if they 
were, on a sound construction of the questions, based on a misunderstanding on his 
part of the questions… I cannot see how an innocent mistake based on a reasonable 
construction of the questions… can somehow raise an issue of moral hazard. 
The allegation should be disclosed was criticised. A leading example of this is seen 
in Brotherton v Aseguradora Colseguros (No.2)608, where reinsurers were entitled 
to avoid the reinsurance policy on the grounds of non-disclosure due to allegations 
of serious misconduct and fraud on behalf of a senior manager of the bank in 
Colombia which had been seen in media reports. These allegations influenced the 
decision of the prudent insurer, because they were deemed to be moral hazard. 
There has been much debate about when allegations should be considered as 
material and if the allegations were true or even false. This is because of the 
recognition of the positive role of insurers to enquire unlike under the old law where 
the insured held the responsibility to disclose all facts that impacted on the insurer’s 
decision. Importantly, Waller LJ in North Star Shipping Ltd v Sphere Drake 
Insurance Plc (the North Star)609 found that it was ‘unjust’ to give the insurer the 
right to avoid the policy because of a false allegation. Furthermore, Waller LJ 
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recognised a difficulty in denying the right of avoidance when insurers proved there 
was an impact of an allegation of fraud on the insurer’s decisions whether this 
allegation was true or false.610 This interpretation may be developed or considered 
further by the courts in terms of IA in light of the change from the duty of disclosure 
to the duty of fair presentation of risks.  
S 7(4) of IA requires the insured to disclose any unusual facts. This leads to 
conclude that the case of allegation as moral hazard is still relevant to be either 
disclosed or at least ‘signposted’. Accordingly, if the insurer requires further 
information, the insurer shall ask follow-up questions as long as the insured’s 
presentation is fair. This position is for business insurance unlike the position of 
consumer insurance where the consumer is not required to volunteer information 
about allegations.  
An example for the materiality of a criminal conviction is seen in the case of 
Lambert v Co-operative Insurance Society611, where a claim made by the insured 
under a household ‘all-risks’ policy in which she had failed to disclose a criminal 
conviction of her husband, even though the insurer had not ask about such criminal 
convictions. It was held that non-disclosure was the ground for the insurer to avoid 
the policy. There are certain consequences arising from this case.  
First, the insured could not argue that if the insurer did not ask questions about 
specific information, that this meant that such information was not material.612 
Second, there was no need to have a connection between the non-disclosure and the 
loss.613 However, in the future, this policy would be recognised as a consumer 
insurance policy where the insurer shall ask questions and the insured will have no 
obligation to offer information. Thus, consumer protection should protect the 
position of consumers as they may not recognise the importance of some facts to 
insurers. On the other hand, in business insurance, insureds are required to make a 
fair presentation even by giving ‘signposts’ to give insurers a chance to ask 
questions in order to reveal further information. 
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It should be noted that s 4 of Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 excludes the 
requirement to disclose any facts about spent criminal convictions. However, the 
IA still requires disclosure of previous convictions, even if they are deemed spent 
in terms of s 4 and any previous breach of the duty of disclosure on this basis will 
still be relevant.614 This is reasonable as it provides balance between a previous 
breach of the duty of disclosure and the exclusion provision under s 4 of the 1974 
Act. 
The materiality of the insured’s insurance history has been recognised by the case 
law. For example, in Locker & Wolf Ltd v Western Australian Insurance Co615, 
where the policy was for fire insurance, a previous refusal of motor insurance was 
held material. This was because the insured failed to disclose this previous refusal 
to another insurer. A further example is in Ewer v National Employers’ Mutual 
General Assurance Association Ltd616, where it was required to disclose the claims 
history for all types of insurance, although the policy was for fire insurance. Again, 
IA does not challenge the position of the previous decisions and they are still 
relevant after the Act has come into force.  
Although this study did not find any relevant CRIDV decisions under Saudi 
jurisdiction related to moral hazard, there is nothing to prevent Saudi jurisdiction 
from learning from the UK experience in respect of this issue. This is especially 
because Saudi regulations recognise ‘material facts’ as any facts that impact on the 
decision of the other party. Therefore, these facts can be about moral hazard. 
Accordingly, further developments in this area of insurance law is recommended to 
be recognised by Saudi regulations.  
6.6.2. Knowledge of the Insured 
The insured is supposed to know certain information that is known as ‘actual 
knowledge’, based on s 4(2)(a) of IA, and ‘constructive knowledge’, based on s 
4(2)(b). On the one hand, actual knowledge includes blind-eye knowledge based on 
s 6(1), which means that the individual’s knowledge is not only supposed to be his 
actual knowledge but also ‘matters which the individual suspected and of which the 
individual would have had knowledge but for deliberately refraining from 
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confirming them or enquiring about them’. Blind-eye knowledge is defined, as well, 
as ‘where the assured would become aware of a fact had he or she not wilfully shut 
his or her eyes to the fact’617. On the other hand, constructive knowledge is that 
which the insured ought to know or would be known by any other person in their 
capacity as being required for the insurance policy, such as a broker, if the insured 
is an individual; or by senior management or by any other person if the insured is 
not individual.  
There are seven points to be considered regarding the knowledge of the insured. 
Firstly, the application of s 4 of IA differs depending on whether the insured is an 
individual or not. Based on s 4(2), if the insured is an individual, the insured is 
supposed to know only ‘what is known to the individual and what is known to one 
or more of the individuals who are responsible for the insured’s insurance’; while, 
based on s 4(3), the insured who is not an individual is supposed to know only ‘what 
is known to one or more of the individuals who are part of the insured’s senior 
management or responsible for the insured’s insurance’. Further, the term ‘known’ 
refers to actual knowledge including blind-eye knowledge and it is not extended to 
constructive and imputed knowledge as it then becomes complex.618 This is true as 
in case of large businesses and multi-national cooperation where the decision 
makers are include a number of employees, it can be hard to include the constructive 
knowledge as each employee involves in the formation of an insurance contract; 
however, this needs further authoritative interpretation by the courts to affirm that 
constructive knowledge should not be included as this area of law is currently 
uncertain.  
Secondly, s 4(8) indicates that senior management refers to any individual who 
plays ‘significant roles in the making of decisions about how the insured’s activities 
are to be managed or organised’. In addition, this section is restricted by the 
requirement of ‘reasonable search’.619 Thus, it is not only the knowledge of senior 
management but also what each individual can reveal by a ‘reasonable search’. A 
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difficulty may arise in the case of large businesses where several numbers of 
employees take a specific role in making such a decision, and each one has specific 
and significant knowledge.620 A further question is which level of senior 
management should be included and to what extent, especially, for large and 
multinational businesses. Accordingly, this further uncertainty needs an 
authoritative interpretation in order to limit and restrict the meaning of senior 
management in light of the duty to undertake reasonable research. The prudent 
insurer test and use of expert evidence may play a significant role to satisfy the 
requirements of this duty.  
Thirdly, a difficulty may arise in respect to s 4(5) which interprets the meaning of 
‘the person connected with a contract of insurance’ as the insured or any other 
person who is covered by the insurance contract. The difficulty may arise because 
if one of the persons who is connected to the policy or the beneficiaries of the policy 
do not provide material facts, the whole policy would be impacted and this would 
affect all parties. An example would be where the insured seeks to have insurance 
cover for Directors’ liability. In this instance, if one director does not provide 
material facts, the whole policy may be impacted as well other directors.621  
Fourthly, s 4(3) and s 4(4) include the word ‘only’ when referring to the new law 
instead of the previous common law position. It was accepted that, based on the old 
law, the breach of the duty of disclosure by an agent was an independent breach, 
although, based on s 19 of MIA, the agent’s duty of disclosure was separate from 
the insured’s duty as the ‘agent to insure’.622 However, the ‘agent to insure’ is now 
removed by IA. Subsection 4(2)(a) covers knowledge held by a person responsible 
for the insured’s insurance. The duty of disclosure is now totally on the insured as 
the material facts which are known by his agent or broker are imputed to the 
insured.623 In other words, brokers are not required to disclose information that 
ought to be known to the broker, whereas the insured is required to disclose 
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information that is actually known to the insured’s broker.624 This important issue 
had been recognised by s 19(b) of MIA to give the insured an excuse if the broker 
communicated facts too late to the insured.  Significantly, this issue is missed by 
IA. The question then is, as long as the insured holds independently the duty of fair 
presentation and there is no duty on the broker, whether the insured’s breach of the 
duty of fair presentation may be excused if the broker communicated facts too late 
to the insured. Kendall and Wright believe that this does not excuse the insured as 
IA does not include a similar provision as in MIA.625 However, this should be 
interpreted in light of the meaning of ‘readily available’ facts to the insured, and by 
interpreting that the duty is not to disclose all material facts but to make a ‘fair’ 
presentation of them. Thus, this can lead to say that the insured’s duty should be 
considered as to make fair presentation of available facts. 
Fifthly, confidential information should limit to the sort of facts that should be 
imputed to the insured. Depending on s 4(4), ‘an insured is not… taken to know 
confidential information known to an individual if the individual is, or is an 
employee of, the insured’s agent and the information was acquired by the insured’s 
agent (or by an employee of the agent) through a business relationship with a person 
who is not connected with the contract of insurance’. However, if an agent or a 
broker held general market information which is not confidential, this knowledge 
is imputed to the insured. For example, if a broker of two clients holds confidential 
information of these two clients. Consequently, the broker is not supposed to 
provide this information for any of them, because there is no connection between 
their insurance contracts. However, where the information is not confidential, the 
insured is supposed to know this information through his broker. Significantly, an 
interesting illustration is made by Kendall and Wright in the 2014 report of the Law 
Commissions in order to clarify the difficulties of confidential information where 
the facts ought not to be disclosed, as follows626: 
Assume that the individual broker acts for a manufacturer of medical implants which 
provides claims information to the broker for the purposes of renewing its liability 
insurance. The information discloses notifications concerning injuries allegedly 
caused by the off-label use of one of its products by a chain of clinics. The individual 
                                                          
624 Peter Macdonald Eggers, ‘The Fair Presentation of Commercial Risks under the Insurance Act 
2015’, in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime for 
Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 31. 
625 David Kendall & Harry Wright, A Practical Guide to the Insurance Act 2015 (Practical 
Insurance Guides) (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) para 3.26. 
626 Ibid para 4.16. 
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broker also arranges the liability insurance for the chain of clinics, which is apparently 
unaware of the claim notifications. Should the broker disclose the notifications to (a) 
the chain of clinics and/ or (b) the chain’s insurers when renewing the chain’s 
insurance with them?... the authors’ view is that it probably ought not to be disclosed 
to the clinic or its insurers. 
In MacGillivray, it is questioned that ‘it is not clear why the insurer should suffer’ 
by holding confidential information from the insured’s agent or broker.627 This is 
especially where the ‘insurer have been deceived, so that the insurance would be 
voidable and the insured has a remedy against the agent’628. However, this 
perspective may be criticised as it is not clear why the insurer ‘should’ suffer from 
information that is not available to the insured himself. The question could arise 
why the insurer should have an advantage of the agent or broker’s confidential 
information of other clients. The insurer should only know whatever complied with 
the two elements of what has been revealed as a result of ‘reasonable research’ and 
that which has been ‘reasonably revealed’ to the insured. It is not assumed that other 
confidential information of the agent’s clients shall be used in order not to harm the 
insurer and to be insurer-friendly.  
Sixthly, the insured whether an individual or not is proposed to know reasonable 
information, whether within the insured’s organisation or by other person, that 
reasonably has been revealed by a ‘reasonable search’, making enquiries, or from 
another source such as the insured’s agent or broker629, based on s 4(6). The duty 
to make a ‘reasonable search’ is ‘novel’; however, some difficulties may face large 
businesses and Multi-national Corporation.630 In MacGillivray, it says that ‘the 
‘reasonable search’ is a somewhat open-ended concept and so can arguably impose 
on the insured some obligations that the present law may not impose’631.  
The Law Commissions addressed the significance of the ‘reasonable search’ as it 
reflects good insurance placement process and the way to deal with 
‘reasonableness’ as they illustrated that ‘the “reasonable search” requirement is a 
key element of our knowledge proposals… We expect that what is “reasonable” 
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will depend on the size, nature and complexity of the business’632.Further, there is 
a question in regard to the proof of the duty to make a ‘reasonable search’, which 
test should be applied whether subjective or objective to prove compliance with the 
requirement of this duty.633 The 2014 Report of the Law Commissions considered 
the objective test to prove complying with the requirement of the duty to 
‘reasonable search’634; however, it still needs further authoritative interpretation.635 
It is much more appropriate to apply the objective test instead of the subjective test 
for two reasons. First, it would be standard for similar types of insurance contracts 
which means that it would be more practical for courts and contracting parties. 
Second, it would be clearer for the insureds to be understood as the subjective test 
would consider specific circumstances of each insured which may raise confusion 
among insureds.  
It becomes complicated if fraud is involved in compliance with the duty to have 
‘reasonable search’. However, the duty of ‘reasonable search’ would be limited to 
the data available to the insured. Although ‘the data available to the insured is 
questioned’ as to which data is being referred to636; it is clear that ‘available to the 
insured’ is a fact of each case. In addition, two issues may need to be satisfied being 
the impact of fraud on the data available to the insured, on the one hand, and the 
reasonableness of the insured, on the other. In other words, it would not be 
reasonable to know information that was withheld fraudulently by an agent or an 
employee.637 Merkin acknowledged this issue as one of the interpretation of 
‘reasonably revealed’ and ‘reasonably research’ by saying that ‘the phrase 
‘reasonably revealed’ could be taken to refer to what would have been revealed 
without fraud’638. This is true because in case of fraud by an employee or a broker 
                                                          
632 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business 
Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Summary 
(Law Com No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014) paras 8.78 - 8.79, 8.83. 
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638 Robert Merkin, ‘What Does an Assured ‘Know’ for the Purpose of Pre-Contractual 
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the insured should be secured from this specific fraud by applying the rule of Re 
Hampshire Land Co639. 
Finally, IA does not consider any provisions to repeal or modify the rule in Re 
Hampshire Land Co640. As a result, the rule will still be applied in case of fraud by 
the agent of the insured till the courts deal with this issue after IA coming into force. 
In brief, in this case, the insured was secured from the fraud of his agent, and the 
fraud was against the insurer.641 Merkin acknowledged this point by saying ‘it is 
less easy to argue that the knowledge of the broker’s fraud is not to be imputed to 
the assured’642. In Deutshe Ruck Akt v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd643, it was pointed 
out that the agent’s fraud became material, if the fraud related directly to the risk, 
but if the fraud did not relate directly to the risk, the fraud would not be considered 
material. Significantly, after IA, this rule should be extended to include the senior 
management of the insured and employees.  
By comparison, under Saudi jurisdiction, there is no similar position regarding the 
knowledge of the insured in Saudi regulations. Article 42 of IMCCR uses general 
terms to have the reasonable person disclose all material facts that are relevant to 
the insurance policy. Accordingly, particular provisions are required and could be 
learned from the UK experience. This could be specifically by adopting the business 
insurance regime and providing specific provisions that comply with business and 
professional insurance separate from consumer insurance.   
6.6.3. Knowledge of the Insurer 
The insurer’s knowledge consists of actual knowledge but also includes blind-eye 
knowledge, based on s 6(1), as well as constructive knowledge.644 Section 5(1) of 
IA points to actual knowledge as being the information ‘only’ ‘known to one or 
more of the individuals who participate on behalf of the insurer in the decision 
whether to take the risk and if so on what terms’. In referring to individuals, an 
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individual may be the insurer’s employee or agent or in any other capacity such as 
brokers. Again, this provision includes a limitation by including the term ‘only’. 
Thus, any other previous interpretation to expand actual knowledge would not be 
relevant. 
Section 5(2) gives a non-exhaustive list of the information that the insurer ought to 
know, as being constructive knowledge, i.e. if ‘an employee or agent of the insurer 
knows it and ought reasonably to have passed on the relevant information to an 
individual’, such as information held by claims department.645 Further, as far as 
constructive knowledge is concerned, s 5(2) states that ‘the relevant information is 
held by the insurer and is readily available to an individual’, such as the insurer’s 
records. Birds raised a significant question in regard to what is ‘readily available’ 
especially, for example, where the underwriting department has no right to access 
the claims department records.646  
In Mahli v Abbey Life Assurance Co Ltd647, the majority of the Court of Appeal 
found that there was no imputation of knowledge from the insurer’s claims 
department to the insurer’s underwriting department partially as these departments 
were not in the same location. Although this decision may be criticised as the source 
of the data is the same for the same insurer. However, if the insurer used two 
different systems for each department, this ground might reasonably succeed.  
Significantly, applying this authority now post-IA may be difficult as IA adopts a 
different approach from the old law. For instance, the interpretation of ‘readily 
available’ should include any information in the insurer’s organisation whether this 
information is in a different department or not as this information is presumed to be 
known.648 The interpretation may extend the insurer’s role to include the insurer’s 
duty to conduct a search, as long as this search is feasible.649 Currently, it is up to 
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the courts to interpret the meaning of ‘readily available’ and its limits. In addition, 
there will be different positions in light of the new duty of fair presentation. 
As far as the interpretation of ‘readily available’ is concerned, Merkin recognised 
another significant question whether the insurer is under a duty to ‘search electronic 
files’, and if so which test is proper to prove ‘readily available’ whether a subjective 
or an objective test.650 On the other hand, Merkin pointed out another question about 
which individuals’ knowledge within the insurer’s organisation should be taken into 
account.651 Both questions are complex especially where the underwriting is 
separate and where the data is massive and many individuals may be involved and 
hold some knowledge. However, availability may refer to a wider duty than 
searching electronic files within the insurer’s organisation or other organisations 
such as the insurer’s broker organisation as long as these files are available. In 
addition, it may extend to all data bases that are available in the market. Thus, it 
may be likely that one can use the objective test to prove the failure of such duty.  
However, special circumstances of the actual insurer may be still considered. For 
example, in the Canadian case Coronation Insurance Co v Taku Air Transport 
Ltd652, where an airplane crash occurred, and the insurer rejected the claim on the 
grounds of non-disclosure of the bad accident records and the accuracy of numbers 
of the seating capacity. Significantly, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
seating capacity was material but the air accident records were not, because these 
records were in the public domain, which should be known by the insurer as it stated 
that ‘at a minimum, it [the insurer] should review its own files on the applicant, and 
should make a search of the public record of the air carrier's accidents’653. Thus, the 
question is whether the common law approach in the UK would be similar to the 
Canadian approach. 
Section 5(3) gives a non-exhaustive list of the sort of the circumstances the insurer 
is presumed to know. These include, as s 5(3) states, ‘things which are common 
knowledge and things which an insurer offering insurance of the class in question 
to insureds in the field of activity in question would reasonably be expected to know 
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in the ordinary course of business’.654 The famous example for common knowledge 
is the case of Carter v Boehm655, where the non-disclosure is about information that 
was a part of the common knowledge of the insurer.  
It is widely accepted that to assess the knowledge of the insurer and the impact of 
the material facts on the insurer’s decision expert evidence shall be led.656 The 
court, however, is not bound by these opinions especially where these opinions 
conflict from insurer to insurer.657 McCardie J pointed out the court’s position on 
the use of expert evidence in Yorke v Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd658, saying that 
‘Expert evidence may frequently afford great assistance to the Court upon questions 
of novelty or doubt... Judges are always free to test and revise every form of expert 
testimony’659. Nevertheless, if the court can reach its decision on materiality, expert 
evidence becomes unnecessary.660 Mance LJ, in Brotherton v Aseguradora 
Colseguros (No.2)661, illustrated that courts are the ‘ultimate decision makers’ 
regarding the determination of the role of the expert, and this remains after IA 
coming into force. Thus, the common law authorities on this issue are still relevant.  
There is no specific provision for determining the knowledge of the insurer under 
Saudi jurisdiction, and this should be examined by the Saudi regulations following 
on from the UK experience. Further reform toward more specific and detailed 
provisions is necessary to have specific and comprehensive detailed insurance law 
and regulations.  
6.6.4. Waiver  
Based on IA, there is an exception to the duty of disclosure in the absence of enquiry 
by the insurer, based on s 3(5), if ‘it is something as to which the insurer waives 
information’. Burton J, in Sugar Hut Group v Great Lakes Reinsurance662, 
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illustrated this where the insurer had the right to make further enquiries; however, 
if the insurer failed to ask further questions, it would be a ‘a starting point for a 
waiver’.663 Accordingly, as a limit for the duty of disclosure, if a reasonable man 
did not consider some facts as material because of the wording of the proposal, 
these facts should be waived by the insurer.664 This leads to say that if the wording 
of a question misleads a reasonable man into not answering a question accurately, 
the insurer cannot rely on the inaccuracy of the answer.665 However, if the problem 
is due to the wording of the insurer’s question, the question is whether this should 
be counted as a case of waiver or as breach of the insurer’s duty to ask questions 
clearly. Although IA does not indicate the extent to which waiver should be applied 
and it needs an authoritative interpretation by the courts; this situation should be 
counted as a consequence of the breach of the insurer’s duty to ask clear questions 
rather than a waiver. Counting this situation as a breach of the insurer’s duties of 
utmost good faith can give the insured a chance to further remedies, and it can limit 
the insurer’s bad faith conducts. 
Waiver can be at the pre-contractual stage commonly by an express term such as in 
HIH Casualty and General Insurance Co v Chase Manhattan Bank666 where the 
policy included a ‘statement of truth’, which exempted the insured from the duty of 
disclosure of material facts or make any representation as this duty is waived by the 
insurer.667 Furthermore, waiver can be at the post-contractual stage by acting in 
several situations, for example, by not seeking to avoid the policy for a long time 
when the misrepresentation is revealed, such as in Wise Underwriting Agency Ltd 
v Grupo Nacional Provincial668. Several situations and requirements of waiver are 
going to be considered below. 
Five requirements for waiver were developed through case law which is still 
applicable under the new law. In Wise Underwriting Agency Ltd v Grupo Nacional 
Provincial669, cargo cover was issued for a Cancun retailer who imported luxury 
goods from Miami; and the claimants, Wise, were entitled to avoid the reinsurance 
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contract on the basis of misrepresentation of a consignment including high-value 
Rolex watches to Cancun as it was described only as clocks due to a translation 
error. However, the Court of Appeal found that affirmation grounded to waive the 
reinsurer’s right to avoid the reinsurance policy. Significantly, the waiver 
requirements were set and adopted by the Court of Appeal, as follows670: 
1. The insurer must have actual knowledge of the facts not disclosed prior to the 
contract. Constructive knowledge is insufficient. 
2. The insurer must also know that non-disclosure creates the right to avoid. 
3. The insurer has a reasonable time in which to decide what to do. 
4. There must be an unequivocal communication to the assured by words or conduct 
that the insurer has made an informed choice to affirm the contract. 
5. Whether such a communication is found depends upon how a reasonable person in 
the position of the assured would interpret the insurer's words or conduct. 
Making an ‘informed choice’ is addressed in proving waiver. Proof of an ‘informed 
choice’ is based on whether to satisfy the position of the reasonable insured who 
would appreciate that the insurer had made an informed choice, or to satisfy the 
impact of the insurer’s conduct on the actual insured. While the former test provides 
a balance between the actual conduct of the insurer and the position of the 
reasonable insured, the latter may lead to difficulties in satisfying the position of 
the actual insured case-by-case.671  
There are four common situations where waiver can occur that are: First, a limit on 
the duty of fair presentation; second, a limit on a specific type of information; third, 
a limitation of the authority of the insured to represent; fourth, a restriction on the 
insurer’s remedies such as the insurer’s right to avoid the insurance policy.672 
Although they are not covered by IA, two significant matters about limitation were 
decided on in HIH Casualty and General Insurance Co v Chase Manhattan Bank673. 
Firstly, if the waiver is particularly for the insured, it does not extend to his agent. 
Secondly, the waiver cannot exclude fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent 
non-disclosure due to public policy. 
Six examples are provided to illustrate when waiver should be considered. Firstly, 
the most usual situation for waiver is when the insured has left a question 
unanswered, and the insurer does not require details in regard to this blank answer. 
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This would be a waiver made by the insurer about this particular information unless 
this blank answer had a negative meaning; then, it would be considered as an 
answer.674 Accordingly, this should be counted as incorrect information which may 
in addition be misrepresentation.675  
Secondly, when a question is specific to a time or the type of insurance, such as in 
liability insurance, when the insurer asks about any claims made in the last five 
years.  
Thirdly, where the insured is to provide information on refused applications or 
claims history for specific types of insurance policies. This refers to the fact that it 
is material to the insurer to know only this specific information.  
Fourthly, when the proposal requires an answer to provide information about any 
motor convictions, this would imply that other convictions were not material to the 
insurer.676  
Fifthly, when the policy includes an express contract term that excludes the 
insured’s duty of disclosure and to not misrepresent. Accordingly, the insurer is not 
allowed to avoid the policy for non-disclosure or misrepresentation as the insurer 
waives its right to do so.677  
Finally, in the case  of the online proposal where the insurer provides choices to 
answer some questions, such as ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers, and where the insurer does 
not provide any space to provide further information, the question is whether this 
case should be counted as a waiver or not. In Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services 
Ltd678, where the insured argued that the insurer’s online form did not have any 
space to provide further information, the Court of Appeal did not consider this case 
as a waiver. However, this authority can be criticised in the case of consumer 
insurance, individual trader, and micro-businesses where insureds have limited 
experience and knowledge to provide further information when the construction of 
the question limits the answer.  
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In Saudi jurisdiction, the only regulation that recognises waiver is IRCHIL. Article 
84 of IRCHIL sets out that the insurer may waive all or some information that is 
required to be provided by the insured, and the information that is provided 
completely or partially based on the waiver, is the information that should be 
examined to find out whether the insured complies with the requirement of the duty 
of disclosure. There is no further interpretation of waiver except under article 84. 
The wording of this article is very general which can cover the six situations of the 
waiver that are found in the UK approach. This provision is limited to the 
cooperative health insurance policies under CHIL; thus, all other types of insurance 
do not apply this provision. Accordingly, Saudi regulations should recognise the 
need to add further provisions to deal with waiver similar to the IRCHIL and by 
learning from the UK experience.  
The next section critically analyses the requirement of inducement in the UK and 
Saudi jurisdictions. This requirement is significant as it limits the insured’s pre-
contractual duties. 
6.7.  The Requirement of Inducement 
The requirement of inducement was introduced, in the UK, by the House of Lords 
in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co v Pine Top Insurance Co679. IA introduced the 
necessity of inducement as a statutory requirement. Particularly, s 7(3) states that 
‘a circumstance or representation is material if it would influence the judgement of 
a prudent insurer in determining whether to take the risk and, if so, on what terms’. 
By s 8(1), the insurer is required to prove the inducement by either not entering into 
the contract or on entering it on different terms. The inducement needs to be proved 
even though materiality has been proved. The previous common law authorities are 
still relevant for interpretation of the requirement of inducement. Accordingly, if 
the insurer fails to meet the requirements of inducement, no remedy can be 
awarded.680 Lord Mustill acknowledged the requirement of inducement by saying 
that: ‘a material misrepresentation will not entitle the underwriter to avoid the 
policy unless the misrepresentation induced the making of the contract’681.  
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The question had been left in Pan Atlantic682 whether inducement was to be 
presumed or to be proved as a consequence of proving materiality.683 Significantly, 
although IA clearly requires inducement, it says nothing about the presumption of 
the inducement. Therefore, the previous law is still applicable.  
Inducement might be presumed, if the court accepted the materiality of a fact. There 
is no rule though that says proof of materiality is a presumption of inducement.684 
However, there were some cases where insurers had a good reason preventing them 
from providing evidence of inducement; thus, proof of materiality was presumed to 
be a requirement of inducement, such as in St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co 
(UK) Ltd v McDonnell Dowell Constructors Ltd685. Accordingly, insurers should 
provide evidence on how they have been induced by material non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation. Significantly, the Court of Appeal in Assicurazioni Generali Spa 
v Arab Insurance Group (B.S.C.)686 resolved the issue of the presumption of 
inducement by requiring it to be proved. The Court of Appeal summarised the 
relevant issues for inducement, as follows687: 
i) In order to be entitled to avoid a contract of insurance or reinsurance, an 
insurer or reinsurer must prove on the balance of probabilities that he was 
induced to enter into the contract by a material non-disclosure or by a material 
misrepresentation.  
ii) There is no presumption of law that an insurer or reinsurer is induced to enter 
in the contract by a material non-disclosure or misrepresentation.  
iii) The facts may, however, be such that it is to be inferred that the particular 
insurer or reinsurer was so induced even in the absence from evidence from 
him.  
iv) In order to prove inducement the insurer or reinsurer must show that the non-
disclosure or misrepresentation was an effective cause of his entering into the 
contract on the terms on which he did. He must therefore show at least that, 
but for the relevant non-disclosure or misrepresentation, he would not have 
entered into the contract on those terms. On the other hand, he does not have 
to show that it was the sole effective cause of his doing so. 
As the requirement of inducement is a ‘matter of fact in every case’688, there is 
debate on how to prove there has been inducement. It can be proved by showing 
how an insurer may ask different or further questions which should lead, 
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consequently, to the imposition of different terms. Further, it is required, first, to 
prove materiality. The distinction between materiality and inducement is that 
whereas materiality is about the conduct of a prudent insurer in making the decision, 
inducement focuses on the actual insurer’s conduct.689  
 Case law provides examples regarding the proof of the requirement of inducement 
as IA does not provide detailed provision on how to prove this requirement. In 
Drake Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc690, it was important to prove not 
only whether the non-disclosure induced the insurer to enter into the contract, but 
also what would have happened if the fact was disclosed. Further, where there was 
no change in the premium because of non-disclosure of a conviction, which was 
found at no fault of the insured, inducement cannot be proved. Further, in Glencore 
International AG v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd691, inducement could not be proved as 
the total loss was much bigger than the loss would have been if the facts were 
disclosed. In this case, the policy covered all the risks of loss and the insured 
claimed for the loss of stored crude oil, but the insurer rejected the claim due to 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation. However, the court held that even though the 
insured’s non-disclosure and misrepresentation occurred, the insurer could not 
prove inducement because of the limited impact of the loss as part of the total risk. 
Further, the prudent insurer would not have been induced into such insurance 
policy.  
In a recent case Axa Versicherung AG v Arab Insurance Group (BSC)692, a ‘first 
loss treaty’ was issued to cover USD $500,000 losses for any one accident or 
occurrence of marine energy construction risks from 1996 to 1997. The reinsurer 
sought to avoid the reinsurance treaty due to the non-disclosure of past marine 
energy construction losses based on statistics from 1989 to 1995, which had shown 
high losses in 1989-1990. The reinsurer was not entitled to avoid the reinsurance 
treaty because inducement was not proved. The failure to prove inducement was 
because the reinsurer could not prove that it would not have taken the risk if the 
statistics were disclosed. The determination of the requirement of inducement had 
to comply with the requirement of fair presentation. Moreover, the facts had been 
                                                          
689 Peter MacDonald Eggers, 'The Past and Future of English Insurance Law: Good Faith and 
Warranties' [2012] UCLJLJ 211, 222. 
690 [2004] QB 601. 
691 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 111. 
692 [2017] EWCA Civ 96, [2017] 1 All ER (Comm) 929, [2017] Lloyd's Rep IR 216. 
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‘fairly’ disclosed. Later, the Court of Appeal dismissed the reinsurer’s appeal. This 
is an important decision because it interpreted the requirement of inducement in 
light of the duty of fair presentation. Thus, such elements as ‘fairly’ disclosed and 
‘reasonable research’ and ‘reasonably reveal’ are relevant to prove inducement 
unlike the past position of the common law where these elements were not 
recognised based on MIA. 
The requirement of inducement is part of the Saudi jurisdiction. To prove breach of 
the duty of disclosure, it is necessary to prove inducement, similar to the UK 
approach. Inducement has been considered by IMCCR, IRCHIL, and UCMIP. 
Article 42 of IMCCR requires insurers to inform insureds about their duty of 
disclosure about any material facts that impact on underwriting the risk. Article 
2(16) of UCMIP defines a material fact as ‘any fact that affects the company's 
decision to accept or reject insurance or impacts on the insurance premium or terms 
and conditions of the contract’. However, article 2 of ICPP does not expressly 
mention the requirement of inducement but rather implies the requirement of 
inducement by referring to ‘any information that may be significant to any of the 
parties to an insurance policy’. Saudi regulations do not debate whether to treat 
inducement as a presumed requirement. In addition, the burden of proof to show 
inducement is on the insurer.693   
CRIDV examine the requirement of inducement of material facts to determine the 
failure of the duty of disclosure and, consequently, to determine the breach of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith.694 For example, in a decision no 89/R/1433H (2012) 
which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 398/a/1435H (2014) in Riyadh, 
where there was a dispute about the insurer’s claim to not pay out on the policy 
based on the insured’s misrepresentation. The Committee found that the insurer had 
failed to prove inducement based on this misrepresentation. Accordingly, the facts 
were not considered material as no inducement had been proved, and the insurer’s 
claim was dismissed. In addition, the insurer was obliged to pay the insured’s claim. 
Another example, in a decision no 85/R/1435H (2014) in Riyadh, the Committee 
found the insured had breached the doctrine of utmost good faith by non-disclosure 
                                                          
693 Decision no 38/J/1429H (2008) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations in Jeddah. 
694 Decision no 128/R/1435H (2014) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 704/a/1436H 
(2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Jeddah. 
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of material facts. These facts were about the insured’s health records and 
misrepresentation to the insurer of these material facts induced the insurer to enter 
into the insurance contract on these particular terms at that premium. 
The next section considers legal remedies upon breach of the insureds’ pre-
contractual duties in both the UK and Saudi jurisdictions. As there are detailed 
provisions for each jurisdiction, this section divides into two subsections. The first 
subsection considers legal remedies in the UK for business insurance. The second 
subsection considers legal remedies in Saudi Arabia.  
6.8.  Legal Remedies 
6.8.1. Legal Remedies in the UK 
In terms of s 8 of IA, a ‘qualifying breach’ occurs on breach of the duty of fair 
presentation by the insured. A qualifying breach can be either a deliberate or 
reckless breach or a non-deliberate or reckless breach. IA defines in s 8(5) ‘a 
qualifying breach is deliberate or reckless if the insured knew that it was in breach 
of the duty of fair presentation, or did not care whether or not it was in breach of 
that duty’. Otherwise the breach is non-deliberate or reckless breach. The Law 
Commissions considered recklessness as a ‘difficult concept… It requires a lack of 
interest in making a fair presentation; perhaps an almost complete disregard for the 
quality of the presentation’695. The Law Commissions differentiated between ‘not 
caring’ and acting ‘carelessly’ based on the insured’s intent. Thus, if the insured 
made a statement without caring whether this statement was true or not, this would 
reflect that the insured did not care and was not acting carelessly.696 The Law 
Commissions provided some examples of deliberate conducts, as follows697: 
(1) Refraining from disclosing a circumstance which the insured knows to be material;  
(2) Making a data dump or otherwise presenting risk in a particular way in order to 
conceal certain information (as in the case where a summary is very misleading)… 
Recklessness might be particularly salient in the data dump context, where an insured 
does not care whether the insurer will be able to make sense of the information 
provided, with the result that obviously important information may well be missed.  
(3) Intentionally lying about a material representation, either in the initial presentation 
or by knowingly giving a false response to an insurer enquiry… It may also be shown 
by answering a question with no attempt to check the facts. 
                                                          
695 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business 
Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Summary 
(Law Com No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014) paras 11.43 – 11.47. 
696 Ibid. 
697 Ibid. 
   164 
 
 
It should be noted that IA differs from CIDRA as the latter does not specify what 
careless breach is. IA combines careless breach and innocent breach under the 
definition of non-deliberate or reckless breach. However, CIDRA does not regard 
acting innocently as a breach of the duty to take reasonable care to not make a 
misrepresentation, which may need further interpretation by the courts to affirm this 
conclusion. 
There are similarities between IA and CIDRA regarding legal remedies upon breach 
of the insured’s pre-contractual duties. There is no assumption of avoidance as a 
consequence of the breach of the duty of fair presentation of the risks under IA 
which is similar to CIDRA. Based on IA, if the breach is deliberate or reckless, the 
insurer may avoid the contract, refuse all claims, and retain the premium698, which 
is similar to the legal remedies of deliberate or reckless misrepresentation under 
CIDRA. Another similarity between IA and CIDRA is the legal remedies for non-
deliberate or reckless breach under IA and the legal remedies for careless 
misrepresentation under CIDRA.  
As was shown in chapter 5, there are three possible remedies for non-deliberate or 
reckless breach. First, if the insurer would not enter into the contract at all, the 
insurer may avoid the contract, refuse all claims, and return the premium paid.699 
Second, if the insurer would enter into the contract but on different terms, the 
contract should be treated as if those terms existed.700 For example, in a liability 
insurance policy, if specific types of risk should be excluded, the policy would be 
treated as if those risks were excluded from the day of commencement of the 
insurance policy. Third, if a higher premium should have been charged, the claim 
will be reduced proportionately.701 Again, in the case of subrogation a claim should 
reduce proportionately in terms of IA. Thus, the amount to be paid by the insurer 
may reduce proportionately, in terms of the following formula702: 
X =
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
× 100 
                                                          
698 S 2, Schedule 1 of IA.  
699 S 4, Schedule 1 of IA. 
700 S 5, Schedule 1 of IA. 
701 S 6(1), Schedule 1 of IA. 
702 S 6(2), Schedule 1 of IA. 
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Significantly, the insurer’s right to avoid the policy should be exercised in good 
faith. This is again part of the insurer’s post-contractual duty of utmost good faith. 
For instance, if the insurer cannot prove materiality or inducement, the insurer may 
be in breach of the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith.703 Consequently, this 
duty is a limit on the insurer’s right to avoid the insurance policy. This authoritative 
judicial decision should be followed even after IA coming into force as the doctrine 
of utmost good faith becomes an interpretative principle which may impose implied 
terms such as the insurer’s duty to exercise its rights and powers. 
Insurers may waive their rights, as shown in section 6.6.3, to avoid the policy by 
either affirmation or estoppel. Both estoppel and affirmation are well-recognised by 
the common law, and this should apply under IA, as IA does not exclude either 
estoppel or affirmation provisions. The only issue would be to consider the insurer’s 
role in affirmation, for example by not asking follow-up questions to reveal more 
information. Affirmation is based on the insurer’s conduct or words to waive their 
rights of avoidance for non-disclosure or misrepresentation as the insurers have full 
knowledge about the facts; estoppel is when the insurer’s conduct induces the 
insured to think that there is no need to disclose facts as the insurer would not avoid 
the policy as a consequence of non-disclosure or misrepresentation.704 A further 
distinction between affirmation and estoppel was pointed out by Mance J by saying 
that ‘in affirmation (as distinct from estoppel), the actual state of mind of the other 
party is not the test. Affirmation depends on the objective manifestation of a 
choice’705.  
Affirmation would be recognised, for example, where the insurer accepted payment 
of the premium after the insurer had knowledge about non-disclosure of facts; the 
insurer delayed in communicating with the insured or confirming the insurance 
cover706, and the insurer gave a notice of cancellation707. For example, in Insurance 
Corporation of the Channel Islands v The Royal Hotel Ltd708, where there were two 
insurance policies covering material damage to the hotel building and interruption 
                                                          
703 Drake Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc [2004] QB 601. 
704 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) [7-223]. John 
Lowry, Philip Rawlings, & Robert Merkin, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles (3rd edn, Hart 
Publishing 2011) 134 - 135. 
705 Insurance Corporation of the Channel Islands v The Royal Hotel Ltd [1998] Lloyd's Rep IR 151. 
706 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) [7-228]. 
707 Wise Underwriting Agency Ltd v Grupo Nacional Provincial [2003] EWHC 3038 (Comm). 
708 [1998] Lloyd's Rep IR 151. 
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to business, the insured claimed for fire. Although the materiality and inducement 
tests were satisfied, avoidance was not allowed because of waiver as the insurer had 
known about the non-disclosed facts, and the insurer did not seek to avoid the policy 
at that time. For another example, in Argo Systems FZE v Liberty Insurance Pte 
Ltd709, there was a misrepresentation in a letter sent from the insured to the insurer 
since 2003; however, the insurer knew about this misrepresentation but it took no 
action at that time. The insurer did not seek to avoid the policy or return the 
premiums, and when the insured placed a claim, the insurer sought to avoid the 
policy based on the non-disclosure and misrepresentation. The trial judge found that 
the insurer affirmed the contract, as the insurer spent seven years to take an action 
and this period was long to seek the avoidance. 
In the case of variation of a policy, the same legal remedies apply to deliberate or 
reckless breach, or non-deliberate or reckless breach. Two scenarios may be 
considered. Firstly, if the variation had no effect on the entire policy, the 
consequences of the breach would impact only on the variation and it would not 
have any effect on the whole policy.710 Secondly, if the variation had a direct and 
significant impact on the entire policy, the consequences of breach would impact 
on the whole policy.711 For example, if avoidance is the remedy for a reckless 
breach of a variation, and the variation has an effect on the whole policy, the whole 
policy should be avoided, such as in Limit No.2 Ltd v Axa Versicherung AG712. 
Termination is not imposed by IA where the insured does not wish to proceed with 
the contract upon non-deliberate or reckless breach unlike CIDRA, which imposes 
termination in case of careless misrepresentation. Accordingly, termination is 
available to consumers as further protection; while, in business insurance, this 
option is not available unless the contract express otherwise. However, termination 
in business insurance could provide benefits to the individual trader, micro and 
small businesses. This is because they need similar protection to consumers due to 
the lack of their bargaining powers to negotiate such termination provisions at the 
pre-contractual stage. Hence, it is recommended to adopt this advantage of CIDRA 
into business insurance by imposing termination provisions to give the right to 
                                                          
709 [2011] Lloyd’s Rep IR 427.  
710 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) [7-202]. 
711 Ibid [7-206]. 
712 [2008] EWCA Civ 1231, [2009] Lloyd’s Rep IR 396. 
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terminate for businesses that are not in the same bargaining position as insurers. 
However, if both the insurer and the insured have the same bargaining powers, they 
may exclude the provisions of termination by contracting out. 
6.8.2. Legal Remedies in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi regulations are brief in considering remedies upon breach of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith, specifically, the breach of the duty of disclosure and 
misrepresentation. In addition, specific remedies apply based on specific types of 
insurance policies, which means that these remedies are not binding for other 
policies. For example, IRCHIL covers breach of the duty of disclosure in good faith. 
If the insured acts without fraud, the insurer must not reject any claims because of 
errors, inaccuracy, invalidity, or breach of the duty of disclosure, based on article 
77 of IRCHIL. This then does consider the case of fraudulent non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation. Additionally, this regulation does not adopt avoidance as a 
remedy even if there is fraud, and the only remedy available, in case of fraudulent 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation, is to reject the insured’s claim. This provision 
is significant due to the level of protection given to insureds and beneficiaries, 
especially, because this type of insurance is a compulsory insurance for non-
governmental employees. However, it seems that this provision needs to be 
developed, because it may motivate insureds to act carelessly. The question is 
whether the insurer can reject further claims where the insured acts fraudulently. 
According to the regulation, there is a gap regarding this issue, and it seems that 
there is nothing to prevent the insurer rejecting further claims because of a previous 
fraud.  
There is disagreement between article 77 of IRCHIL and the Unified Medical 
Disclosure Form, part of the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance. This form 
includes the necessity of providing accurate answers, because insurers have the 
right, in the case of non-disclosure, to recover all paid indemnity and re-calculate 
the insurance premium. However, this Form is not consistent with article 77 
because the insurers have, on the one hand, the right to recover all paid indemnity, 
and, on the other hand, insurers must not reject any claims in case of invalid or 
inaccurate answers. This could lead to conclude that the provision of the Unified 
Medical Disclosure Form may apply in case of fraud. For instance, if the insurer 
knows about the fraud after paying the insured’s claim, the insurer may recover 
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paid indemnity already paid. However, this is not clear from the wording of the 
Unified Medical Disclosure Form because it includes a general statement with no 
further interpretation. Accordingly, further development is encouraged and urgent 
for both the Unified Medical Disclosure Form and IRCHIL. 
According to article 123 and 127 of IRCHIL and article 14 of the Unified Health 
Insurance Policy, Cooperative Health Insurance Disputes Committees have the 
authority to choose proper remedies upon the failure of the insurers or the insureds’ 
in compliance with their duties. Additionally, article 17 of the Rules of Cooperative 
Health Insurance Disputes Committees sets out that in case of any legal gaps, 
general rules and provisions of Islamic laws and any other related provisions to the 
dispute may be considered but not binding. Although, this is not a definitive 
position, it has a significant advantage as the committees have authority to decide 
on the applicable provisions depending on the surrounding circumstances on a case-
by-case basis. This is because the decision of the committees are not binding in 
future disputes. Accordingly, it is recommended there should be full consideration 
of all related provisions specifically in regard of the doctrine of utmost good faith 
and especially legal remedies.   
There are variations of the remedies available on breach of the duty of disclosure 
between compulsory health insurance policies and compulsory motor insurance 
policies. Specifically, according to article 6(2) of UCMIP, the insurer has the right 
to recover the paid indemnity if the insured concealed or failed to disclose material 
facts prior to conclusion of the policy, which induced the insurer’s decision to enter 
into the contract, or on which terms or premium. Similarly, article 12(7) of ICPP 
includes that insurers must not repudiate paying indemnity to a third party in the 
case of breach of motor insurance by the insured; and  it is for the insurer to recover 
any paid indemnity.  
Based on two of CRIDV decisions, rejection of the insured’s claim is the only 
remedy in case of breach of the duty of disclosure. In a decision no 146/R/1434H 
(2013) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 76/a/1436H (2015) in 
Riyadh, CRIDV rejected the insured’s claim to recover his loss based on a 
comprehensive motor insurance policy because the insured failed to disclose a 
change in the vehicle’s engine. The Committee considered this fact as material 
which had induced the insurer’s decision. Thus, the Committee held that the insured 
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was in breach of his duty of disclosure, and, consequently, rejected his claim. 
Further, in a decision no 35/R/1435H (2014) in Riyadh, CRIDV rejected the 
insured’s claim to recover health treatment costs due to non-disclosure of the past 
health record.  
There are two main criticisms of these CRIDV decisions. Firstly, CRIDV did not 
examine whether the insured acted intentionally or carelessly. Further, the CRIDV 
attitude to only reject claims in case of deliberate breach was not fair for insurers 
as the insurance policy is retained. This stance might be considered as an advantage 
for consumer insurance; however, it would not be fair for business insurance 
policies.  
Sharia provisions are considered in resolving insurance disputes. Significantly, 
reconciliation is considered by CRIDV as an agreed method to settle insurance 
disputes in general at the agreed indemnity based on the discretion of the 
contracting parties.713 This is depending on the Holy Quran ‘reconciliation is 
best’714; and the Prophet’s tradition ‘reconciliation is permitted between Muslims 
except a reconciliation that permits a forbidden or forbids a permitted’715. However, 
CRIDV should play a positive role in protecting the insured when the negotiation 
position of the insureds and insurer is not equal especially where the insured has a 
limited experience, limited knowledge, or is elderly. This is especially important 
where the breach cannot be proved and is more significant for individual and non-
business insurance.  
Based on Islamic contract law, significant remedies for the failure of the duty of 
disclosure may be considered by applying theories of turned and deprecation, if 
possible.716 Based on these theories, renegotiation of the insurance policy is 
permitted to adjust due premium, terms and conditions based on the recent disclosed 
information. Furthermore, these theories would preserve the insurance policy and 
                                                          
713 Decision no 243/R/1433H (2012) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations in Riyadh; decision no 75/R/1428H (2007) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance 
Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; and decision no 248/R/1434H (2013) of the Committees for 
Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh. 
714 The Holy Quran, 4:128. 
715 Bashar Awad Marouf (ed), AlJame’a Alkabeer (Sunan Alturmathi) (Dar Algharb Aleslami 1996) 
part 3 ‘Alahkam O Alwasaya’, 27, Hadith No 1352. Abdullah Bin Zaid Almahmoud, ‘Alaqd Sharia’t 
Almotaqedeen’ (1984) 10 Islamic Research Journal 145. 
716 Mahmoud Mozafar, Nazerayet Alaqd (Dar Hafiz 2002) 197. See also, Abdul RazzaK Alsanhouri, 
Alwaseet fe Sharh Alqanoon Almadani (Munsha'at Alma'aref 2004) part 1 ‘Masader Aleltizam’, 402. 
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exclude only the invalid or disagreed part. For example, if there is an insurance 
policy for more than one person, such as a family health insurance policy, and there 
is a breach of the duty of disclosure regarding only one member of the family in 
respect of past health problems, surgeries, or pregnancy. Furthermore, based on the 
theory of deprecation, rather than avoid the whole insurance policy, this person 
would be excluded from the benefits of the insurance policy.717 Consequently, this 
policy should have the flexibility to change its conditions by either increasing or 
decreasing due premiums, or reducing the insurance coverage by an attached 
agreement.  
On the other hand, according to the turned theory, the insurance policy is preserved 
but turns from type to type or level to level of insurance policies. For example, if 
the insured does not disclose all information regarding a health insurance policy in 
order to reduce the premium, the insurer, based on this theory, may turn to a lower 
type of health insurance policy due to the disclosed facts without avoidance of the 
whole policy. However, further amendments to the policy must be in favour of the 
insurer. It is clear that these theories will preserve and maintain insurance policies; 
however, these theories will only apply if there is agreement between both 
contracting parties. 
The next section critically analyses provisions of contracting out and basis of 
contract clauses in the UK. This section compares these provisions with CIDRA, 
from one hand, and the old law, from the other, where necessary.  
6.9. Contracting Out and ‘Basis of Contract Clauses’ 
Basis of contract clauses in proposal forms meant that the insured’s answers were 
converted to terms and warranties of the insurance policy.718 Thus, any failure in 
these answers, even if they were irrelevant, allowed the insurer to repudiate its 
liability to pay claims.719 For instance, in Dawsons Ltd v Bonnin720, the insurer 
repudiated its liability to pay claims on the ground of a failure to provide a correct 
                                                          
717Abdul RazzaK Alsanhouri, Alwaseet fe Sharh Alqanoon Almadani (Munsha'at Alma'aref 2004) 
part 7(2) ‘Aqd Altameen’, 1185. 
718 James Davey, ‘Utmost good faith, freedom of contract and the Insurance Act 2015’ (2016) 
27 Insurance Law Journal 247, 253. 
719 Peter Tyledysley, ‘Reform at Last’ in Peter Tyledysley (ed), Consumer Insurance Law: 
Disclosure, representation, and the Basis of Contract Clauses (Bloomsbury 2013) 49. 
720 [1922] 2 AC 413. 
   171 
 
answer about where the insured lorry was garaged, and a breach of warranties; 
however, this answer was immaterial.   
There were two main criticisms of ‘basis of contract clauses’ especially in the 
context of consumer insurance.721 Firstly, insureds including a consumer or even 
individual trader, micro-businesses, and small businesses were unaware about the 
meaning of the ‘basis of contract clauses’ and its impact on the contract.722 This is 
especially because the terminology used needs an expert to interpret the meaning 
of ‘basis clause’723. Secondly, there was no requirement of a link between the 
breach and the loss.724  
As a result of the significant disadvantageous impact of the ‘basis of contract 
clauses’, they are abolished in both consumer and business insurance. Depending 
on IA, contracting out the provisions of basis of contract clauses by s 9 of IA is not 
permitted for formation of the insurance contract or a variation. After the coming 
into force of IA, insurers need to write each statement that is provided by the insured 
to turn this statement into a warranty.725 Based on s 15 and s 16 of IA, any contract 
term that may put the insured in a worse position is not allowed for consumer and 
business insurance policies. Basis of contract clauses did not allow balance between 
the contracting parties, and were the ‘perfect’ protection of the insurers’ interests.726  
Unlike consumer insurance policies which do not allow contracting out of the 
insured’s duty of reasonable care to not make misrepresentation, business insurance 
policies may contract out of many provisions of IA. This includes the duty of fair 
presentation based on freedom of contracts as s 16(2) of IA requires only to justify 
the transparency requirement of s 17(2) of IA. Although it is not likely that parties 
                                                          
721 Peter Tyledysley, ‘Reform at Last’ in Peter Tyledysley (ed), Consumer Insurance Law: 
Disclosure, representation, and the Basis of Contract Clauses (Bloomsbury 2013) 49. 
722 Ibid. 
723 James Davey, ‘Utmost good faith, freedom of contract and the Insurance Act 2015’ (2016) 
27 Insurance Law Journal 247, 253. 
724 Peter Tyledysley, ‘Reform at Last’ in Peter Tyledysley (ed), Consumer Insurance Law: 
Disclosure, representation, and the Basis of Contract Clauses (Bloomsbury 2013) 49. 
725 James Davey, ‘Utmost good faith, freedom of contract and the Insurance Act 2015’ (2016) 
27 Insurance Law Journal 247, 253. 
726 Ibid 252. 
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will contract out IA regime, some insurance policies may be required to apply 
contracting out provisions of IA according to their complexity.727 
Section 17 sets out the transparency requirement about disadvantageous terms 
meaning that insurers must take all steps to clarify these terms to insureds before 
entering into the contract. Those terms may rely on the old law and apply the duty 
of disclosure, and may limit the extent of material facts that are relevant to be 
disclosed.728 As far as business insurance concerned, it seems that any change in 
the terms should be written clearly with no room for doubt, to comply with the 
transparency requirement of s 17 of IA. This is particularly because both parties 
have the experience to specify and clarify contractual terms. The requirement of s 
17 should be shown as ‘regulatory costs’ rather than a restriction of the freedom of 
the contract.729 However, s 17 also maintains the balance between contracting 
parties especially in the case of the individual trader, small or micro-businesses.  
Davey questioned whether exclusion of the insured’s duties or/and remedies should 
extend to cover the broker’s breach especially in the case of broker’s fraud.730 On 
the grounds of public policy, fraud must not be excluded for both the insured and 
his agent or broker.731 Further, in HIH Casualty and General Insurance Co v Chase 
Manhattan Bank732, where waiver was concerned, the clause that waived the 
insured’s duty of disclosure did not extend to his agent or broker. All in all, the 
extent to which limitation or exclusion clauses can be recognised in business 
insurance is still uncertain and needs further interpretation by the courts. 
Drafting terms should be clear and unambiguous, and these terms should draw to 
the insured’s attention the significance of these terms.733 In MacGillivray, Birds 
pointed out that ‘in some cases, it may be difficult to spell out clearly and 
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unambiguously the effect of the disadvantages term’734. Examining clarity of terms 
is an issue that needs further interpretation by the courts by adopting of either an 
objective test, based on the reasonable insured, or a subjective test, based on the 
actual insured in order to prove the insurer’s failure to comply with the requirement 
of s 17. However, it can be said that the prudent insurer test should be looked at to 
find out whether drafting is clear and unambiguous. However, Birds illustrated the 
issue by showing the failure of the requirement of s 17 as ‘the characteristics of 
insured persons are to be taken in account’.735 This view supports the subjective 
test, which complies with the requirement of s 17. This is because it needs to 
examine facts, the wording of the contract, and the knowledge and experience of 
the actual insured.  
The actual knowledge of the insured or his agent is looked at in determining the 
clarity of disadvantageous terms, based on s 17(5) of IA. By s 17(4), two elements 
will be taken into account to determine meeting the requirement of s 17(2) being 
the characteristics of the insured persons and the circumstances of the transactions. 
This would be easily accessible in the case of an individual trader, micro-
businesses, and small businesses where a few number of employees are involved. 
However, the characteristics of insureds in large businesses would be complicated. 
Consequently, s 17 seems to need a specific authoritative interpretation to clarify to 
what extent the transparency is required as it is uncertain.  
By comparison under Saudi jurisdiction, unlike the UK approach, Saudi approach 
does not recognise contracting out of the provisions of any law or regulations. 
Further, Saudi law does not consider facts that are provided by insureds as basis of 
the contract. Thus, there is no mirror on this point in Saudi jurisdiction. This is an 
advantage to Saudi jurisdiction for two reasons. First, based on ICPP, all Saudi 
insurance market is considered as consumers. Thus, it is not recommended to have 
provisions of contracting out or basis of contract clauses in consumer insurance. 
This is like the recent UK position based on IA which has not allowed to the 
contracting out provisions of CIDRA in the case of consumer insurance and basis 
of contract clauses are abolished. Second, the Saudi insurance experience is still not 
able to include similar provisions for business insurance customers unless they are 
                                                          
734 John Birds, Ben Lynch, & Simon Milnes, MacGillivray on Insurance Law (13th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2015) [20-060]. 
735 Ibid. 
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individual traders, micro-businesses, as small businesses are protected similar to 
consumers as the experience is still modest.  
6.10. Conclusion 
This chapter considers the insured’s pre-contractual duties for business insurance 
in the UK in comparison to Saudi jurisdiction which applies similar duties to the 
UK, although ICPP considers the whole market as consumers. Three major 
questions are answered in order to achieve the objectives of this study. First, this 
chapter analyses and criticises similarities and differences between consumer and 
business insurance in the UK. Second, it analyses the position of the duty of 
disclosure, misrepresentation, and the duty of fair presentation in business 
insurance in the UK and Saudi Arabia. It also criticises and analyses the duty of 
disclosure and the position of the common law interpretation of the old law for the 
new regime in the UK. Thirdly, this chapter recognises the Saudi needs to 
differentiate between consumer and business insurance by learning from the UK 
experience.  
Since IA, there have been significant changes in the insurance law in the UK. The 
duty of fair presentation provides comprehensive provisions including various 
types of proper remedies. Termination provisions are recommended for business 
insurance similar to consumer insurance in order to provide proper protection for 
individual traders, small, and micro-businesses. Significantly, proving the breach 
of the duty of fair presentation is covered by IA by imposing provisions in respect 
of materiality, prudent insurer test, and the requirement of inducement. Similarities 
between the old law and IA can easily be recognised. Further, similarities to Saudi 
jurisdiction regarding materiality and the requirement of inducement are found. 
However, this chapter finds that some areas of IA are still uncertain as they need 
further interpretation by the courts.  
Two criticisms of Saudi regulations were considered. Firstly, the duty of disclosure 
is based on several regulations in Saudi jurisdiction, which may lead to difficulties 
for consumers in figuring out all related provisions about pre-contractual duties. 
This study suggests that it is preferable for the insured’s pre-contractual duties to 
be fully covered in one comprehensive regulation rather than several regulations. 
Second, detailed provisions regarding the insured’s pre-contractual duties are often 
missed, such as provisions in respect of the insured’s knowledge and that of the 
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insurers, waiver, remedies, renewals, and variations, which require further 
consideration by the regulator. This need is urgent especially in respect of the legal 
remedies as ICPP does not provide any remedy in case of breach of consumers’ 
duties. This is because consumers’ needs will be met by clear and specific 
legislation. Remarkably, some legal remedies, including the application of the 
theory of turned and deprecation, are well-considered by Islamic contracts law. As 
a result, a strong recommendation is made to support the existence of these theories 
by Saudi regulations. 
This study recommends to learn from the UK experience in respect of three 
significant matters. First, it is recommended for Saudi jurisdiction to differ between 
consumer insurance and business insurance. Second, it is recommended to differ 
between legal remedies in case of deliberate or reckless breach or non-deliberate or 
reckless breach of the insured’s pre-contractual duties. Finally, it is important to 
highlight that the provision of termination in the case of breach of the insured’s pre-
contractual duties whether for consumers or businesses is recommended to be 
recognised by Saudi regulations. This is because these provisions give the insured 
and the insurer a choice to either proceed with an insurance policy after changing 
terms or premium or to terminate the policy without any impact on any previous 
claims or paid premium. 
The next chapter critiques and analyses the insured’s post-contractual duties in the 
UK and Saudi jurisdictions. This chapter compares between the continuing duty of 
disclosure and misrepresentation in both jurisdictions. Further, this chapter analyses 
some other examples of the insured’s post-contractual duties in the UK and Saudi 
jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INSUREDS’ POST-CONTRACTUAL DUTIES OF UTMOST 
GOOD FAITH  
 
7.1. Introduction 
The insured’s post-contractual duties of utmost good faith have not been 
recognised by the new reform in IA and CIDRA in the UK unlike the insured’s 
pre-contractual duties. Fraudulent claims are considered separately as IA contains 
specific provisions regarding legal remedies. Therefore, after the IA come into 
force, the doctrine of utmost good faith became unspecified and uncertain. This 
chapter shall clarify the position of the doctrine of utmost good faith by proposing 
the imposition of specific duties, specifically, in respect of the insured’s post-
contractual duties.  
On the other hand, Saudi jurisdiction recognises the insured’s post-contractual 
duties of utmost good faith especially for fraudulent claims, which are dealt with 
in terms of the doctrine of utmost good faith. However, the Saudi jurisdiction fails 
to provide proper remedies.  
Accordingly, this comparison adds value for both jurisdictions by providing a 
critical analysis of the insured’s post-contractual duties and fraudulent claims. This 
analysis examines the UK case law establish an interpretation for the doctrine of 
utmost good faith in the UK. 
In order to achieve the objectives of this study, two main questions will be 
addressed in this chapter to establish what are the insured’s post-contractual duties 
in both the UK and Saudi jurisdictions? And what are the major criticisms of these 
duties? 
 To answer these questions, this chapter is in five sections looking at the rationale 
behind the insured’s post-contractual duties, the insured’s duty to provide required 
documents, the insured’s duty to use the subject of the insurance contract in good 
   177 
 
faith, the insured’s duties during the progress and settlement of claims, and the 
insured’s duty to not make fraudulent claim. 
7.2. The Rationale of the Insured’s Post-Contractual Duties 
The insureds’ post-contractual duties arise after the conclusion of the contract. 
Noticeably, the insureds’ post-contractual duties were regularly recognised by the 
common law in respect of fraudulent claims.736 However, fraudulent claims are now 
dealt with independently of the doctrine of utmost good faith, based on s 12 of IA.  
IA does not specifically cover the insured’s post-contractual duties. Nevertheless, 
the Law Commissions discussed the possibility of there being insureds’ post-
contractual duties not related to fraudulent claims based on the interpretation of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith.737 The doctrine of utmost good faith is still relevant 
after IA as it becomes an interpretative principle. Thus, the common law is still 
applicable. There are some significant authorities that discussed the insured’s post-
contractual duties such as the Litsion Pride738, the Star Sea739, and the Mercandian 
Continent740.  
In the Star Sea741, the insurers alleged that the insured had breached the continuing 
duty of utmost good faith by a failure of disclosure during the court proceedings. 
This allegation was rejected by the House of Lords because failure to disclose 
during the proceeding is a matter for the court not the insurer, which was narrower 
definition than post-contractual duties especially where the remedy served only the 
insurer not the insured. As a result, it was recognised that there was a limit on the 
requirement according to the duration of the duty. However, there was a 
disagreement about the basis of post-contractual duties and their scope as to which 
actions should be considered as breach, since Lord Clyde and Lord Hobhouse found 
this duty ‘not an absolute’742 and ‘elusive’743, respectively.  
In The Litsion Pride744, the claim was made by the mortgagees to recover the cost 
                                                          
736 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) [6-015]. 
737 The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law: The 
Insured’s Post-Contract Duty of Good Faith (Issue Paper 7, 2010) para 6.1. 
738 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437. 
739 [2003] 1 AC 469 
740 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 802. 
741 [2003] 1 AC 469, [82]. 
742 Ibid [7]. 
743 Ibid [54]. 
744 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437. 
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of a vessel which had been destroyed, but this claim was rejected by the insurer due 
to non-disclosure about material circumstances and this failure to disclose was seen 
as fraud. This is because the insured failed to notify the insurer about entering into 
an ‘additional premium area’, which was considered as breach of the continuing 
duty of utmost good faith. The Court found that the scope of the duty of utmost 
good faith extends to the post-contractual stage. The basis of this duty relies on it 
being an implied term to disclose material facts and to not misrepresent based on 
the wording of s 17 of MIA.  However, the scope of the post-contractual duty of 
utmost good faith was overruled by the Star Sea745. Further, The Litsion Pride746 is 
still a good law in regard the agency aspect. 
However, post-contractual duties as an implied term was considered in Pan Atlantic 
Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd747. It was criticised the use of the 
remedy of avoidance ab initio, upon the breach.  
In the Mercandian Continent748, the court agreed on the existence of the post-
contractual duties of utmost good faith with limitations.749 Firstly, post-contractual 
duties did not include fraudulent claims because they were based on the application 
of the rule of law. This leads to say that if there is no fraudulent intent, the insured 
owes post-contractual duties of utmost good faith.  
Secondly, any breach at the renewal stage of an insurance policy should be 
considered as breach of the insured’s pre-contractual duties rather than a post-
contractual breach750, because the renewal of a contract should be considered as a 
new contract. Thus, avoidance as a consequence of a breach can apply to a renewed 
contract only is not applicable for post-contractual issues. 
Thirdly, insurers should exercise their rights to seek defence or to settle a claim 
such as in the case of a subrogation, in good faith by considering the insured’s 
interest. However, this recognises the insurer’s post-contractual duties rather than 
those of the insured.  
                                                          
745 [2003] 1 AC 469, per Lord Hobhouse at [71]. 
746 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437. 
747 [1994] 3 All ER 581. See also Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2017) [6-016]. 
748 Ibid. 
749 Ibid [22]. 
750 Ibid 571. 
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Fourthly, where an insured seeks a ‘held covered’ clause. This clause is used in 
marine insurance policies to notify the insurer about variations in condition in order 
to continue the cover for an additional agreed premium. In this case, the insured has 
to make the notification to the insurer. According to the Star Sea751, this situation 
should be considered as a variation.752 As a result of this conclusion, the remedy 
was permitted but avoidance was only of the variation. Longmore LJ clearly 
reached this conclusion by saying that ‘although it is settled that good faith must be 
observed, it is never suggested that lack of good faith in relation to a matter held 
covered by the policy avoids the whole contract of insurance’753. 
Fifthly, post-contractual duties should be limited to express or implied terms in 
order to disclose specific information or facts that should be agreed on by the 
parties. In the Mercandian Continent754, the Court of Appeal did not find avoidance 
appropriate in the case of breach.755 For instance, where the parties agreed on 
contractual terms that require the insured to disclose specific information to obtain 
the insurer’s consent. For example, in Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v 
Ellis756, where the policy included a term that required the insured to disclose the 
need for a modification to obtain the insurer’s consent before the modification was 
made.  
The Law Commissions compared civil law jurisdictions based on the Principles of 
European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) to the UK jurisdiction in order to 
illustrate the insured’s post-contractual duties.757 The Law Commissions found that 
PECIL is a ‘helpful way of a regulating the insurance bargain’758. Moreover, the 
Law Commissions found that the insured has a duty to notify the insurer about 
aggravation of risk. Thus, if the insured failed to notify the insurer, the insurer may 
refuse to pay the related loss or a proportionate part the claim. Furthermore, in case 
of the reduction of the risk, the insured has a right to a relevant proportion of the 
premium to be reduced/ returned, and if the insurer refuses this reduction, the 
insured has a right to terminate the policy within two months. The Law 
                                                          
751 [2003] 1 AC 469. 
752 Ibid 370. 
753 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 802, 571. 
754 Ibid. 
755 Ibid 571. 
756 (1990) 54 SASR 61, 10 MVR 143, 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-957. 
757 The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law: The 
Insured’s Post-Contract Duty of Good Faith (Issue Paper 7, 2010) para 6.15 – 6.17. 
758 Ibid para 6.43. 
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Commissions found the European position was based on the duration of the 
policy.759 While, in civil law jurisdictions, the policies may extend to more than a 
year; the UK approach tends to be for annual policies which may renew giving rise 
to pre-contractual duties at the renewal stage. However, the insured is required to 
disclose to the insurer any circumstances that may increase the risk during the 
performance of the contract.760  
Significantly, after the abolishment of avoidance as a remedy upon breach s 17 of 
MIA breach of the insureds’ post-contractual duties is left with no remedies. This 
is an advantage of this reform because avoidance was a barrier to impose further 
obligations due to its harsh impact. Thus, the courts can be more flexible and can 
impose specific implied terms based on specific circumstances and find appropriate 
remedies instead of avoidance by expanding the interpretation of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith as an interpretative principle. Furthermore, the position of PEICL 
may be accepted by the courts by recognising the doctrine of proportionality and 
termination. Damages may be recognised as a consequence of breach contractual 
terms.  
By comparison, according to Saudi law and regulations, the insured owes post-
contractual duties of utmost good faith. The significance of post-contractual duties 
is that circumstances and facts may change; accordingly, these changes may impact 
on the probability of the occurrence of the covered risks.761  
Article 5 of ICPP specifies the insured’s post-contractual duties. In terms of article 
5.6 of ICPP, insureds must use the insurance service or product in accordance with 
certain terms and conditions; avoid risks (article 5(7) of ICPP); and update their 
information such as either material facts or personal and communication 
information, address and phone numbers, and if there is failure to disclose this 
information, consumers may lose their insurance contract rights to claim and hold 
the insurers liable (article 5(11) of ICPP).  
In decision no 14/J/1433H (2012) in Jeddah, CRIDV held that the insured must act 
                                                          
759 Ibid para 6.18. 
760 See, for example, Hussain v Brown, (1996) unreported, as it cited in The Law Commission and 
Scottish Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law: The Insured’s Post-Contract Duty 
of Good Faith (Issue Paper 7, 2010) para 6.22; Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2000] Lloyd’s 
Rep 154; and Black King Shipping Corp v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437. 
761 Ghazy Abu Orabi, Ahkam Aqd Altameen: Dirasa Moqarana (Dar Wael 2011) 297.  
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in good faith by disclosing relevant information and material facts and abstaining 
from any act that may increase or cause the risk to occur. Moreover, in decision no 
09/R/1429H (2008) in Riyadh, where a cargo insurance policy was issued, the 
insured failed to update the information about the cargo’s route. While the route 
was from Brazil to Saudi Arabia via a direct flight, the actual route was described 
as being from Brazil to United Arab of Emirates via a direct flight, and from United 
Arab of Emirates to Saudi Arabia via truck, which was destroyed by an accident 
and the entire goods were damaged. CRIDV held that the insured was in breach of 
the post-contractual duty to disclose this material fact by intentionally not providing 
a proper update to the insurer. Accordingly, CRIDV rejected the insured’s claim. 
This CRIDV decision is similar to the decision in The Litsion Pride762 with regard 
of notifying the insurer about material circumstances. 
Article 8(2) of UCMIP states that the insured has a period of 10 days to disclose 
any changes in material facts that have been disclosed in the insurance proposal. 
This Article gives the right to the insurer to withhold insurance cover for 3 working 
days. Based on article 6, the insurer has to pay the third party, who acts in good 
faith; then, the insurer has the right to recover any paid indemnity from the insured. 
Situations where this can be used include using the vehicle in contravention of 
restrictions under article 6(1)(a), carrying passengers beyond the capacity of the 
vehicle (article 6(1)(b)), using the vehicle for the public where it is not allowed 
(article 6(1)(c)), deliberately causing an accident (article 6(3)), failure to notify the 
insurer in writing within 10 working days about any material changes to the facts 
previously disclosed in the proposal (article 6(4)), leaving the scene of a car 
accident (article 6(5)), withholding admission of liability for the accident 
unjustifiably to harm the insurer (article 6(6)), traffic violation, (article 6(7)). 
Therefore, it is clear that this regulation recognises the insured’s post-contractual 
duties to act in good faith. However, this is limited to compulsory motor insurance 
policies.  
CRIDV gave several decisions on the application of UCMIP. Moreover, CRIDV 
appreciated the position of the third party who acted in good faith. In a decision no 
13/J/1429H (2008) in Jeddah, the Committee held the insurer must pay the 
indemnity to the third party who acted in good faith as the third party was not 
                                                          
762 [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437. 
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responsible for the insured’s breach of the post-contractual duty by delaying the 
notification of the accident for 21 months. Moreover, the Committee gave the right 
to the insurer to recover the paid indemnity from the insured as long as the insurer 
could prove the insured’s breach.763 A similar decision accepted the third party’s 
right to be paid as result of the insured’s breach of his post-contractual duty by 
driving in the opposite directions.764 However, in decision no 90/D/1435H (2014) 
in Dammam, where the claim was made by the insured himself, the Committee 
rejected his claim to be indemnified as he was in breach of the post-contractual duty 
to disclose any material facts to the insurer and had breach article 6(4) of UCMIP. 
In addition, based on a decision no 34/J/1429 (2008) which was affirmed by the 
Appeal decision no 115/a/1435H (2014) in Jeddah, when the insured had made 
traffic violations in good faith or under force majeure, the Committee held that no 
breach had occurred and the insurer must indemnify the third party.  
Accordingly, both the UK and Saudi jurisdictions accept there are insured’s post-
contractual duties. Similarities in both jurisdictions can be found where the insured 
fails to disclose material circumstances to the insurer. Saudi jurisdiction gave the 
right to the insurer to not pay the insured’s claim and to recover any payment from 
the insured; whereas the UK reform in IA failed to specify both the nature of the 
insured’s post-contractual duties and related remedies. Although it is open to the 
courts to set proper remedies upon breach the post-contractual duties; this 
uncertainty creates a significant disadvantage especially for consumer insurance 
where consumers have limited knowledge about their duties. The law should be 
clear and specific for both contracting parties, and this study suggested that the law 
makers should consider insureds’ post-contractual duties for both business and 
consumer insurance in the same clear and particular way as the insureds’ pre-
                                                          
763 Similar to a decision no 55/J/1429H (2008) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes 
and Violations in Jeddah; decision no 72/J/1429H (2008) of the Committees for Resolution 
Insurance Disputes and Violations in Jeddah; decision no 32/J/1430H (2009) of the Committees for 
Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Jeddah; decision no 22/D/1435H (2014) which was 
affirmed by the Appeal decision no 257/a/1436 (2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance 
Disputes and Violations in Dammam; decision no 34/D/1435H (2014) which was affirmed by the 
Appeal decision no 449/a/1436 (2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations in Dammam; and decision no 05/D/1435H (2014) of the Committees for Resolution 
Insurance Disputes and Violations in Dammam. 
764 Decision no 34/J/1429H (2008) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 115/a/1435H 
(2014) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Jeddah. Similar to a 
decision no 113/J/1429H (2008) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations in Jeddah; decision no 42/J/1429H (2008) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance 
Disputes and Violations in Jeddah. 
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contractual duties by not only considering the duties and remedies upon breach but 
also to specify the nature of these duties whether applying these duties on the basis 
of implied terms or an independent duties than the doctrine of utmost good faith. 
As a result, this would limit the uncertainty, and the law would become more 
specific, accessible, and predictable.  
Accordingly, it is important to find out and analyse examples of the insureds’ post-
contractual duties from other common law jurisdictions such as Australia in order 
to contribute to the discussion of the interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good 
faith after the amendment to s 17 of MIA, and by comparing the findings with the 
Saudi jurisdiction. The next section comparatively analyses the insured’s duty to 
provide required documents. The critical analysis examines the application of this 
duty after the enforcement of IA.  
7.3. The Insured's Duty to Provide Required Documents  
In Goshawk Dedicated Ltd v Tyser & Co Ltd765, the insurance contract included an 
implied term which required the insured to provide certain documents to the 
insurers during the performance of the contract. The conclusion of the Court of 
Appeal is significant because it highlights that the purpose of this continuing duty 
is to make fair presentation which is consistent with the recent regime in the UK. 
The Court of Appeal supported this conclusion by considering the House of Lords’ 
decisions in Phoenix General Insurance Co of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance Co 
Ltd766, as following767: 
An example of such an implication, made for the purposes of business efficacy but 
informed by the insurance context of good faith, can be found in Phoenix General 
Insurance Co of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd… where Hobhouse J 
accepted an implied term which extended to the obligation to keep proper accounting 
records and to make them reasonably available to reinsurers as being something which 
‘would probably be imported anyway by the duty of good faith’ (at 614). 
However, the question is whether the court could now imply the term, even though 
the legislation now does not recognise it under s 17 of MIA as amended, in 
accordance with the idea being promoted here that the doctrine of utmost good faith 
itself now may impose implied terms.  
                                                          
765 [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 224. 
766 [1985] 2 Ll Rep 599, 613 - 614. 
767 [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 224, [49], [53]. 
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While Saudi regulations do not recognise this duty, CRIDV had recgonised it. In a 
decision no 93/J/1429H (2008) in Jeddah, the insured acted in bad faith by not 
complying with the policy terms, failing to provide required documents to the 
insurer. In this case, the insurer had issued a car transport insurance policy. The 
policy required the insured to provide licenses and all documents of the cars in case 
of total loss, as the insurer had the right to retain those cars. An accident occurred 
to the car-transporter transferring these cars, and all cars were destroyed. 
Accordingly, the insurer paid the indemnity to the insured, and claimed the car 
licenses and documents; however, the insured deliberately did not comply with the 
insurance policy’s terms. The Committee held that the insured’s act reflected bad 
faith as the insured received the indemnity and delayed to provide the documents 
without good reason to harm the insurer. Thus, the insured was obliged to return 
the full indemnity that had been paid and to pay damages including vehicles repair 
expenses that were paid by the insurer, as well as vehicle storage cost. Similarly, in 
a decision no 246/D/1436H (2015) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 
48/a/1437 (2016) in Dammam, the Committee found that the insured’s withholding 
of required documents was the reason to reject the claim as the insured had breach 
the post-contractual duty to provide required documents to the insurer in a 
maximum of 90 days as required by the policy.768 
Accordingly, both Saudi and the UK laws and regulations have not recognised the 
insured’s duty to provide required documents to the insurer. However, case law and 
CRIDV have considered this duty as a post-contractual duty. From the UK side, 
this duty needs to be developed to be in line with the idea of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith as an interpretative principle which may imply terms into insurance 
contracts. If the common law considers the breach of this duty as a breach of an 
implied term, further remedies can be sought including damages based on breach 
of the contract. On the other hand, this study recommends further developments in 
Saudi regulations to recognise this duty expressly and to specify remedies in case 
of breach.  
The next section comparatively analyses the insured’s duty to use the subject of 
insurance contract in good faith. The critical analysis shall examine the application 
                                                          
768 Similar to a decision no 60/D/1435H (2014) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes 
and Violations in Dammam. 
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of this example after the commencement of IA. 
7.4. The Insured’s Duty to Use the Subject of Insurance Contract in Good 
Faith  
The insured owes a duty to use the subject of the insurance contract in good faith. 
An unexpected or unusual use should be considered as breach of the post-
contractual duties associated with utmost good faith. However this specific duty is 
not covered by IA. 
To illustrate this point, an example is provided from Australia. In Pegela Pty Ltd v 
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd769, the Supreme Court of 
Victoria had lengthy deliberations to consider that the insured’s use of a life 
insurance policy as a means of risk-free arbitrage had breach the insured’s 
continuing duty of utmost good faith based on s 13 of ICA.770 
Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, there is no specific provision in respect of this duty. 
However, in a decision no 94/D/1429H (2008) in Dammam, where use of an insured 
vehicle for commercial uses was examined as a possible breach of the insured’s 
post-contractual duty to use the subject of the insurance contract in good faith. 
Furthermore, the insurer failed to prove the insured’s breach as the Official Traffic 
Report and hospital report found there had been no passengers except for the driver, 
the insured, which supported the insured’s defence that the vehicle had not been 
used for commercial uses. The Committee rejected the insurer’s claim based on the 
lack of evidence.  
Consequently, this area needs further developments by the UK and Saudi 
jurisdictions. From the UK side, again, this duty should be developed further in line 
with the current position of the doctrine of utmost good faith as an interpretative 
principle which may imply terms into insurance contracts. Thus, it is suggested that 
this duty and its related remedies should be considered specifically and with no 
doubts especially for consumer insurance due to lack of knowledge, experience, 
and the level of awareness. On the Saudi side, further developments are 
recommended to recognise this duty expressly by Saudi regulations and to 
determine the remedies in case of breach. Again, this consideration would raise 
                                                          
769 [2006] VSC 507 (13 April 2006) 
770 Ibid [859] – [896]. 
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predictability, accessibility and limited the uncertainty in regard the interpretation 
of the doctrine of utmost good faith. 
The next section comparatively analyses the insured’s duty during the progress and 
settlement of claims. The critical analysis shall examine the application of this after 
the commencement of IA. 
7.5. The Insured’s Duties during the Progress and Settlement of Claims  
The insured’s duties during the progress and settlement of claims are not contained 
in the UK legislation but have been developed through case law. Two main points 
arise. Firstly, although the common cause of an exaggerated claim is usually 
fraudulent, it can sometimes be made with no fraudulent intent. In that situation, 
the doctrine of utmost good faith plays a significant role.771 For example, in Ewer 
v National Employers' Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd772, MacKinnon J 
illustrated this as he stated that ‘I do not think he was doing that as in any way a 
fraudulent claim, but as a possible figure to start off with, as a bargaining 
figure’773. In this scenario, the insurer may allege that the insured has acted in bad 
faith, however, the burden of proof of the fraud is on the insurer. Significantly, in 
Danepoint Ltd. v Allied Underwriting Insurance Ltd774, it was found that the 
exaggeration itself should not be counted as fraud except if the exaggeration was 
combined with misrepresentation or concealment.775 This is especially where the 
determination of loss is not clear or ‘a matter of opinion’; however, where the value 
‘is or should be clear-cut’ and the information is accessed by the insured, 
exaggeration is not easy to be excused and may be more likely to be fraudulent. 776 
This was illustrated further in Danepoint777 to distinguish between exaggeration as 
a fraudulent claim and when it is not based on the value of the claim, as 
following778:  
In some the exaggeration of the claim was not regarded as fraudulent: see, for 
example… Thomas J. (as he then was) in Nsubuga v. Commercial Union [1998] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 682 at 686, referred to the “commercial reality that people will often put 
forward a claim that is more than they believe that they will recover”. The 
                                                          
771 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) [6-028]. 
772 [1937] 2 All ER 193.  
773 Ibid 203. 
774 [2005] EWHC 2318 (TCC). 
775 Ibid [56]. 
776 Ibid [56]. 
777 Ibid. 
778 Ibid [54], [56]. 
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judge…made the point that it “would not generally in those circumstances be right to 
conclude readily that someone had behaved fraudulently merely because he put 
forward an amount greater than that which he reasonably believed he would recover”. 
Secondly, the insured should act in good faith through settlement of a claim. This 
allows the insurers’ to settle a claim with a third party, does not to waive the 
insurer’s right of subrogation, and the insured must not seek a settlement with a 
third party without the insurers’ consent779. These situations would be considered 
breach of the insured’s post-contractual duties. Further, what remedies are available 
for the insured’s breach of the continuing duty of utmost good faith are uncertain, 
but damages can be strongly suggested especially where the insurer suffers loss. 
Again then, appropriate remedies are still open to question and to the courts to 
specify based on the surrounding circumstances of breach.  
Similarly, under Saudi jurisdiction, there is no specific provision about the insured’s 
post-contractual duty during the progress and settlement of claims except in respect 
of fraudulent claims. However, CRIDV does recognise this type of insured’s duty. 
For example, in a decision no 81/R/1435H (2014) which was affirmed by the 
Appeal decision no 181/a/1435H (2014) in Riyadh, where the insurer rejected to 
pay indemnity for the insured who held a medical professional liability insurance 
for medical malpractice. This was because a claim had been made against the 
insured in respect of medical malpractice by his patient. The insured did not notify 
the insurer immediately about this claim as the insurance policy required. 
Furthermore, the insurer had the right to represent the insured in case any claims 
were made against him. The insurer rejected to pay the indemnity which led to 
imprisonment of the insured. Nevertheless, the Committee rejected the insurer’s 
claim to not pay the indemnity because the insurance policy did not include a time 
limit within which to notify the insurer about any claim against the insured. 
Surprisingly, the Committee considered this requirement as an arbitrary term 
because the insured had attended all court sessions which reflected his interest in 
not accepting the decision that was made against him. As a result, the Committee 
held that the reason for the insurer requiring this term had been met by the insured, 
and there had been no increase of the risk to the insurer based on the insured’s act. 
Finally, the Committee held that the indemnity had to be paid in full, the term that 
required the insured to notify was invalid, and damages were awarded as 
                                                          
779 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) [6-029]. 
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compensation for imprisonment.  
There were three criticisms of the CRIDV decision. Firstly, the Committee looked 
at the fact there was no time limit within which to notify the insurer about any 
claims against the insured. This failure to indicate the time limit should be 
considered in the context of other facts including that the insured handled the claim 
that was made against him and appealed. However, the insured did not notify the 
insurer during all of these procedures, which supported the insurer’s allegation of 
the insured’s breach being deliberate as the insured had known he should have 
notified the insurer.  
Secondly, there may be doubt in respect of the Committee’s decision to recognise 
the term as arbitrary. This is because the term is common in many types of insurance 
policies to notify the insurer about any material facts that are relevant. Furthermore, 
the disclosure of these facts is part of the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith, 
and concealing this information is reflective bad faith act or at least a careless 
conduct.  
Thirdly, the Committee accepted attendance at the trial and the appeal as enough 
conduct to achieve the purpose of the insurer’s right to represent the insured, which 
seems incorrect. This is because the representation that is made by the insurer is not 
necessarily the same as the representation that is made by the insured himself, as 
the insurer has legal consultants and more experience especially where the insured 
is a consumer.  
Accordingly, further developments are recommended for UK and Saudi law as they 
have not examined the insured’s duties during the progress and settlement of claims. 
From the UK side, this duty requires to be developed further based on the doctrine 
of utmost good faith as an interpretative principle which may imply terms to the 
insurance contracts especially after the development of the consumer insurance 
regime, which requires unambiguous and specific duties. On the Saudi side, it is 
recommended there should be further developments to recognise this duty expressly 
by Saudi regulations and to determine the appropriate remedies in case of breach. 
The next section comparatively analyses the insured’s duty not to make fraudulent 
claims. The critical analysis shall examine the application of IA by comparing the 
new legislation with the old law. 
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7.6. The Duty not to Make Fraudulent Claims 
An ABI report found that in 2013 there were over 118,500 fraudulent claims with 
a total value of £1.3 billion.780. In terms of ss 2 – 4 of the Fraud Act 2006, fraud is 
using dishonesty and deceit to either seek benefits to the fraudster or another or put 
the other party in a disadvantageous position or to seek loss to others. The law in 
this area had been uncertain about the nature of fraudulent claims. The Law 
Commissions referred to this area of law as ‘convoluted and confused’781. It says 
that ‘the law in this area prior to the introduction of the Act (IA) was at best 
unsettled and at worst confused and incoherent’782.  
There were two main problems depending on the connection between fraudulent 
claims and the doctrine of utmost good faith. Firstly, the common law held that a 
fraudulent claim was a breach of the insured’s post-contractual duty of utmost good 
faith. Secondly, the courts emphasised that the fraudster cannot ever benefit. In the 
Star Sea783, Lord Hobhouse found that ‘the fraudulent insured must not be allowed 
to think: if the fraud is successful, then I will gain; if it is unsuccessful, I will lose 
nothing’784. This also found in the old case Britton v The Royal Insurance 
Company785, where Willes J stated that ‘the law is, that a person who has made such 
a fraudulent claim could not be permitted to recover at all’786. 
The English and Scottish Law Commissions recommended that fraudulent claims 
should have separate remedies from the doctrine of utmost good faith to clarify the 
law in this area as the law was uncertain.787 The separation of fraudulent claims 
from the doctrine of utmost good faith in order to have their own specific remedies 
was an advantage for IA especially after the uncertainty of remedies for breach of 
                                                          
780 See The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business 
Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com 
No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014) para 19.1. 
781 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business 
Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Summary 
(Law Com No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014) para 19.3. 
782 Simon Rainey & David Walsh, ‘Remedies for Fraudulent Claims under the Insurance Act 2015’, 
in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime for Commercial 
and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 66. 
783 [2003] 1 AC 469. 
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787 Simon Rainey & David Walsh, ‘Remedies for Fraudulent Claims under the Insurance Act 2015’, 
in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime for Commercial 
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the doctrine of utmost good faith based on the amended s 17 of MIA. However, 
consideration of the doctrine of utmost good faith may still be relevant as the 
doctrine of utmost good faith becomes an interpretative principle, which may be 
relied on in fraudulent claims. This is because s 12 of IA only looks at the remedies 
in the case of fraudulent claims and does not provide a definition or any 
specification about the requirements of fraudulent claims. Moreover, s 12 applies 
to both consumer and business insurance. 
S 12 of IA has solved two main problems. First, the nature of fraudulent claims had 
been questioned whether they were to be dealt with as based on an implied term or 
the rule of law.788 Second, the related remedy was based on the breach of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith which meant that the insurer was entitled to avoid the 
policy, which was inconsistent with how fraudulent claims were to be treated. 
By comparison, under the Saudi jurisdiction, fraud means any illegal act, providing 
deliberately incorrect information, or deliberate concealment of material facts 
which induces the other party's decision, and to gain ineligible benefits from the 
insurance policy during its performance.789 The Saudi regime relies mainly on AFR 
to examine the insured’s behaviour when the insured makes a claim. However, 
further situations may be considered as fraudulent claims based on CRIDV and 
differences between frauds, abuse, and misleading are recognised by IRCHIL. 
Fraud is defined as intentional deceit by a contracting party to obtain benefits or 
privileges that are not permitted to the relevant individual or entity, by article 1(38) 
of IRCHIL; abuse however is defined as any practices by a contracting party ‘which 
may lead to obtain benefits or privileges that are not eligible to receive without the 
intent to defraud, deceive, misrepresent or distort facts for the purpose of obtaining 
such benefits and privileges’, based on article 1(39) of IRCHIL. Misleading is 
defined as any behaviour, which is not covered by the definition of fraud of an 
individual or entity, by article 1(40) of IRCHIL. Accordingly, both abuse and 
misleading behaviours will be breach without the intent to fraud. The essential 
difference between these definitions is the recognition of the intent; however, this 
regulation does not provide further details on how to specify this intent. 
                                                          
788 For further details, Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd and others [2003] 
1 AC 469. 
789 Bahaa Shukri, Bohooth fe Altameen (Dar Althaqafa 2012) 721. See also Ghazy Abu Orabi, Ahkam 
Aqd Altameen: Dirasa Moqarana (Dar Wael 2011) 312. 
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Accordingly, this will be based on the discretion of Committees to determine 
whether the action is covered by the fraud, abuse, or misleading definitions based 
on the surrounding facts and circumstances.  
7.6.1. Deterring Fraud 
7.6.1.1. Deterring Fraud in the UK 
Fraudulent claims are not defined by IA; it only addresses related remedies. The 
gap is left to be filled by the courts in order to specify when a claim should be 
identified as a fraudulent claim.790 Accordingly, this uncertainty is a disadvantage 
of IA because the requirements of breach of the duty to not claim fraudulently are 
ambiguous. However, fraudulent claims can be ‘where a claim is for a loss known 
to be non-existent or exaggerated791, the part of the claim which is non-existent or 
exaggerated should not itself be immaterial or insubstantial’792. As a result of this 
definition, there are several types of fraudulent claims. However, fraudulent devices 
or collateral lies was questioned, and, recently, fraudulent devices were deemed not 
part of the fraudulent claims rule.  
‘Fraudulent devices’ is defined as where ‘a genuine claim is supported by 
fraudulent evidence which conceals the fact that the insurer has a defence to the 
claim or otherwise improves the insured’s prospects of obtaining recovery’.793 This 
is for instance includes production of a false invoice, receipt, or a witness statement. 
Significant issues developed where the law encouraged insurers either to increase 
the levels of evidence required in order to reject the insureds’ claim or to define the 
fraud by a way that was not reflected in the law.794 Moreover, the ability to 
distinguish between the entire fraudulent claim and the fraudulent devices was 
called into question.795  
                                                          
790 Simon Rainey & David Walsh, ‘Remedies for Fraudulent Claims under the Insurance Act 2015’, 
in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime for Commercial 
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793 Philip Rawling & John Lowry, ‘Insurance Fraud: The "Convoluted and Confused" State of the 
Law’ [2016] Law Q Rev 132, 96. 
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As a result of these criticisms, the position of fraudulent devices was changed by 
Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicherung AG796. According to 
Versloot, fraudulent devices would not be considered under the rule on fraudulent 
claims. The Supreme Court overruled significant previous authorities in this area of 
law797, such as the Litsion Pride798, where collateral lies were deemed irrelevant to 
the claim, and the lie was seen as an attempt to not pay an additional premium and 
was not related to the claim at all, as follows799: 
The treatment of The Litsion Pride by Lord Hobhouse in The Star Sea is, to my mind, 
more consistent with the exclusion of collateral lies from the fraudulent claims rule 
than with their inclusion… With hindsight, it may be that the better analysis of The 
Litsion Pride is that the lie told was not part of the presentation of the claim at all, 
but rather part of a dishonest antecedent attempt to avoid liability to pay the 
additional premium for taking the ship into a war zone. Likewise the present point 
was far from arising in The Mercandian Continent, where the lie was in no sense part 
of the presentation of the claim, indeed was not even directed to the insurers, but rather 
amounted to a misplaced attempt to serve their interests. (Bold added). 
Significantly, in Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicherung 
AG800, the Supreme Court did not apply the fraudulent claims rule to a claim that 
was supported by collateral lies because these lies did not materially influence the 
insurer’s decision whether to pay the claim, and the use of fraudulent devices could 
not be treated as a fraudulent claim.801 This was because the insurer is liable to 
indemnify a genuine claim; even although it may be supported by collateral lies.802 
However, the insured cannot gain a benefit according to lies but can only recover 
for a genuine claim.803 The law in Versloot804 remains after IA, although it is said 
that ‘the Supreme Court judgment in Versloot… has complicated the application of 
this remedy’805.  
On the other hand, Lord Mance found that the fraudulent claims rule included the 
use of fraudulent devices based on the doctrine of utmost good faith.806 The major 
point here was to discuss the basis of the lies which was a breach of the doctrine of 
                                                          
796 [2016] UKSC 45, [2017] AC 1, [2016] 3 WLR 543. 
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utmost good faith; even though they did not result in a specific loss. The view of 
Lord Mance is significant and consistent with the interpretation of ‘utmost’ good 
faith.807  
Similarly, for example, in the New Zealand case, Stemson v AMP General 
Insurance (NZ) Ltd808, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand held that the remedy 
for a fraudulent claim was the same remedy used for use of a fraudulent device, and 
rejected the insured’s claim which had been based on fraudulent device.809 The 
question should be asked what the impact of ‘utmost’ is if it is not interpreted as the 
greatest and highest level of good faith. With respect to the Lordships, they did not 
follow this interpretation. 
To conclude, as a result of Versloot810, the Supreme Court found that there was a 
distinction between fraudulent claims and fraudulent devices as a consequence of 
the absence of a definition of fraudulent claims by IA. Therefore, the insurer cannot 
rely on the rule for fraudulent claims in respect of the insured’s collateral lies except 
where the contract expressly recognises the insurer’s right to forfeit the contract 
upon the insured’s use of fraudulent devices or collateral lies.811 These terms are 
common in fire insurance policies; however, after the position of the common law 
in Versloot812, these terms would be common in other insurance policies such as 
                                                          
807 Ibid [119]. For further discussion about the basis of fraudulent claim and the role of the doctrine 
of utmost good faith, as following: 
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marine insurance policies.813 Furthermore, the question may arise after the 
separation of fraudulent claims from the doctrine of utmost good faith, on the one 
hand, and the distinction between fraudulent claims and fraudulent devices, on the 
other hand, whether to consider fraudulent devices as breach of the insured’s post-
contractual duties. This is especially because the doctrine of utmost good faith is 
not defined, although it was considered in Versloot814 that ‘the case enunciates any 
wider obligations of post-contract good faith in relation to merely culpable non-
disclosure or misrepresentation, it has been finally and authoritatively disapproved 
in The Star Sea’815. However, as the doctrine of utmost good faith becomes an 
interpretative principles, it may open up further judicial discussion on the 
interpretation of the amended s 17 of MIA.  
7.6.1.2.  Deterring Fraud in Saudi Arabia  
As shown above, fraud is recognised in Saudi jurisdiction mainly in a separate 
regulation, AFR. AFR distinguishes between fraud in business insurance and non-
business insurance unlike the rest of Saudi law and regulations. This is an advantage 
and a significant conduct by Saudi regulation as it is the only recognition of the 
importance to differentiate between business and consumer insurance. Moreover, it 
would give a significant sign and support to differentiate further between business 
and consumer insurance for other duties and remedies regarding the doctrine of 
utmost good faith. Further, there are other indicators of fraud based on the party 
who carried out fraud and whether it took place prior to conclusion of the policy or 
at the claim stage, based on article 45 of AFR. Article 45(b) of AFR provides 
examples of basic situations of fraud during the performance of the contract that are 
submitting claims for false loss, misrepresenting facts to have the claim covered by 
the policy, and exaggerating the value of the loss. Moreover, fraud against the 
insurer will occur by ‘committing fraud in the purchase or execution of an insurance 
product to obtain an illegitimate coverage or payment’, based on article 7(c) of 
AFR. However, this regulation is not limited to fraud committed by the insured but 
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extends to any third-party who may act in favour of the insured, based on article 45 
of AFR.   
For non-business insureds, indicators of fraud are divided into three principal 
categories including, for example, general conduct, payment, and coverage, which 
are the common fraud situations. There are significant similarities between the 
indicators for non-business and business insured frauds. Significantly, regarding the 
insured’s general conduct, the regulation provides indicators of frauds including not 
only hiding facts about the insurance policy or providing incorrect or inaccurate 
answers and information about the loss to insurers or a third party or an authority, 
such as experts and police, which is similar to business insurance; but also 
abstaining from preventing or limiting the loss.816 Other indicators under this 
regulation are in regard to the cover and payment. For instance, where the insured 
requests changing terms and conditions frequently or prior to a loss, again similar 
to business insurance; requests the cover be paid to different accounts or to a third 
party; tries to settle the claim quickly by accepting a lower indemnity; has a 
problematic financial situation; claims immediately once the policy is valid; 
provides incomplete, inaccurate documents; provides inconsistent dates with dates 
in other documents or reports such as police or a hospital reports; and fail to provide 
original documents.  
For non-business motor insurance policies, article 8(7) of UCMIP covers three 
types of fraud that are, first, the pre-existence of fraudulent claims by the insured; 
second, use of fraudulent methods by insureds, agents, or others, such as a driver, 
to get the benefits of the insurance cover; third, where the loss is a result of a 
deliberate act. The advantage of this provision is that it includes any fraudulent act 
by any individual or party connected to the insured. This significantly protects the 
insurer from actions of the insured anyone else not party to the contract. 
AFR deals with other signs of fraud in business insurance. Indicators for specific 
insurance policies such as fire, cargo, and motor insurance policies are considered 
separately. For example, in cargo insurance policies, inconsistencies between the 
actual weight, goods' prices, or the kind of goods and the provided information are 
considered as fraud. For fire insurance policies, indicators focus on the source of 
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the fire and related circumstances. For instance, when the loss occurs only in a 
single building that is covered by the policy whereas other buildings are not covered 
by insurance; the cause of fire is unknown or unexpected; fire alarms have not 
detected the fire or were switched off. For general motor insurance policies, 
indicators are including, for example, finding a relationship between the insured 
and other involved parties in an accident; increasing the amount of the actual loss; 
and delaying to contact authorities such as police after the accident.  
Accordingly, the significance of this regulation is due to the important role that it 
plays in deterring fraud and protecting the insurer from the most common frauds. 
Indicators to deter fraud are comprehensive, and they are supposed to help insurers 
monitor insurance activities. On the one hand, these indicators are significant legal 
presumptions for insurers when seeking evidence of the insured’s fraud because the 
burden of proof is on the insurer. On the other hand, CRIDV can enforce these 
indicators to deter fraud. 
On comparing Saudi and the UK laws and regulations on deterring fraud, it seems 
that Saudi jurisdiction provides detailed provisions to deter fraud unlike in the UK. 
Deterring fraud, based on IA, is uncertain and needs further developments by the 
judiciary in order to determine the requirements of fraud in light of the recent 
change in the role of the doctrine of utmost good faith. 
7.6.2. Legal Remedies 
7.6.2.1.Legal Remedies in the UK 
Notably IA, provides particular remedies for fraudulent claims. Specifically, the 
insurer has the right not to pay out on the fraudulent claim under s 12(1)(a), or can 
recover any payment that is made in respect of a fraudulent claim (s 12(1)(b)). The 
insurer give notice to the insured to terminate the contract from the time of the 
fraudulent act (s 12(1)(b)). This termination will have only a prospective effect. 
Accordingly, in case of termination, the insurer may reject all claims that are made 
after the fraudulent claim even if they are genuine claims (s 12(1)(a)), and the 
insurer is not obliged to return any paid premiums to the insured (s 12(2)(b)). This 
is more advantageous than termination under the old law which forfeited not only 
the claim but also any valid claim prior to the fraudulent claim; thus, the insured 
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was required to return any payments made before the fraudulent claim.817 Another 
advantage in respect of termination is that previous, genuine and paid claims are 
not impacted by the fraudulent claim. In other words, there is no need to return any 
paid genuine claims to the insurer as long as these genuine claims are made before 
the fraudulent claim.  
Two significant arguments have been made in respect of the termination as IA does 
not specify when termination should be elected for, and whether the insurer’s right 
is subject to waiver or estoppel. Firstly, IA fails to give a time limit within which 
the insurer may terminate the policy. According to Kendall and Wright, the 
‘termination may be made at any time (subject to waiver or estoppel’818. However, 
this perspective does not consider the insurer’s post-contractual duty to exercise its 
rights in compliance with the doctrine of utmost good faith. Accordingly, the 
insurer is still obliged to exercise the right to terminate the policy in good faith and 
within a reasonable time; otherwise the insurer’s right to terminate may be deemed 
to be waived, even though the waiver of this right is not recognised by IA. However, 
taking a reasonable time to elect to terminate should not be considered as waiver of 
the insurer’s right where the insurer delays to communicate with the insured after 
the fraudulent claim is made.819 
Second, the gap in the legislation regarding the timing of termination may lead to 
disputes where there is a genuine claim after the fraudulent claim is made, but the 
insurer does not elect to terminate at the time of the fraudulent claim.820 There is a 
questions then whether the insurer might notify the insured about termination to 
avoid paying valid claims.821 To answer this question, it is necessary to interpret the 
doctrine of utmost good faith as requiring the insurer to exercise its rights under 
post-contractual duties in good faith. Therefore, if on examination of the 
circumstances, the insurer delays in notifying the insured about termination to the 
prejudice of the liability to pay valid claims, this should be considered as breach of 
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the insurer’s post-contractual duties of utmost good faith. Furthermore, the insurer 
should pay the valid claim, and the right to terminate should be waived.  
It was argued whether damages might be awarded in the case of fraudulent claims 
especially for the cost of investigation.822 The Law Commissions discussed this 
point, and found that it would be difficult to assess the cost of investigation 
especially where the investigation was conducted by the insurer itself.823 Based on 
the old law, damages were not awarded in the case of fraudulent claims as the 
remedy for breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith was avoidance.824 However, 
it was held that damages for deceit might be possible against a fraudster especially 
for the cost of investigation of a fraudulent claim but this rule of law was not 
certain.825 As a result, by abolishing avoidance as a remedy for breach of the 
doctrine of utmost good faith, and after setting specific remedies for fraudulent 
claims, damages are now considered in the case of fraudulent claims as a remedy 
where there has been deceit in respect of the cost to investigate especially as breach 
of the doctrine of utmost good faith is left without specific remedies. It is now open 
to the courts to consider a new position recognising damages as a remedy upon 
breach of the insured’s post-contractual duties.  
To sum up, the strength of IA due to the separation of fraudulent claims from the 
doctrine of utmost good faith is because of two reasons. The first reason is because 
IA has put the nature of this duty on a statutory basis. The second reason is that 
provides a variety of remedies unlike avoidance previously which was a harsh 
remedy. This strength is significant as the doctrine of utmost good faith is now left 
without any remedy for breach in terms of the amended s 17 of MIA. Accordingly, 
IA provides obvious position in regard to remedies of fraudulent claims.   
7.6.2.2.Legal Remedies in Saudi Arabia 
There is no similar obvious approach in Saudi Arabia as the UK. Instead, article 10 
of Anti-Fraud Regulation sets a general provision where there has been fraud by 
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insureds that non-compliance with this regulation should be considered as a breach 
of LSCIC and IRLSCIC. Although the regulation considers many indicators of 
fraud; the remedy does not cover the insurer’s interest. In fact, this remedy is 
improper and uncertain which needs further development. There should then be 
further urgent reform of available remedies under this regulation to meet the 
insured’s fraudulent claims.  
Similarly uncertain is article 123 of IRCHIL which gives the right to the 
Committees to recommend and set proper remedies. Further, the Committees apply 
remedies in respect of the insured’s bad faith, abuse, or fraud, based on article 87 
of IRLSCIC. Again, both provisions are uncertain and lack specification. Further 
development of legal remedies for fraudulent claims is recommended.  
By article 6 of UCMIP, the insurer has the right to recover paid indemnity in respect 
of the insured’s fraudulent claims. Although, the insurer may claim to recover a 
paid indemnity from the insured or to not pay a third party as a result of bad faith; 
the policy sets a limit to this provision by binding the insurer to pay the indemnity 
to a third party, who acts in good faith, based on article 8(7) of UCMIP, as shown 
above in section 7.2. However, this limit does not conflict with the insurer’s right 
to recover any indemnity paid to a third party from the insured. By this provision, 
the regulation maintains the principle of good faith in all dealings including in 
favour of third parties, allowing a balanced set of remedies. Significantly, by article 
7 of UCMIP, the insured’s rights under the policy ‘shall be forfeited if the claim 
involves fraud’. 
CRIDV provides that the insured’s claim is rejected in case of a fraudulent claims 
similar to section 12(1)(a) of IA. In a decision no 131/R/1433H (2012) which was 
affirmed by the Appeal decision no 346/a/1435H (2014) in Riyadh, CRIDV rejected 
the insured’s claim which was proven to be fraudulent claim, as the insured failed 
to prove that it was genuine.826 In a decision no 14/J/1433H (2012), the insured 
claimed for full indemnity for a stolen vehicle and damages for late payment. Later, 
the insured changed the claim to a claim for total loss of the vehicle without 
providing any further evidence. The insurer rejected the claim because the insured’s 
allegations about his stolen vehicle was not clear as the vehicle included a high 
                                                          
826 Similar to a decision no 375/R/1433H (2012) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance 
Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; and a decision no 264/R/1433H (2012) of the Committees for 
Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh. 
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standard security system which required the original key to run the vehicle. Thus, 
the insurer rejected the insured’s claim because of the suspicion of bad faith and 
fraud as the original keys of the vehicle were missing. The Committee found the 
claim was fraudulent as the insured acted in bad faith. Moreover, the Committee 
held that contracting parties must comply with the doctrine of utmost good faith 
prior to conclusion of the policy, during the performance of the policy, and at the 
claim stage. As part of the post-contractual duties, the insured must provide correct 
material facts in good faith, and the insured must not increase the insured risks. As 
the insured was not complying with the doctrine of utmost good faith, the insured’s 
right to claim was forfeited. 
Accordingly, it is clear that the Saudi approach in respect of rejection of fraudulent 
claims as the principal remedy needs to develop and include other remedies similar 
to the UK approach including recovery of payments and the right to terminate the 
insurance policy in order to give balance to both contracting parties. As shown in 
the UK jurisdiction, the UK has made significant changes to legal remedies for 
fraudulent claims in terms of IA. This study recommends adopting the UK approach 
regarding legal remedies to gain the benefits of the recent UK reform by having 
clear and balanced provisions.    
7.7.  Conclusion 
The insured's post-contractual duties are included in Saudi regulations unlike the 
UK approach where the insured’s post-contractual duties are not clear based on the 
recent reform. The interpretation of the previous case law remains relevant until the 
courts either accept the previous position or consider a different basis relying on 
recognition of the doctrine of utmost good faith as an interpretative principle. This 
leads to assume that as the doctrine of utmost good faith may now recognise implied 
terms, the judiciary may accept implied terms in insurance policies regarding the 
insured’s post-contractual duties. However, all of this area of law remains uncertain 
in respect of determination of the duties, the basis of these duties and their remedies.  
Fraudulent claims are regulated separately from the doctrine of utmost good faith, 
as IA imposes specific and well-developed remedies in the case of a fraudulent 
claims. However, IA has failed to define a fraudulent claim. It now is open to the 
courts to develop this area and fill this statutory gap. On the other hand, the Saudi 
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approach has an entire regulation about fraud and provides indicators of fraud for 
each type of insurance. However, AFR fails to provide proper remedies in the case 
of the insured’s fraud. Accordingly, this study supports that Saudi regulations 
should learn from the UK approach by considering similar remedies to fill this gap.  
The next chapter analyses the insurer’s pre-contractual duties in the UK and Saudi 
jurisdictions. This chapter critically compares the duty of disclosure and critically 
analyses examples of the insurer’s pre-contractual duties in both jurisdictions.    
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CHAPTER 8 
INSURERS’ PRE-CONTRACTUAL DUTIES OF UTMOST 
GOOD FAITH  
 
8.1. Introduction  
The doctrine of utmost good faith has a reciprocal effect, which imposes duties on 
both insureds and insurers.827 However, whilst CIDRA and IA have recognised the 
insureds’ pre-contractual duties for consumers and businesses, they fail to consider 
insurers’ duties. The scope of insurers' duties, particularly, pre-contractual duties 
has been questioned828, and insurers’ post-contractual duties shall be discussed in 
the following chapter. Accordingly, due to the significance of identifying the scope 
of the insurers’ pre-contractual duties, this chapter critically analyses the scope of 
the insurers’ pre-contractual duties by identifying the common law position; 
providing examples from commonwealth jurisdictions to assist with identifying the 
potential effects of the doctrine of utmost good faith after the enactment of IA in 
the UK; and comparing the UK jurisdiction to the Saudi jurisdiction. 
Two main questions shall be addressed in this chapter: what are the insurers’ post-
contractual duties in both the UK and Saudi jurisdictions, and what criticisms face 
these duties? To answer these questions, this chapter is divided into four sections 
looking at the insurers’ duty of disclosure; the insurers’ duty to inform insureds’ 
about the consequences of breach of the insurance contract; the insurers’ duty to 
consider the insureds’ needs when proposing an insurance policy; and the insurers’ 
duty to ensure the accuracy of the insureds’ disclosure. 
 
                                                          
827 John Birds, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 159. See also, 
Baris Soyer, ‘The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith: Is the Path Now Clear for the Introduction for New 
Remedies?’ in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime for 
Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 38. 
828 Peter Mann, ‘The Elusive Second Quadrant of Utmost Good Faith: What is the Scope of an 
Insurer’s Pre-Contractual Duty of Utmost Good Faith?’ (2016) 27 Insurance Law Journal 176. 
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8.2. The Insurers’ Duty of Disclosure 
Insurers as well as insureds are bound by the duty of disclosure, and the insurer’s 
concealment of either material facts or policy terms that are not clear to the insured 
should count as breach of the duty of utmost good faith. Material facts can be, for 
instance, ‘the existence of fraud in connection with the risk..., any defence which… 
may be relied on at a later stage…, and foreign illegality’829.  
In Carter v Boehm830, Lord Mansfield considered both parties to be under the duty 
of good faith and entitled to the same remedy for breach, as he stated that 'good 
faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows to draw the other 
into a bargain from his ignorance of the fact and his believing the contrary… the 
policy would be void, against the underwriter if he concealed'831. However, Lord 
Mansfield did not expand on the insurer’s duties, but his Lordship provided a 
specific example of the insurer’s duty, where non-disclosure would induce the 
insured’s decision to enter into the contract.832 His Lordship stated that ‘the policy 
would equally be void, against the underwriter, if he concealed; as, if he insured a 
ship on her voyage, which he privately knew to be arrived: and an action would lie 
to recover the premium’833. 
The principal issue regarding the insurers’ pre-contractual duty of disclosure is 
whether the insurer holds the ‘duty to speak’. The existence of the insurer’s duty to 
speak and related remedies are questioned.834 Aikens J illustrated the existence of 
the duty to speak and its impact on the remedy for breach in HIH Casualty and 
General Insurance Ltd & Ors v Chase Manhattan Bank & Ors835 by stating that ‘of 
course, without a duty to speak up, then there could be no right to damages’836. 
                                                          
829 Baris Soyer, ‘The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith: Is the Path Now Clear for the Introduction for 
New Remedies?’ in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime 
for Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 43. 
830 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905. 
831 Ibid 1910. 
832 Ibid 1909. 
833 (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1909. 
834 Baris Soyer, ‘The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith: Is the Path Now Clear for the Introduction for 
New Remedies?’ in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime 
for Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 40. 
835 [2001] CLC 48. 
836 Ibid [110]. 
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The question whether the insurer has the duty to speak had been raised in Ted Baker 
Plc v AXA Insurance UK Plc837. The Court of Appeal discussed the existence of the 
duty to speak in insurance contracts. Further, the Court of Appeal referred to Drake 
Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc838, where Pill LJ stated the insurer’s post-
contractual duty was very limited; however, the insurers’ duty of good faith was 
required to disclose what the insurer had in mind before avoiding the contract.839 
Sir Christopher Clarke pointed out that the insurer was expected to disclose 
information, and the insurer’s concealment was misleading. Sir Clarke stated that 
‘TB was… entitled to expect that if the insurers regarded the Category 7 material… 
as outstanding, due… then, acting honestly and responsibly, they should have told 
her. Not to do so was misleading’840. Significantly, Sir Clarke did not consider the 
insurer’s duty as dependent on the doctrine of utmost good faith, and this conclusion 
did not require examining of the extent of the insurer’s duty to speak. This was 
because linking the duty to the doctrine of utmost good faith would extend the 
possibilities where the insurer might hold the duty to speak.841  However, Sir Clarke 
recognised clearly even though with hesitation that the nature of insurance contracts 
as they rely on the doctrine of utmost good faith that would increase the chance to 
have the duty by stating that ‘such a nature will, if it does anything, increase the 
likelihood of a party having a duty to speak’842. As it is said ‘if it does anything’ 
referring to the doctrine of utmost good faith, the doctrine can be seen as a principle 
that may impose implied terms. Accordingly, the insurer’s duty to speak can be 
considered as an implied duty in insurance contracts. The extent of this may be 
greater due to the nature of the doctrine, however, it is significant to extend the 
interpretation of the doctrine especially for consumer insurance contracts, which 
should give further consumer protection to the UK consumer insurance market. 
 
As an example from a commonwealth jurisdiction, there is no doubt about the 
insurers’ duty of disclosure in Canada. Insurers have a positive obligation to 
disclose and to not misrepresent all material facts to the insureds in most provinces 
in Canada.843 This disclosure may either be for obtaining information that is 
                                                          
837 [2017] EWCA Civ 4097. 
838 [2004] QB 601. 
839 [2017] EWCA Civ 4097, [71]. 
840 Ibid [87]. 
841 Ibid [89]. 
842 Ibid. 
843 See for example, Ontario Insurance Act, RSO. 1990, c18, s 185, which states that:  
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relevant to the proposed insurance844 or information that must be disclosed by the 
insured in the proposal.845  
For a further example, in Young v Tower Insurance Limited846, the High Court of 
New Zealand discussed why the duty of good faith should be implied in insurance 
contracts as the duty has a reciprocal application, and the interpretation of the duty 
should not be merely limited to the duty of disclosure, as follows847: 
[T]his duty extends beyond a mere obligation on the insurer and the insured of 
continued disclosure… I find, as a bare minimum that the duty requires the insurer to: 
(a) disclose all material information that the insurer knows or ought to have known, 
including, but not limited to, the initial formation of the contract… (b) Act reasonably, 
fairly and transparently, including but not limited to the initial formation of the 
contract. 
Under the Saudi jurisdiction, article 53(1) of IRCICCL and article 32 of ICPP cover 
the insurers' pre-contractual duty of disclosure. By articles 24 - 26 of IRCICCL, 
insurers have to provide accurate and detailed information about the insurance 
products and covered risks to insureds. Further, by article 16 of IMCCR, insurers 
should take and monitor their reasonable measures to ensure that consumers 
understand and are aware about information. Article 11 of IMCCR considers 
integrity as an obligation on insurers by adopting that insurers must act honestly, 
fairly, and transparently when dealing with insureds. Further, this article commits 
insurers to follow best practice to protect the insured's interest.  
The insured’s remedy in terms of Lord Mansfield’s judgment was that the insurance 
contract was void. Later, avoidance was codified by s 17 of MIA as the only 
available remedy. However, there were two main problems with avoidance. Firstly, 
avoidance was not favourable to the insured and it prevented use of other remedies. 
After the enactment of IA, avoidance is totally abolished, which gives the common 
                                                          
‘Where an insurer fails to disclose or misrepresents a fact material to the insurance, 
the contract is voidable by the insured, but, in the absence of fraud, the contract is not 
by reason of such failure or misrepresentation voidable after the contract has been in 
effect for two years’ 
844 Ibid s 148. 
845 Ibid s 227 - 233. See for example, Taylor v London Assurance Corp [1934] 2 DLR 657 (CA), 
revd [1935] SCR 422. 
846 [2016] NZHC 2956. 
847 Ibid [163]. 
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law the opportunity to develop other remedies in the case of the insurers’ breach of 
the duty of disclosure.848  
Further, it may be possible that instead of avoidance, the recovery of premiums paid 
may also not be as suitable a remedy for the insureds as would be a claim of 
damages.849 As the purpose of Lord Mansfield’s decision was to prevent fraud by 
either party, insurers’ fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation is seen as a 
breach of the insurers’ pre-contractual duties of utmost good faith.850 Consequently, 
damages can be awarded based on the tort of deceit, whereas if the 
misrepresentation is negligent the insured may still be awarded damages based on 
Misrepresentation Act 1967.851  
In order to analyse the insurers’ duty of disclosure and remedies available upon 
breach, it is significant to critically analyse the common law position. The leading 
case in the UK jurisdiction is Banque Financiere de la Cite S.A. (Formerly Banque 
Keyser Ullmann S.A.) v Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd. (Formerly Hodge General & 
Mercantile Co. Ltd.)852. In this case, a combination of banks provided a loan to Mr 
Ballestero who provided securities including gemstones, which were fraudulently 
overvalued, and credit insurance policies that included an exclusion clause avoiding 
liability in the event of fraud. Mr Lee, an employee of the broker, had to obtain 
three layers of insurance policies; however, Mr Lee acted fraudulently by issuing a 
cover for the full amount on behalf of the insurers; however, only one layer of cover 
existed. The insurers became aware of the fraud by Mr Lee, but did not notify the 
banks. Mr Ballestero acted fraudulently as he did not repay the loan to the banks 
and disappeared. Then, the banks became aware about the fraudulent gemstones 
and the fraud of Mr Lee. Accordingly, the banks claimed for damages because the 
insurers were in breach of the pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith as the 
insurers had been aware of Mr. Lee’s fraud. However, the insurers refused to pay 
the insurance cover because of the exclusion clause that excluded fraud. 
                                                          
848 Baris Soyer, ‘The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith: Is the Path Now Clear for the Introduction for 
New Remedies?’ in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime 
for Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 43. 
849 Ibid 45. 
850 Ibid 40. 
851 Ibid 40. 
852 [1990] 3 WLR 364, [1991] 2 AC 249. 
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There are three main points about this decision to be critically examined. First, the 
scope of the insurers’ pre-contractual duties of utmost good faith; second, the test 
of materiality; and, third, damages as a remedy upon breach of insurers’ pre-
contractual duties of utmost good faith.  
Firstly, the Court of Appeal agreed that the insurer was required to disclose material 
facts to the insured at the pre-contractual stage based on s 17 of MIA; however the 
scope of this duty was questioned. The Court of Appeal rejected the wider view of 
Steyn J, the judge at first instance, about applying the test of good faith and fair 
dealing by stating that ‘in the case of commercial contracts, broad concepts of 
honesty and fair dealing, however laudable, are a somewhat uncertain guide when 
determining the existence or otherwise of an obligation which may arise even in the 
absence of any dishonest or unfair intent’853. However, it is questionable that the 
Court of Appeal did not consider the impact of adding 'utmost' good faith in 
insurance contracts when considering honesty and fair dealing in the context of 
general commercial contracts. The effect of 'utmost' might require imposing further 
obligations on the contracting parties as it requires the insured to disclose all 
relevant material facts. This became significant when the insurers failure to disclose 
induced the insured’s decision to enter into the contract. This perspective would be 
consistent with Lord Mansfield’s view when his Lordship stated that 'good faith 
forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows'854. However, the Court 
of Appeal focused only on causation rather than the fact of concealing significant 
material fact about the provided securities.855  
Secondly, Steyn J’s view was further problematic in respect of the scope of 
materiality. The Court of Appeal found that Steyn J’s view was not broad or clear 
enough; and applied two tests to identify the materiality of a circumstance whether 
the breach related to the nature of the risk and what level of recoverability of a claim 
was required for prudent insured to consider entering into the contract.856 
Significantly, by applying the view of Steyn J, it may be that not only does the test 
of materiality include the duty to disclose significant facts but also to provide advice 
                                                          
853 [1989] 3 WLR 25, [1990] 1 QB 665, [1989] 3 WLR 25, 772.  
854 (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1910. See also Susan Hodges, Cases and Materials on Marine Insurance 
Law (Routledge Cavendish 1999) 242. 
855 For further reading about the conclusion of causation and the ground to apply damages, see John 
Birds, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 161 – 170. 
856 [1989] 3 WLR 25, [1990] 1 QB 665, [1989] 3 WLR 25, 772. 
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or guidance to the insured.857 The view of Steyn J is similar to the Saudi position 
which expands the scope of the duty of disclosure.  
Saudi insurance regulations define the insurers' duty of disclosure as a pre-
contractual duty, and specify which information must be disclosed prior to 
conclusion of an insurance policy. Insurers have to provide proper advice about 
offers and available insurance products to insureds.858 According to article 10.1 of 
ICPP, the insurers’ pre-contractual duty of disclosure requires the insurer to provide 
information about the activity of the insurer, and any other related financial 
institution, full information about insurance products and their limit and 
exceptions.859 This information may not be practical for consumer insurance, but is 
significant for business insurance, because large business, insureds need to know 
the financial position of the insurer, which may impact on their decision to pursue 
the policy if the insurer’s financial position includes some serious issues or plans 
such as for merger and acquisitions.  
Article 11 of ICPP specifies the minimum information that must be disclosed by 
the insurers which includes information about: rights; responsibilities; duties; 
commissions; costs; insurance cover; details of the premium, any condition of the 
payment including paying in timely manner, and impacts of discounting the 
payment; duration of the insurance policy; advantages and exceptions; procedures 
for settlement of claims; how to complain; any clause may be amended by the 
insurance company after the validity of the contract; any restriction or unusual 
condition may harm the consumer’s interest in anyway; renewal process and if any 
clauses could be renegotiated; cancelation of the insurance policy and its effects; 
and answering any related consumers’ enquiries regarding insurance policy.860 
Thirdly, the Court of Appeal held that damages could not be a remedy upon breach 
of the insurers’ pre-contractual duties.861 Lord Templeman stated that ‘I agree with 
                                                          
857 Baris Soyer, ‘The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith: Is the Path Now Clear for the Introduction for 
New Remedies?’ in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime 
for Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 42. 
858 Article 36-37 of IMCCR and article 10 of ICPP.  
859 Similarly, article 84 - 86, and 101 of IRCHIL recognise similar provisions about the insurers’ 
duty of disclosure. 
860 See also, article 30, 37, and 42 of IMCCR. 
861 See also, Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v Qureshi [1999] Lloyd's Rep IR 453, where the 
Court of Appeal found that the avoidance was the only available remedy rather than damages upon 
the breach in insurer's pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith.  
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the court of appeal that a breach of the obligation does not sound in damages’862. It 
was argued by the Court of Appeal that the cause of the loss was not because of the 
insurers' non-disclosure, and it was not because of Mr Lee’s fraud but the inability 
of Mr Ballestero to repay the loan. Thus, on the grounds of causation, the claim 
failed. However, this did not take into account the insured’s interest. In other words, 
allowing avoidance instead of damages would not favour the insured especially 
when there was a loss, but it would be in favour of the insurer.863  
Similarly, damages were not accepted in Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual 
War Risks Association Ltd864, where the Court of Appeal examined the possibility 
of damages. The Court of Appeal distinguished the law of Torts, specifically, the 
US approach on bad faith, and, second, the tort of negligence. To illustrate their 
decision, the Court of Appeal explained there were four reasons behind not relying 
on tort, as following865: 
First, the powers of the court to grant relief when there has been non-disclosure of 
material facts stems from the jurisdiction originally exercised by the courts of equity 
to prevent imposition. Since duress and undue influence as such gave rise to no claim 
for damages, the court saw no reason in principle why non-disclosure as such should 
do so.  
Second, the decision in Container Transport International Inc v Oceanus Mutual 
Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 476 established that, 
where an underwriter seeks the remedy of avoidance of a policy, the actual effect of 
the non-disclosure on his mind is irrelevant and what matters is the effect of the non-
disclosure on the mind of a notional prudent underwriter. This principle illustrated one 
of the conceptual difficulties involved in upholding the remedy by way of damages. 
Third, the clear inference from the Marine Insurance Act 1906 is that parliament did 
not contemplate that a breach of the obligation of utmost good faith would give rise to 
a claim to damages in the course of such contract. 
Fourth, since in the case of a contract uberrimae fidei the obligation to disclose a 
known material fact is an absolute one, and attaches with equal force whether the 
failure is attributable to 'fraud, carelessness, inadvertence, indifference, mistake, error 
of judgment or even to [the] failure to appreciate its materiality' … a decision of the 
breach of such an obligation in every case and by itself constituted a tort, if it caused 
damage, could give rise to great potential hardship to insurers and even more, perhaps, 
to insured persons.  
Learning some lessons from other commonwealth jurisdictions is important for the 
UK. For example, in Australia, damages can be awarded upon breach of s 13 of 
ICA which considers the doctrine of utmost good faith as an implied term. Although 
it was questioned whether the basis of the doctrine of utmost good faith prior the 
                                                          
862 [1990] 3 WLR 364, [1991] 2 AC 249, 387. 
863 Özlem Gürses, ‘An English Insurer’s Pre-Contractual Duty of Utmost Good Faith’ (2012) 23 
Insurance Law Journal 51.  
864 [1990] 2 WLR 547, [1990] 1 QB 818. 
865 Ibid 888 - 889. 
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conclusion of the contract could still exist as an implied term, the wording of s 13 
of ICA states that ‘in respect of any matter arising under or in relation to [the 
contract of insurance]’, and ‘in relation’ should include the pre-contractual stage. 
Furthermore, in CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd866, the High 
Court of Australia found that the duty of utmost good faith ‘is more important than 
a term implied in the insurance contract’, and ‘the duty imposes obligations on both 
insurers and insureds as long as their conducts have legal consequences.867 
Even though considering the duty of utmost good faith as an implied term is not the 
position under common law868, it has a significant advantage in allowing damages 
upon breach of the doctrine of utmost good faith instead of avoidance which had 
caused difficulties under s 17 of MIA prior to reform.869 However, as avoidance is 
abolished after IA, the amended wording of s 17 of MIA shows further 
interpretation may be possible to allow damages or other remedies. This is 
especially because avoidance was not the appropriate remedy for the insured in the 
case of the insurer’s breach of utmost good faith.870  
A similarity can be found between the decision in CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP 
Financial Planning Pty Ltd871 and the interpretation by the Law Commissions that 
the duty of utmost good faith be considered as an interpretative principle which may 
impose implied terms. The Law Commissions stated that ‘good faith provides a 
background when considering whether it is necessary to imply a particular term’872. 
Saudi jurisdiction sets significant legal remedies for breach of the insurers’ duty of 
disclosure. Nevertheless, these remedies are limited, not comprehensive, and relate 
to professional practice rather than the rules of contract. Article 9 of IMCCR and 
article 9 of OIAR set out general provisions covering non-compliance with any 
                                                          
866 [2007] 235 CLR 1, 62 ACSR 609, [2007] HCA 36, [178] per Kirby J.  
867 Ibid [178] per Kirby J.  
868 Peter Mann, ‘The Elusive Second Quadrant of Utmost Good Faith: What is the Scope of an 
Insurer’s Pre-Contractual Duty of Utmost Good Faith?’ (2016) 27 Insurance Law Journal 176. 
869 Baris Soyer, ‘The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith: Is the Path Now Clear for the Introduction for 
New Remedies?’ in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime 
for Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 38. 
870 Peter Mann, ‘The Elusive Second Quadrant of Utmost Good Faith: What is the Scope of an 
Insurer’s Pre-Contractual Duty of Utmost Good Faith?’ (2016) 27 Insurance Law Journal 176. See 
Özlem Gürses, ‘An English Insurer’s Pre-Contractual Duty of Utmost Good Faith’ (2012) 23 
Insurance Law Journal 51. 
871 [2007] 235 CLR 1, 62 ACSR 609, [2007] HCA 36, [178] per Kirby J.  
872 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business 
Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Summary 
(Law Com No 353, Scot Law Com No 238, 2014) para 30.23. 
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requirements of the whole regulations. In addition, in terms of IMCCR and OIAR, 
any breach of these regulations are considered as a violation of LSCIC and its 
implementing regulation and the licensing conditions. Accordingly, the insurer will 
be subjected to an enforcement action by SAMA to either pay no more than one 
million Saudi Riyals, a prison term of no more than four years, or both, based on 
article 21 of LSCIC. Further, according to article 76 of IRCCLC, the insurers 
licence may be withdrawn for the following reasons: first, if the company ‘does not 
fulfil requirements of the law or rules’, and, second, if ‘SAMA finds that insureds' 
rights, beneficiaries or shareholders are subject to loss due to the method used of 
engaging in activity’. The use of these penalties can be criticised. 
The major criticism is that these penalties are not appropriate in relation to the 
failure of the insurers’ pre-contractual duties as these penalties are more appropriate 
to a violation of professional practice. The other criticism is that the penalties do 
not benefit a particular insured but SAMA since SAMA’s goal is to have a suitable 
and effective insurance market, while the insured’s goal is to gain indemnity, 
recover any loss, or to make amendments to the policy’s conditions in the insured’s 
favour. It is important therefore to investigate how CRIDV reaches its decisions in 
order to identify which remedies are adopted from the practice side. CRIDV 
commonly commit insurers to pay insureds’ claims, or cancel the insurance policies 
and return premiums paid. Damages are recognised by CRIDV as long as the 
insured can prove the loss.873 
For example, in a decision no 335/R/1433H (2012) which was affirmed by the 
Appeal decision no 4/a/1436H (2015) in Riyadh, CRIDV obliged the insurer to 
cancel the insurance policy according to the insured’s request, and to return 
premiums paid to the insured. This was based on the insurer’s breach of the pre-
contractual duty of disclosure by failing to disclose the cancellation procedures and 
its costs to the insured. CRIDV found that the insurer did not comply with the 
requirement of the doctrine of utmost good faith and violated article 15 of IMCCR. 
In conclusion, the insurers’ duty of disclosure is recognised in both the UK and 
Saudi jurisdictions. While the common law tended to limit the insurers’ duty of 
                                                          
873 Decision no 704/R/1436H (2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations in Riyadh, and decision no 1/R/1435H (2014) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision 
no 236/a/1436H (2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in 
Riyadh. 
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disclosure in order not to expand the scope of the duty; Saudi regulations provide 
detailed provisions about it. The legal remedies are still uncertain for both 
jurisdictions. 
The next section comparatively analyses the insurers’ duty to inform insureds about 
the consequences of breach of the insurance contract. The critical analysis examines 
several examples in order to illustrate this duty. 
8.3. Insurers’ Duty to Inform Insureds about the Consequences of Breach of 
the Insurance Contract 
The insurers’ duty to notify the insureds about the results of breach of the contract 
of insurance is debatable. To analyse this duty, examples from the commonwealth 
jurisdictions are provided. For instance, in Australian Associated Motor Insurers 
Ltd v Ellis874, the insurer owed the duty to disclose the consequences of breach the 
policy terms and conditions by the insured. In this case, the insured had a 
comprehensive insurance policy for their car and the policy required them to obtain 
insurer's consent for any modification. The insured made a change without 
obtaining the insurer's consent; later, the car had been involved in an accident which 
did not relate to this modification. The insurer did not accept the insured’s claim 
due to the unauthorised modification. It was held that the insurer had been in breach 
of its duty of good faith, because the insurer did not inform the insured about the 
consequences of breach of the condition of the policy.875  
Similarly, in Suncorp General Insurance Ltd v Cheihk876, the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal held that it was the insurers’ duty to ensure that the insureds were 
informed ‘clearly’ about their duty of disclosure and the significance of this duty.877  
However, the extent of the duty of good faith to inform the insured about the 
consequences of breach of the policy’s terms was argued in Re Zurich Australian 
Insurance Ltd878. According to this authority, the condition in Australian 
Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v Ellis879 was assessed as ‘unusual’ and was a 
                                                          
874 (1990) 54 SASR 61, 10 MVR 143, 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-957, 76,323 per Cox J. 
875 Ibid 76,330 – 76,331. 
876 [1999] NSWCA 238. 
877 Ibid [40] per Giles JA. 
878 [1999] 2 Qd R 203, (1999) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-429. 
879 (1990) 54 SASR 61, 10 MVR 143, 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-957, 76,323per Cox J. 
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common condition in comprehensive motor insurance policies.880 The prudent 
insured should be aware about common insurance policies conditions. This 
authority rejected the approach of turning the duty of good faith to the duty to 
‘coddle insureds’.881  
Another example is in Kelly v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd882, where the claim 
of breach of the duty of good faith by the insurer was declined because the insured 
was aware about the policy’s terms; however, the insured did not comply with these 
terms. This decision is similar to the authority of Re Zurich Australian Insurance 
Ltd883 which examined the awareness of the insured. Thus, the insurer’s duty to 
inform the insured is subject to the insured’s awareness. Further, it was right of the 
court in Re Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd to reject the authority of Australian 
Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v Ellis884 because the insured’s awareness was not 
examined, and the duty of good faith was expanded by an inappropriate application. 
Accordingly, based on the new regime in the UK, the question is whether the 
common law may adopt such a duty and expand the interpretation of the doctrine 
of utmost good faith referred to in s 17 of MIA. To answer this question, looking at 
the conduct of the Court of Appeal, in Banque Financiere de la Cite S.A. (Formerly 
Banque Keyser Ullmann S.A.) v Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd. (Formerly Hodge 
General & Mercantile Co. Ltd.)885, may be significant. The Court of Appeal 
rejected the interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith given by the first 
instance judge. The insurers’ duty to inform insureds’ about the consequences of 
breach of insurance contracts is likely to be rejected but that is not certain. 
However, where this duty is not rejected, the significant question shall be what are 
the legal remedies available to the insureds? It seems that recission of the whole 
policy may be considered by the insured, or damages in case of any loss to the 
insured, although damages are not certain to be awarded in the UK jurisdiction. 
                                                          
880 [1999] 2 Qd R 203, (1999) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-429, [79]. 
881 Ibid [79] – [81], as it was stated that: 
The court found that the insurer was in breach of the implied duty found in section 
13 because it had not notified the insured of the consequence of breaching condition 
5. This decision appears to me, with respect, wrong. A duty, the essence of which is to 
act honestly, is elevated to an obligation in an insurer to coddle its insured.  
882 (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-197, 78,248. 
883 [1999] 2 Qd R 203, (1999) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-429. 
884 (1990) 54 SASR 61, 10 MVR 143, 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-957. 
885 [1990] 3 WLR 364, [1991] 2 AC 249. 
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However, if the insurer failed to comply with this duty fraudulently, damages can 
be awarded on the ground of deceit. The common law should have regard to the 
new regime of dividing the insurance market into consumers and businesses as the 
knowledge of consumers is limited, and, significantly, recognising this duty should 
provide further consumer protection. 
Saudi regulations do not include the insurers’ duty to inform the insured about the 
consequences of breach of the insurance policy’s terms in particular. However, 
Saudi regulations expand the duty of disclosure to a wider application, as shown in 
section 8(2). The insurers’ duty to inform the insured about the consequences of 
breach of the insurance policy’s terms is part of the insurers’ duty of disclosure. 
Furthermore, the expansion of the insurers’ duties can be understood in terms of 
article 11 of IMCCR, which requires integrity as an obligation on insurers by 
ordering that they must act honestly, fairly, and transparently when dealing with 
insureds. Transparency should be interpreted to include the insurers’ duty to inform 
the insured about the consequences of breach of the insurance policy’s terms. In the 
case of the insurers’ breach, remedies are not specified. Therefore, the same 
argument that is considered in section 8.2 should be considered in respect of the 
insurers’ breach to inform the insured about the consequences of breach the 
insurance policy’s terms. Moreover, CRIDV apply damages with no restrictions as 
long as the insured can prove his loss. 
For example, in a decision no 70/R/1435H (2014) which was affirmed by the 
Appeal decision no 269/a/1436H (2015) in Riyadh, CRIDV obliged the insurer to 
pay the insured’s claim that had been rejected by the insurer when processing the 
claim, and to pay damages for the cost of travel. This was because the insurer failed 
to ensure that the policy terms were clarified and understood by the insured.  
CRIDV provided two reasons of this decision: first, it found that the insurer had 
breached article 53(1) of IRLSCIC which states that ‘the company shall, before 
issuing an insurance policy, give the policyholder access to the terms, conditions 
and exclusions of the policy’, as the insurer failed to prove the contrary. Second, 
CRIDV illustrated that the doctrine of utmost good faith is one of the major 
principles of insurance contracts which commits both parties to disclose all material 
facts about the insured risk based on enquiry or not depending on article 15 of 
IMCCR. Article 15 states that ‘companies must communicate all relevant 
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information to customers in a timely manner to enable them to make informed 
decisions’.886 Thus, it is clear that CRIDV recognise this duty and applies other 
practical remedies than those just in favour of SAMA. 
The next section comparatively analyses the insurers’ duty to consider the insureds’ 
needs when proposing insurance policies. Several examples are provided to analyse 
this duty. 
8.4. The Insurers’ Duty to Consider the Insureds’ needs when proposing 
Insurance Policies 
Insurers must consider the insureds’ needs when proposing insurance policies.887 
The importance of this provision is to avoid any misunderstanding and limit the 
opportunity for mistakes by insureds when forming the insurance policy. To analyse 
this duty, an example from the Australian jurisdiction is provided.  
In Speno Rail Maintenance Australia Pty Ltd v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd888, where a 
liability insurance policy was issued to the insured who wished to have an insurance 
cover against all liabilities, the insurance cover did not match the insured's needs. 
It was held that since the insured had commercial experience, the insured’s claim 
about the insurer’s breach of the duty of utmost good faith because the policy did 
not meet the insured’s needs failed. This is consistent with the insured’s awareness 
test that was in Re Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd889. The Supreme Court of 
Western Australia in Speno held that890: 
[T]here was "a duty to speak" on the part of Zurich to inform Speno that the policies 
which it was providing did not extend to Speno the cover it had specifically requested. 
The information was clearly within the category of matters material to the question 
whether, in the particular circumstances a prudent prospective insured would want to 
know. Consequently, in my opinion, there was a breach of the duty of the utmost good 
faith on the part of Zurich. 
                                                          
886 Similar decisions had been made by CRIDV in a decision no 195/R/1434H (2013) which was 
affirmed by the Appeal decision no 231/a/1436H (2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance 
Disputes and Violations in Riyadh, and decision no 306/R/1433H (2012) which was affirmed by the 
Appeal decision no 629/a/1436H (2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations in Riyadh. 
887 Craig Brown ‘An Insurer’s Pre-Contractual Obligations in Canadian Insurance Law’ (2012) 23 
Insurance Law Journal 80. 
888 (2000) 23 WAR 291, (2001) 11 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-485, [2000] WASCA 408, 
BC200007850. 
889 [1999] 2 Qd R 203, (1999) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-429, [42]. 
890 (2000) 23 WAR 291, (2001) 11 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-485, [2000] WASCA 408, 
BC200007850, [46]. 
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Again, looking at the new regime in the UK, the question should be asked whether 
the common law can adopt the insurers’ duty to consider the insureds’ needs when 
proposing insurance policies, and if so what are the legal remedies available to the 
insureds. Expanding the interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith in terms 
of s 17 of MIA is not absolute as this area of law is uncertain. Remedies are likely 
to be rescission or damages if losses occur. Again, damages are not certain to be 
awarded in the UK as the courts have rejected applying damages. However, this 
position may change after the abolishment of avoidance under IA.  
The other example of breach of the insurer’s duty of utmost good faith is in case of 
the insured’s mistake of choosing the insurance policy while the insurer had known 
about this mistake or had contributed to this mistake being made by 
misrepresentation.891 There are two scenarios based on this assumption. Firstly, if 
the insurer had known about the insured’s mistake but had concealed it without any 
misrepresentation. Secondly, if the insureds’ mistake was based on the insurer’s 
misrepresentation. According to the second scenario, damages can be claimed as a 
result of misrepresentation based on s 2(1) of Misrepresentation Act 1967. The 
question is whether damages can be awarded in the first example if the insured 
suffers a loss.  
If the concealment was based on fraudulent intent, damages can be awarded based 
on the tort of deceit, but if the concealment is not fraudulent, the remedy becomes 
uncertain. The concealment based on the Lord Mansfield’s judgment is fraud as he 
stated ‘the keeping back of such a circumstance is a fraud, and therefore the policy 
is void’892. However, voiding the policy will not give an advantage to the insured 
unless the insured knows about the concealment prior to the occurrence of the risk. 
Thus, accepting damages as a remedy could prevent insurers taking a negative role 
when forming an insurance policy.   
In Saudi jurisdiction, based on article 42 of IMCCR, it is the insurers' obligation to 
specify consumers’ needs and proposed insured risks. Insurers have to provide 
proper advice about offers and available insurance products to insureds by ensuring 
that the offer is the best choice for the insured.893 Furthermore, article 11 of IMCCR 
                                                          
891 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) [6-044]. 
892 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905, 1910.  
893 Article 24 - 26 of IRCICCL. 
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considers integrity as an obligation on insurers by ordering that they must act 
honestly, fairly, and transparently when dealing with insureds.  
Identifying which advice can be provided to insureds in order to recognise their 
insurance needs becomes a part of the insurers' pre-contractual duty, according to 
IMCCR and the first principle of ICPP.  Moreover, the significance of this advice 
is to enable insureds to make ‘informed decisions’ regarding entering into a specific 
insurance policy, based on article 15 of ICPP.894 Particularly, this advice must 
include at a minimum, answering how a specific proposed insurance policy would 
meet the insured’s needs. Furthermore, where there is more than one insurance 
policy, the advice must consider differences between these options including, for 
examples, costs and benefits.895 However, providing advice to the insured to give 
him a chance to make an 'informed decision' can be criticised when issuing an 
online insurance policy where the insured is making the policy based on the 
information that is available on the website or through aggregator websites. Thus, 
it seems that providing advice should be accessible to the insured as part of the 
insurers’ duties.  
In case of the insurers’ breach, remedies are not specified in particular. Therefore, 
the same arguments given in section 8.2 should be considered regarding the 
insurers’ breach. In a decision no 10/J/1431H (2010) in Jeddah, CRIDV held that 
the insurer owed the duty to propose an insurance policy that met the insured’s 
needs, as the insured wished to have a professional liability insurance policy to 
cover the insured’s employees in all Saudi regions whereas the policy was for only 
one region. However, the insurer proved that the policy was issued exactly based 
on the insured’s request, and the insured failed to prove the contrary. CRIDV held 
that the failure of this duty could not be proved and as the insurer had requested to 
terminate the policy, the policy should terminate and any premium that was 
provided for the period had to return to the insured. 
The next section comparatively analyses the insurers’ duty to ensure the accuracy 
of the insureds’ disclosure by providing examples for the purpose of the critical 
analysis. 
                                                          
894 See also, article 15 and 34 of IMCCR. 
895 Ibid. 
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8.5. The Insurers’ Duty to Ensure the Accuracy of the Insureds’ Disclosure 
It is the insurers’ duty to ensure the accuracy of the insured’s disclosure. Lord 
Mansfield in Carter v Boehm896 recognised it as he stated that ‘the under-writer at 
London, in May 1760, could judge much better of the probability of the 
contingency, than Governor Carter could at Fort Marlborough, in September 
1769’897. In Joel v Law Union and Crown Insurance Company898, the Court of 
Appeal found that insurers owed the duty to ensure the accuracy of the insured’s 
disclosure not its ‘truthfulness’, as it considered that ‘the duty of the Court to require 
the insurers to establish clearly that the insured consented to the accuracy, and not 
the truthfulness, of his statements being made a condition of the validity of the 
policy’899. In respect of IA, the insurer is expected to play a positive role by ensuring 
the accuracy of the insured’s disclosure, as s 5(2)(3) of IA includes information that 
readily available to the knowledge of the insurer. Thus, it is not expected anymore 
that the insurer has a negative role at the formation of the insurance contract, and it 
is suggested that the insurers and their brokers use all available sources as long as 
it is not a confidential information for the brokers to ensure the accuracy of the 
insureds’ disclosure. 
A similar position was found in the Canadian case Coronation Insurance Co v Taku 
Air Transport Ltd900, where there had been an airplane crash. The insurer did not 
pay the insured’s claim because of the failure to disclose a bad accident record and 
the accuracy of numbers of the seating capacity. The Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the seating capacity was material information but the air accident records were 
not relevant. This was because these records were in the public domain, which 
should be known by the insurer as it stated that ‘at a minimum, it [the insurer] should 
review its own files on the applicant, and should make a search of the public record of 
the air carrier's accidents’901.  
The significant question is, which remedy should be applied upon the breach of this 
duty by the insurer? Again, remedies are uncertain especially after the enactment 
                                                          
896 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
897 Ibid 1914. 
898 [1908] 2 KB 863. 
899 Ibid 886, per Fletcher Moulton LJ. 
900  (1992) 4 CCLI (2d) 115 (SCC).  
901 Ibid.  
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of IA. However, rescission and damages are appropriate remedies, as shown in the 
previous sections. 
Saudi regulations do not include the insurers’ duty to ensure the accuracy of the 
insured’s disclosure in particular. However, as Saudi regulations expand the duty 
of disclosure to a wider application, as shown in section 8.2, the extent of the 
insurers’ duties can be understood based on article 11 of IMCCR, which requires 
integrity as an obligation on insurers by adopting that they must act honestly, fairly, 
and transparently when dealing with insureds. The insurers are assumed to act both 
honestly and transparently. In the case of the insurers’ breach, the remedies are not 
clear. Again, the same argument considered in section 8.2 should be applied in 
respect of this breach. Further, no CRIDV decisions can be found in relation to this 
type of insurers’ pre-contractual duty; however, it can be assumed that CRIDV may 
apply similar remedies that are applied in case of the breach of other insurers’ duties 
such as the rescission and damages. 
8.6. Conclusion 
The insurers’ pre-contractual duties are dealt with similarly by the UK and Saudi 
jurisdictions. The duty of disclosure is recognised in both jurisdictions. While the 
UK common law tended to limit the insurers’ duty of disclosure in order to not 
expand the scope of the duty; Saudi regulations provide detailed provisions about 
it. Further, as long as the new regime in the UK is silent about the insurers’ duties, 
the scope of the insurers’ duties will still be based on the common law authorities. 
However, in terms of the consideration of the doctrine of utmost good faith being 
an interpretative principle which may impose implied terms, further interpretation 
or even changing this area of law may be required by the courts in the future.  
Both jurisdictions fail to provide proper remedies. While the courts rejected 
damages in the UK, Saudi regulations adopt very strict remedies, which are not in 
the interest of the insureds but SAMA; even though CRIDV apply proper remedies 
including damages. The major criticism of CRIDV decisions is that these decisions 
are not binding in future disputes. Therefore, both jurisdictions fail to consider the 
insured’s interest in respect of the granting of remedies. The main obstacle against 
awarding damages in the UK jurisdiction was avoidance, the courts may now be 
able to make further significant changes in considering an award of damages upon 
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breach of the insurers’ pre-contractual duties after IA and the abolishment of the 
sole remedy of avoidance. Finally it is important to interpret more strictly the 
insurer's pre-contractual duties of utmost good faith in the case of consumer 
insurance contracts than in business insurance by maintaining a clear position in 
respect of the accuracy of the disclosure, the accuracy of matching the insurance 
policy to the insureds’ needs, and to notify the insureds about the consequences of 
breach of their duties and contractual terms. 
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CHAPTER 9 
INSURERS’ POST-CONTRACTUAL DUTIES OF UTMOST 
GOOD FAITH 
 
9.1. Introduction 
Insurers’ post-contractual duties of utmost good faith have not recognised by the 
UK new regime, IA and CIDRA. Furthermore, after the enforcement of IA, the 
status of the doctrine of utmost good faith becomes uncertain. This chapter shall 
attempt to clarify the position of the doctrine of utmost good faith by suggesting 
the inclusion of specific duties, particularly, in respect of the insurers’ post-
contractual duties.  
Under the Saudi jurisdiction, conversely, there is a significant recognition of the 
insurers’ post-contractual duties, especially, in respect of the insurers’ duties of 
utmost good faith during the settlement of claims; however, it fails to provide 
proper and relevant remedies. 
Accordingly, this comparison shall add value to both jurisdictions by providing a 
critical analysis of insurers’ post-contractual duties in order to contribute to the 
interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith. This is because the scope of 
insurers’ post-contractual duties of utmost good faith is not obvious and is 
uncertain in the UK.902 Accordingly, this chapter shall highlight several examples 
of insurers’ post-contractual duties. Further, a traditional example of the insurers’ 
post-contractual duties is the duty to pay valid claims in reasonable time. However, 
this classic example shall not be considered in this study because this scenario is 
covered separately by s 28 of Enterprise Act 2016. Therefore, due to the separation 
between the duties in respect of the insurer’s late payment and the doctrine of 
utmost good faith, these provisions are out of the scope of this chapter. 
                                                          
902 Baris Soyer, ‘The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith: Is the Path Now Clear for the Introduction for 
New Remedies?’ in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime 
for Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 52. 
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Two main questions shall be addressed in this chapter in order to achieve the 
objectives of this study about what the insurer’s post-contractual duties are in both 
the UK and Saudi jurisdictions, and what are the major criticisms facing these 
duties. To answer these questions, this chapter is in three sections being the 
insurers’ duties of utmost good faith during investigation of the claim, the insurers’ 
duties to act in good faith when exercising their discretion, rights, and powers, and 
the insurers’ duties of utmost good faith during the settlement of claims. 
9.2. The Insurers’ Duty of Utmost Good Faith during the Claim Investigation 
Insurers commonly investigate insureds’ claims to find out whether the claim is 
valid under the insurance policy. This investigation requires further information 
from the insured about the particular claim and identifies the appropriate actions 
and rights. All of these procedures should be followed in good faith. A failure to 
investigate in good faith would be seen from the insurers’ conduct through the 
investigation. 
There are two possibilities: First, whether the claim is a recoverable under the 
policy; second, where the claim is not recoverable, whether the claim is a fraudulent 
claim. In the first scenario, if the claim would not be recoverable under the 
insurance policy, nothing would be available for the insured and the cost of the 
insurer’s investigation could not be recovered as long the claim was not fraudulent. 
In the second scenario, where the insurer investigates a fraudulent claim, the insurer 
may collect damages for any cost of the insurer’s investigation.903  As shown in 
chapter 6, damages for deceit might be awarded against a fraudster especially for 
the cost of the investigation of a fraudulent claim.904 For example, in Aviva v 
Brown905 the court found that the insured acted not only dishonestly but 
fraudulently after examining the awareness of the insured as he was a businessman 
and a clever insured.906 Thus, the insurer succeeded in his claim for the costs of 
accommodation during the claim investigation, based on the lack of good faith by 
the insured. On the other hand, if the insurer fails to act in good faith by not 
                                                          
903 London Assurance v Clare (1937) 57 L1L Rep 254, 270.  
904 Simon Rainey & David Walsh, ‘Remedies for Fraudulent Claims under the Insurance Act 2015’, 
in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime for Commercial 
and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 69. 
905 [2011] EWHC 362 (QB). 
906 Ibid [91]. 
   223 
 
conducting an investigation907, taking improper procedures for the investigation, 
and causing losses to the insured, recovering these losses should be available to the 
insured on the ground of the insurer’s breach of the post-contractual duty of utmost 
good faith. 
By comparison, under Saudi jurisdiction, article 52(h) of IMCCR requires insurers 
to conduct a reasonable investigation of the insureds’ claims within 10 days for 
individual insureds, and 30 days for business insureds. Two points can be made. 
Firstly, the Saudi approach requires the insurer to conduct a reasonable 
investigation, although the reasonableness test of the investigation is in question. 
The test that should be applied to prove the reasonableness is not clear whether it 
should be the prudent insurer test or the actual insurer test. It seems that the prudent 
insurer test is more appropriate to find out whether all required procedures have 
been followed. Thus, expert evidence can be strongly relevant to identify the 
insurer’s breach.  
Secondly, article 52(h) distinguishes between the case of consumer insurance and 
business insurance with regard to the time period within which the reasonable 
investigation is to be concluded by the insurer. This is significant, as the insurer 
does not need to spend a long time investigating a consumer claim and the consumer 
should be indemnified immediately or the consumer should at least know why they 
may not be indemnified. There is no equivalent in the UK as IA and CIDRA do not 
consider insurers’ post-contractual duties at all. However, this point may be of 
interest in the UK, which distinguishes between consumer and business insurance, 
when conducting an investigation for insureds’ claims. 
The question is whether damages may be available in case of breach of the insurers’ 
post-contractual duty of utmost good faith in both the UK and Saudi jurisdictions. 
By recognising the doctrine of utmost good faith as an interpretative principle in 
the UK, which may generate implied terms regarding the insurer’s post-contractual 
duties, damages for breach may be considered by the courts especially after 
abolition of avoidance as a sole remedy, which had been a barrier for application of 
damages. Although, this area of law is uncertain and it needs judicial interpretation 
to confirm the proper remedy in case of the insurers’ breach; this study suggested 
                                                          
907 See also, Kelly Godfrey, ‘The Duty of Utmost Good Faith — The Great Unknown of Modern 
Insurance Law’ (2002) 14 Insurance Law Journal 56. 
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that to apply damages in case of breach the insurer’s post-contractual duties 
depending on the consideration of the insurer’s duties as implied terms in each 
insurance contracts. On the other hand, Saudi jurisdiction applies damages without 
any limitation as long as the insured can prove his losses.908 
The next section comparatively analyses the insurers’ duty to act in good faith when 
exercising their discretions, rights, and powers. The critical analysis examine 
several examples of the application of this duty. 
9.3. The Insurers’ Duties to Act in Good Faith when Exercising their 
Discretions, Rights, and Powers  
Insurers hold powers, discretion, and significant rights during the performance of 
the contract of insurance, for example, insurers must provide their consent and 
approval such as in medical and motor insurance policies. Several examples are 
provided to critically analyse this section and to predict the potential interpretation 
of the duties on behalf of the insurer as this area of law is uncertain.909 Firstly, in 
Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd910, the court held that the 
insurer’s consent should not be unreasonably withheld as a part of the duty of good 
faith.911  
Secondly, in liability insurance policies, insurers hold the right of subrogation, and 
the right to a defence on behalf of the insured. These rights, powers, and discretions 
should be conducted in good faith. For example, in Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai 
Ping (No2)912, the Court of Appeal illustrated that, as follows913: 
Reinsurers' power to act on behalf of and to bind insurers would be subject to similar 
limitations: it should, at the least, be exercised in good faith and in the common interest 
on the basis of the facts giving rise to the particular claim and not arbitrarily… liability 
insurances commonly contain conditions requiring the insured to refrain from making 
any admission or settlement without insurers' approval (as well as usually entitling 
insurers to take over the defence of any third party claim)… I would therefore accept 
as a general qualification, that any withholding of approval by reinsurers should take 
place in good faith. 
                                                          
908 See for example, decision no 31/R/1434H (2013) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 
667/a/1435 (2014) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh. 
909 John Birds, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 166. 
910 (1991) 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-032. 
911 Ibid 76,910. See also Alison Padfield, Insurance Claims (4th edn, Bloomsbury Professional 
2016) 144. 
912 [2001] CLC 1103. 
913 Ibid [54], [55], [67], and [77]. 
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Furthermore, in the Mercandian Continent914, Longmore LJ recognised a situation 
where the insurer’s post-contractual duty of utmost good faith might be implied by 
looking at the insurer’s duty to conduct a defence in good faith to protect the 
insured’s interest. His Lordship stated that ‘interests of the insured and the insurers 
may not be the same but they will be required to act in good faith towards each 
other... The insured's protection lies in the duty which the law imposes on the 
insurer to exercise his power to conduct the defence in good faith’915. 
Similarly, an example from the Australian jurisdiction, in Distillers Co Bio-
Chemicals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd916, where an Australian 
court set an obligation on the insurer to use its rights in good faith whether the 
insurer decides to take a defence out for the insured or not. It stated that917: 
This duty of good faith… must… not only control the actions of an insurer who has 
taken over its insured's defence but will apply equally to the insurer's exercise of its 
power of granting or withholding consent to the making of admissions etc. even if it 
elects not to take over the defence. 
Thirdly, in Groom v Crocker918, the Court of Appeal considered good faith as part 
of the insurer’s powers. It stated that ‘the effect of the provisions... is… to give to 
the insurers the right to decide upon the proper tactics to pursue in the conduct of 
the action, provided that they do so in what they bona fide consider to be the 
common interest of themselves and their assured’919.  
Fourthly, the insurer has the right to reject a claim if it is not covered under the 
insurance policy; however, the insurer must provide reasons for this decision. In 
other words, it is the insurer’s duty not to reject a claim that is covered by the policy 
including any claim to terminate or avoid the policy.920 As a result, if the insurer 
cannot provide reasonable reasons to reject a specific claim, the insurer would be 
in breach of the continuing duty of good faith.921 Thus, a rejection to settle a valid 
claim should be counted as a breach of the insurer’s post-contractual duty of utmost 
                                                          
914 [2001] CLC 1836. 
915 Ibid [22]. 
916 (1974) 130 CLR 1, 2 ALR 321, 48 ALJR 136, BC7400010. Similarly, see also Edwards v The 
Hunter Valley Co-op Dairy Co Ltd & another (1992) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-113. 
917 (1974) 130 CLR 1, 2 ALR 321, 48 ALJR 136, BC7400010, 31. 
918 [1938] 2 All ER 394, [1939] 1 KB 194. 
919 Ibid 203. See also Cormack v Washbourne [2000] CLC 1039, 1048. 
920 Alison Padfield, Insurance Claims (4th edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2016) 212. 
921 RAF England v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (unreported, Dis Ct of Adelaide, Kitchen J, 30 
July 1991) as mentioned in Kelly Godfrey, ‘The Duty of Utmost Good Faith — The Great Unknown 
of Modern Insurance Law’ (2002) 14 Insurance Law Journal 56. 
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good faith. Moreover, damages can be awarded in light of the late payment 
provisions based on s 28 of the Enterprise Act 2016 in case of non-payment or any 
unreasonable delay to pay a valid claim. This is because the provisions for late 
payment are implied in every insurance contract; thus damages are available as a 
remedy as a consequence of breach the contract. However, the question whether 
damages for insured losses can be awarded is still uncertain, and needs further 
deliberation by the court. 
A similar position is found in Saudi jurisdiction. According to article 52(i) of 
IMCCR, if the claim accepted the insurer’s decision shall include that the insurer 
must acknowledge the amount of the settlement, any reduction in this amount, and 
justification in case the claim is partially rejected; and if the claim is rejected, 
reasons to reject the whole claim must be provided.  
For example, in a decision no 27/D/1437H (2016) which was affirmed by the 
Appeal decision no 120/a/1437H (2016) in Dammam, CRIDV obliged the insurer 
to pay the insured’s claim which had been rejected when the insurer processed the 
claim. Further, CRIDV referred the case to the General Department of Insurance 
Companies Control to investigate the insurer’s violation of IMCCR as the insurer 
settled the insured’s claim by assessing the vehicle as a total loss whereas it should 
not have been. Accordingly, CRIDV found that the insurer had breached article 
52(i) and article 16 of IMCCR which states that ‘companies must take reasonable 
measures to ensure the accuracy and clarity of the information provided to 
customers and make such information available in writing’. This was because the 
total loss report was ambiguous and lacked justification and accuracy as the report 
stated that it was a ‘futility to repair the vehicle economically’. CRIDV found this 
statement did not reflect the actual situation in respect of the vehicle and the 
wording of this statement was inaccurate and not obvious. Therefore, CRIDV found 
that if the vehicle was considered as a total loss on the basis of the insurer's sole 
view, it would not be only unjust to the insured and be an arbitrary interpretation of 
the policy, but also it would be in violation of article 52(f) of IMCCR, which 
obliged insurers to follow fairness and integrity when settling claims. Finally, 
CRIDV justified its decision by referring to article 9 of the same regulation which 
states that ‘non-compliance with the requirements set forth in This Code will be 
deemed a breach of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 
and its Implementing Regulations and the licensing conditions and may subject the 
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companies to enforcement action’.922 Accordingly, it clearly appears that CRIDV 
sharply dealt with the insurers’ breach of post-contractual duties. 
Fifthly, insurers had the right to avoid generally the policy upon breach of the 
insured’s pre-contractual duties based on s17 of MIA before the enactment of IA 
and on specific types of breach after CIDRA and IA. However, this right was to be 
exercised in good faith; otherwise, the insurer would breach its post-contractual 
duty of utmost good faith. For example, in Drake Insurance Plc v Provident 
Insurance Plc923, if the insurer could not prove materiality or inducement, the 
insurer would be in breach of the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith.924 
Interestingly, Rix LJ linked the insurer’s post-contractual duty of utmost good faith 
with the insurer’s knowledge by saying that ‘knowledge or shut-eye knowledge of 
the fact that the accident was a no fault accident would have made it a matter of bad 
faith to avoid the policy’925. 
Significantly, in Drake Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc926, Clarke LJ not 
only recognised the insurer’s duty to exercise the right of avoidance in good faith, 
but also required the insurer to make a proper inquiry where needed to give the 
insured a chance to update the information. This perspective is essential under the 
modern regime in the UK, as CIDRA and IA require the insurer to have a positive 
role by making enquiries and asking follow-up questions. This is especially where 
the insured may make only signposts about a material fact which requires the 
insurer to ask further questions or waive the right to know this information. Clarke 
LJ stated that, as follows927: 
A failure to make any inquiry of the insured before taking the drastic step of avoiding 
the policy was… a breach by the insurer of the duty of good faith… the duty of good 
faith required them at least to tell the insured what they had in mind and give him an 
opportunity to update them... All that was required was a simple inquiry… an insurer 
shall show the utmost good faith, the principle, in my judgment, required that inquiry 
to be made before the "wholly one-sided" remedy of avoidance was exercised.  
                                                          
922 Similar decisions had been made by CRIDV, for example, decision no 285/R/1435H (2014) 
which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 398/a/1435H (2014) of the Committees for 
Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh, and decision no 70/D/1435H (2014) of the 
Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Dammam. 
923 [2004] QB 601. 
924 Ibid. Similar position was in Strive Shipping Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association 
[2002] EWHC 203 (Comm), [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 669. However, this position was rejected in 
Brotherton v Aseguradora Colseguros (No.2) [2003] EWHC 335 (Comm), [2003] 2 CLC 629. 
925 Ibid [91] per Rix LJ. 
926 Ibid. 
927 Ibid [177]. 
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As these duties are not specified by IA or CIDRA, it is open to the common law to 
add further interpretation as to which act should be considered as a breach of the 
insurers’ post-contractual duties or to maintain the common law position in this area 
of law. In any event, this would give the common law the flexibility to interpret 
good faith in several ways based on the surrounding circumstances of each case. 
Consequently, upon the abolishment of avoidance as a remedy under s 17 of MIA, 
it is uncertain how the courts will regard legal remedies upon breach of the insurers’ 
post-contractual duties; however, it has been said that this removal is ‘likely to yield 
positive results… by adopting entirely new remedies depending on different 
circumstances’928. 
By comparison, under Saudi jurisdiction, Saudi regulations show lack of 
consideration of the insurers’ duties to act in good faith when exercising their 
discretions, rights, and powers except under article 52(f) and 52(i) of IMCCR, 
where the similarity between article 52(i) and the UK approach was shown. 
According to article 52(f) of IMCCR which requires the insurer to handle the claim 
in a fair manner, ‘fair manner’ can be interpreted as exercising powers and rights 
fairly. Interestingly, in the Arabic version, this article states particularly integrity, 
fairness, and non-discrimination. Accordingly, the insurers are obliged when 
exercised their rights and powers during the claim handling to act in good faith by 
preventing any unfair exercise of their powers and rights.  
As a consequence, the UK approach has recognised the insurers’ duties to act in 
good faith when exercising their rights, discretion, and powers at a reasonable level. 
On the other hand, the Saudi approach does not show similar recognition of such 
significant duties. Thus, it is recommended for the Saudi approach to learn from the 
UK experience to develop this area of law due to its significance, especially when 
the insurer exercise their right to avoid the policy. Further, for both jurisdictions, 
developing proper remedies particularly damages upon breach of these duties is 
significant. 
The next section comparatively analyses the insurer’s duty of utmost good faith 
during the settlement of claims. The critical analysis examine several examples of 
                                                          
928 Baris Soyer, ‘The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith: Is the Path Now Clear for the Introduction for 
New Remedies?’ in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime 
for Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 51. 
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the application of this duty. 
9.4. The Insurers’ Duty of Utmost Good Faith during the Settlement of Claims 
Insurers have the right to negotiate the settlement of a claim under some types of 
insurance policies such as liability policies. This negotiation and making offers not 
only shall be in good faith, but also shall disclose any facts that the insured may be 
interested to know about the claim decisions including the consequences of the 
settlement.929 For example, in Fargnoli v GA Bonus, plc930, Lord Penrose illustrated 
that the doctrine of utmost good faith is reciprocal; therefore, insurers owe duties 
of utmost good faith when dealing with claims. His Lordship stated that ‘it must be 
open to question whether an insurer would be in good faith in delaying an admission 
of liability, or in advancing spurious defences to a claim, or to put the insured the 
proof of what the insurer knows is true, or in delaying settlement of claims’931. 
Furthermore, it is accepted that where there is a reasonable offer provided by a third 
party consistent with the policy conditions, the insurer shall accept this offer.932 
Consequently, the insurer’s failure to act in good faith probably may lead to a delay 
in the payment, which allows damages on the grounds of the late payment 
provisions of the Enterprise Act 2016.  However, remedies are questioned where 
the claim should be rejected but the insurer’s conduct includes a failure to disclose 
any facts that the insured may be interested to know.  
There is no doubt that the insurer is under an implied duty to handle the claim 
reasonably by taking into account the insureds’ interest933, such as in Groom v 
Crocker934. This should include failure to disclose any conflict of interests that arise 
during the settlement of a claim which is a breach of the insurer’s post-contractual 
duty of utmost good faith. However, the common law position is not clear in this 
respect.935 An observation was made by the Court of Appeal in the Mercandian 
                                                          
929 Kelly Godfrey, ‘The Duty of Utmost Good Faith — The Great Unknown of Modern Insurance 
Law’ (2002) 14 Insurance Law Journal 56, 5. 
930 [1997] CLC 653. 
931 Ibid 670 - 671. 
932 Peter Havenga, ‘Good Faith in Insurance Contracts – Some Lessons from Australia’ (1996) 8 SA 
Merc LJ 75. 
933 Baris Soyer, ‘The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith: Is the Path Now Clear for the Introduction for 
New Remedies?’ in Malcolm Clarke & Baris Soyer (eds), The Insurance Act 2015: A New Regime 
for Commercial and Marine Insurance Law (Informa Law from Routledge 2017) 46. 
934 [1938] 2 All ER 394, [1939] 1 KB 194. 
935 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) [6-060]. 
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Continent936 which required acting in good faith by both parties during the claim 
handling. For a further example from the Australian jurisdiction, in Distillers Co 
Bio-Chemicals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd937, the High Court of 
Australia stated that ‘its [the insurer] power of restraining settlement by the insured 
must be exercised in good faith having regard to the interests of the insured as well 
as to its own interests… both in the defence of actions against the insured and in 
their settlement’938. 
A further example was seen in the recent New Zealand authority Young v Tower 
Insurance Limited939, the High Court of New Zealand illustrated the existence of 
the insurers’ post-contractual duty of good faith in relation to claims handling.940 
The High Court ended this argument by giving specific reasons for the existence of 
insurers’ post-contractual duty of utmost good faith during handling of the claim; 
providing the minimum scope of this duty; and it held damages as a remedy for the 
breach, and it noted as follows941:  
While the duty to disclose all material facts is often enforced against the insured, I 
have no doubt that a corresponding duty, especially at the stage of lodging and 
processing a claim, applies to the insurer… I find, as a bare minimum that the duty 
requires the insurer to:942  
(a) Disclose all material information that the insurer knows or ought to have known, 
including, but not limited to… during and after the lodgement of a claim;  
(b) Act reasonably, fairly and transparently, including but not limited to… during and 
after the lodgement of a claim; and  
(c) Process the claim in a reasonable time… this, however, must take into account the 
time required to properly investigate and assess all aspects of the claim… Factors that 
may need to be taken into account include the type of insurance, the size and 
complexity of the claim, compliance with any relevant statutory or regulatory rules or 
guidance, and factors outside an insurer’s control. 
I find that nominal damages… should be awarded for the defendant’s [insurer’s] 
failure to disclose this document to the plaintiff. 
Although the interpretation of the implied term of the duty of good faith in Young 
v Tower Insurance Limited943 was considered by the High Court of New Zealand in 
                                                          
936 [2001] CIC 1836. 
937 (1974) 130 CLR 1, 2 ALR 321, 48 ALJR 136, BC7400010. 
938 Ibid 27, 31 - 32. 
939 [2016] NZHC 2956. 
940 Ibid [157] – [158]. In this case, the High Court clarified the duty of good faith in insurance 
contracts due to the uncertainty of the existence of this duty as the New Zealand Marine Insurance 
Act 1908 abolished s 17 which requires the doctrine of utmost good faith, which was stated the 
similar wording of s 17 of MIA. 
941 Ibid [159], [163] – [166]. 
942 This interpretation of the implied duty of utmost good faith was also considered in Kilduff v 
Tower Insurance Limited [2018] NZHC 704 (17 April 2018) [107] – [108]. 
943 [2016] NZHC 2956. 
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Kilduff v Tower Insurance Limited944, Gendall J found that there was no breach by 
the insurer as long as the insurer acted in good faith and no damages might be 
awarded.945 In this case, the insured alleged that the insurer breached an implied 
duty of good faith because the settlement offered was inadequate and the insurer 
unreasonably delayed carrying out works and to make payment.946 However, 
Gendall J took a significant stance by illustrating this implied duty in light of the 
surrounding circumstances as he stated that947: 
It must be accepted here that responsibility for this is not Tower’s alone. One reason 
is the unique factor of the Christchurch earthquake sequence… Tower suggests it was 
consistently attempting to get experts on site to carry out further investigations, but 
says it was delayed in doing so by the plaintiffs. In particular, the plaintiffs did not 
allow Tower’s experts access to the house. 
Peter Havenga, who provided some examples from South Africa, considers the 
insurer’s technical defence as a breach of the continuing duty of utmost good 
faith.948 Although the doctrine of utmost good faith should be considered as a 
general and an interpretative principle for all matters of insurance contracts in the 
UK, relying on a technical defence is far more than the rationale of the doctrine of 
utmost good faith especially for business insurance, which may use a technical 
defence as both parties are professional, but there could be a room for it too in 
consumer insurance based on the level of the insureds’ awareness. 
In the Saudi jurisdiction, insurance regulations treat insurers’ post-contractual 
duties of utmost good faith in settlement of claims in details by including that once 
any changes occur to disclosed clauses, communications information, claims filing 
procedures, or any other conditions of the policy, insurers have to notify consumers 
directly and immediately.949 Moreover, article 52 of IMCCR provides detailed 
provisions about the insurer’s duties during claims handling. Similarities can be 
seen between the Saudi approach and the approach in New Zealand in Young v 
Tower Insurance Limited950. However, the Saudi approach is more detailed by 
Article 52(a)-(j), as follows: 
                                                          
944 [2018] NZHC 704 (17 April 2018). 
945 Ibid [115] – [116], [125]. 
946 Ibid [105]. 
947 Ibid [119] – [120]. 
948 Peter Havenga, ‘Good Faith in Insurance Contracts – Some Lessons from Australia’ (1996) 8 SA 
Merc LJ 75. 
949 Article 12(2) and (3) of ICPP. See also article 51 of IMCCR. 
950 [2016] NZHC 2956. 
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  Insurers are required to respond to claims in prompt manner, by article 52(a).  
 Insurers shall provide all required documents to place a claim, by article 52(b).  
 Insurers shall explain all steps about filing claims to the insured, by article 52(d).  
 Insurers shall acknowledge the insured about receiving the claim, by article 
52(c).  
 Insurers shall notify the insured about any missed documents within 7 days from 
receiving the claim, by article 52(c).951  
 Insurers shall inform the insured about the progress of the received claim, at 
least, every 15 working days, by article 52(e).  
 Insurers shall handle the claim in a fair manner, which reflects the role of the 
doctrine of good faith, by article 52(f).952  
 Insurers shall notify the insured in writing about the insurer’s decision whether 
to accept or refuse the claim, by article 52(i).953  
 Insurers shall explain to the insured how to appeal against the insurer’s decision 
if the settlement is not accepted by the insured, by article 52(j).954  
Article 44 of IRCICCL sets a general provision as a period limitation for insurers 
to settle insured’s claims. This Article differentiates between the time limit for 
settlement of individual and business. Specifically, for individual insureds, the 
insurer shall settle the claim within 15 days from the day of receiving all required 
documents of the claim, and another 15 days may be added on giving reasons for 
this extension. For business insureds, the insurer shall settle the claim within 45 
days from the day of receiving all required documents, and if any extension is 
needed, notice about this including reasons should be given. 
Although the Saudi regulations have recognised in detail the insurers’ post-
contractual duties of utmost good faith during settlement of claim, remedies are not 
                                                          
951 A similar provision is set by article 7 of UCMIP. 
952 Ibid. 
953 Ibid. 
954 Ibid. 
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discussed in case of breach these duties. Therefore, it is important to investigate the 
decisions of CRIDV in respect of the breach of the insurers’ post-contractual duties. 
The only regulation that mentions a legal remedy is UCMIP. In terms of article 7, 
it states that if the insurer fails to settle the insured’s claim within the time period, 
which is 15 days, and without justified reasons, damages can be awarded for any 
losses in relation to the insurer’s breach.955 CRIDV have widely recognised 
damages as a consequence of breach of the insurers’ duties during settlement of the 
claim in all insurance disputes, including motor insurance. This is especially, where 
an insurer exceeds the time limit period unreasonably and breaches the provisions 
of article 44 of IRCICCL.956  
To conclude, the UK approach takes into account the insurers’ post-contractual 
duties during the settlement of claims. On the other hand, the Saudi approach has 
detailed and specific provisions covering these duties, which is similar to the 
modern approach in New Zealand. Both the UK and Saudi jurisdictions do not give 
specific remedies on breach of the insurers’ duties. However, damages are 
commonly recognised in the Saudi jurisdiction whereas, in the UK, damages as a 
remedy is still uncertain. 
9.5. Conclusion 
The insurers' post-contractual duties are specifically addressed by the Saudi 
regulations unlike the UK approach where the insurers’ post-contractual duties are 
not recoginsed by the modern regime.  
The interpretation of the common law is still relevant but this depends on whether 
the doctrine of utmost good faith is accepted as an interpretative principle. This 
leads to assume that as the doctrine of utmost good faith may recognise implied 
contractual terms, the courts may impose implied terms in insurance policies 
regarding the insured’s post-contractual duties. Different examples are provided 
                                                          
955 See also, article 8(6) of UCMIP. 
956 See for example, decision no 121/R/1435H (2014) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance 
Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; decision no 41/R/1435H (2014) which was affirmed by the 
Appeal decision no 273/a/1436H (2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and 
Violations in Riyadh; decision no 221/R/1434H (2013) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision 
no 112/a/1436H (2015) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in 
Riyadh; decision no 78/R/1433H (2012) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 374/a/1435H 
(2014) of the Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh; decision no 
265/R/1434H (2013) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 151/a/1436H (2015) of the 
Committees for Resolution Insurance Disputes and Violations in Riyadh. 
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consistent with the new regime of the doctrine of utmost good faith being an 
interpretative principle. However, the scope of the insurers’ post-contractual duties 
is still uncertain and needs further development by judiciary. This may include 
expanding the scope of these duties especially for consumer insurance, where 
consumers need to know what are the insurers’ duties and their rights. In 
comparison, Saudi jurisdiction shows a significant level of recognition of the 
insurers’ post-contractual duties. Remarkably, both jurisdictions show uncertainty 
regarding legal remedies. While the UK approach is totally uncertain about 
remedies especially damages based on the new position of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith after the enactment of IA, the Saudi approach applies damages widely 
and strictly deals with the insurers’ breach and violations of Saudi regulations. 
However, it is recommended for both jurisdictions to set out specific provisions for 
remedies especially for consumer insurance policies. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Insurance contracts rely on the doctrine of utmost good faith in the UK and Saudi 
Arabia. Although there is no doubt about this aspect of insurance contracts, this 
area of law has been developed recently in both jurisdictions. The developments are 
significant especially in the UK, however, there is uncertainty in related issues 
especially about the interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith now in terms 
of the amended s 17 of MIA.  
This study was undertaken to critically analyse insurance law with regard to the 
doctrine of utmost good faith in Saudi and the UK but was not intended to 
recommend replacement of the doctrine, this study intended to provide potential 
key proposals for the use of the doctrine of utmost good faith and to limit 
uncertainty in the law. This is because the recent reform in the UK was essential; 
however, the reform focuses on one party, the insured, rather than providing balance 
obligations on both the insurer and the insured. Producing recommendations is one 
of the possibilities of a comparative study and its final step, according to Siems.957  
As this is a comparative study, an essential step is to use comparative analysis to 
evaluate Saudi law.958 The study critically analyses, evaluates and explores 
significant developments of insurance law with respect to the doctrine of utmost 
good faith especially after the introduction of consumer protection in 2014 in Saudi 
Arabia. However, the study considers key proposals to have more specific and 
comprehensive law and regulations.  
The aim of this thesis is to provide a comparative analysis of the doctrine of utmost 
good faith and mutual duties of insurers and insureds between the UK and Saudi 
insurance laws and regulations to develop recommendations for Saudi Arabia. This 
should accordingly contribute to the development of insurance law in Saudi Arabia. 
The critical analysis of the UK law is significant for this thesis, and accordingly, as 
                                                          
957 Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 13. 
958 Ibid 23. 
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some areas of law are uncertain, this study contributes towards clarifying this 
uncertainty.  
For both jurisdictions, this study intends to provide further predictability about the 
status of the doctrine of utmost good faith. For Saudi jurisdiction, this study 
proposed that adoption of business insurance regime including the duty of fair 
presentation of risks and its related remedies along with the duty of disclosure but 
on the inquiry basis rather than the disclosure basis; adoption of the duty of 
reasonable care to not make misrepresentation in consumer insurance and its related 
remedies; and abolish the duty of disclosure in consumer insurance. Further, it is 
proposed to have specific remedies for types of breach of insureds and insurers’ pre 
and post-contractual duties instead of applying general contracts law in this specific 
area of law. Saudi insurance law should move forward by applying conventional 
insurance instead of Takaful due to several challenges in the application of Takaful 
insurance. For the UK jurisdiction, it is proposed that moving to the duty of good 
faith would limit the uncertainty of the law and raise the predictability of the 
meaning instead of the confusion between these two concepts, as these concepts 
were seen interchangeable.  As well as, the UK insurance law does not consider the 
case of the insured’s post-contractual duties and the insurer’s pre and post-
contractual duties; thus, this study proposed to consider specific significant duties 
for both parties; which would raise the predictability of the law and limit uncertainty 
especially for consumer insurance. Further specific outcomes are recognised below 
for each particular jurisdiction. 
According to Siems, it is possible to suggest law reform to improve efficiency or 
fairness for the domestic law (in this study the Saudi law) and to offer advice for 
the foreign law (in this study the UK law) by taking differences between legal 
systems into account.959 This perspective is applied in this study. The following 
points shall contribute to clarifying the law and providing a balanced approach to 
the interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith in both jurisdictions, and to 
highlight the areas that need to be addressed by further studies.  
 
                                                          
959 Ibid 23. 
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A. Outcomes For the UK Jurisdiction 
1- The interpretation of the doctrine of utmost good faith may be wider after 
the coming into force of IA by imposing further duties on both insureds and 
insurers. This is because the specific meaning of the doctrine remains 
uncertain especially after the abolishment of ss18-20 of MIA. This can be 
seen as an advantage when one examines the Law Commissions’ proposal 
to use the doctrine as an interpretative principle for not only the 
interpretation of the duty of fair presentation, but also to impose implied 
terms affecting both insurers and insureds. Therefore, the courts may now 
be able to imply clear insured’s post-contractual duties and insurers’ pre and 
post contractual duties based on the doctrine of utmost good faith. 
2- As chapter 4 shows the distinction between ‘utmost good faith’ and ‘good 
faith’ is not clear except for underlining the significance of the doctrine of 
good faith. However, from the practical point of view, this distinction was 
unremarkable especially from the points of view of clients of insurance 
companies. Accordingly, this study supports simply applying the doctrine 
of good faith. This is because, firstly, contract law does not generally rely 
on the doctrine of good faith except for a few types of contracts.960 
Secondly, this approach follows Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm961. 
Thirdly, it limits the argument about the differences between ‘good faith’ 
and ‘utmost good faith’ in practice especially for consumer insurance. 
Fourthly, the study does not discover that there is any significance of adding 
‘utmost’ to ‘good faith’. Fifthly, many academic and judicial views found 
that the terms ‘good faith’ and ‘utmost good faith’ are interchangeable. 
3- One of the significant advantage of the modern reform in the UK is to apply 
consumer protection. As this study shows in chapter 5, it may not be 
reasonable to include micro-businesses and individual traders as large 
businesses and multi-national corporations. This study proposes to extend 
                                                          
960 See for example, Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex Hospital 
Services NHS Trust [2013] EWCA Civ 200, [2013] BLR 265; Monde Petroleum SA v 
WesternZagros Ltd [2016] EWHC 1472 (Comm). 
961 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
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consumer protection provisions to include both micro-businesses and 
individual traders. 
4-  This study proposes to call for further studies in the future in respect of the 
application of business insurance noting how the courts treat individual 
trader and micro-businesses disputes, and how they deal with the way the 
different sizes of business comply with their insureds’ duties. Examining 
reasonableness and the balance of bargaining powers between insurers and 
insureds is proposed for further studies. 
5- According to chapter 5, the study proposes special rules for insurers in the 
case of contracting online by specifying particular requirements and to 
impose further protection for consumers by increasing their level of 
awareness. 
6- As the study shows in chapter 6, in terms of s 4 and 6 of IA, the 
interpretation of ‘senior management’, ‘reasonable research’, and ‘readily 
available’ regarding the insurer’s and insured’s knowledge is uncertain. The 
study proposes that courts may take a narrower approach in order to limit 
the interpretation of the insured’s and insurer’s knowledge especially for 
large businesses and multi-national corporations, where the decision 
involves several parties and persons. 
7- Chapter 6 discusses that the rules for contracting out of the regulations do 
not apply for consumers, only businesses. The study looks at the conduct of 
insurers with individual traders and micro-businesses, noting they do not 
have the extent of experience of large businesses and are therefore more 
similar to consumers. Accordingly, this study proposes to exclude micro-
businesses and individual traders from the application of the contracting out 
provisions. It can be said that s 17 of IA contains the requirement of 
transparency with regard to contracting out; however, this requirement is 
not enough to protect, for example, consumers, and because of similarities 
between the position of consumers and micro-businesses and individual 
traders, this proposal is reasonable.  
8- Abolishment of avoidance by the insurer allows room to adopt a new 
approach. Payment of damages on breach of the doctrine of utmost good 
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faith is widely accepted by other jurisdictions such as Australia and New 
Zealand. Currently, there are no real barriers to the courts granting damages 
awards especially if the courts would now follow the Law Commissions’ 
approach relying on the doctrine of utmost good faith as an interpretative 
principle. As chapter 4 illustrates, the doctrine of utmost good faith may be 
seen to impose implied terms and duties in insurance contracts, so any 
breach can be considered as a breach of an implied term, and damages may 
be awarded as a consequence of a breach of the contract. 
9- As chapter 6 shows, termination is proposed to be the remedy for non-
deliberate or reckless breach especially for micro-businesses and individual 
traders as provided under CIDRA, as both micro-businesses and individual 
traders are in a similar position to consumers in respect of experience, level 
of awareness, and having limited bargaining powers. 
10- The study proposes in chapter 7 several that the insureds’ post-contractual 
duties of utmost good faith could be implied in insurance contracts. These 
duties are the insured’s duty to provide required documents, the insured’s 
duties to use the subject of the insurance contract in good faith, and the 
insured’s duties during the settlement of claims.  
Chapter 7 discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Versloot962 not to 
include fraudulent devices under the rule of fraudulent claims. The study 
proposes that the use of fraudulent devices be considered as breach of the 
insured’s post-contractual duty of ‘utmost’ good faith, especially in business 
insurance.  
The study further proposes that remedies upon breach of the insureds’ post-
contractual duties of utmost good faith should be proportionately and 
termination. The impact of making the duties implied terms would result in 
the possibility of an award of damages for breach of the insurance contract. 
11- As the study shows in chapter 8, it is proposed to include insurers’ pre-
contractual duties of utmost good faith as implied terms of insurance 
contracts, as the doctrine of utmost good faith has a reciprocal effect for 
                                                          
962 [2016] UKSC 45, [2017] AC 1, [2016] 3 WLR 543. 
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insurers and insureds. The pre-contractual duties are the insurers’ duty of 
disclosure of material facts that may impact the insured’s position; the 
insurers’ duty to inform the insureds’ about the consequences of breach of 
the insurance contract especially for consumer insurance; and the insurers’ 
duty to ensure the accuracy of the insureds’ disclosure. Again, the study 
proposes that damages could be sought for breach of this duty if it is 
considered as implied term.  
12- Chapter 9 further shows that the insurers’ post-contractual duties of utmost 
good faith can also be implied in insurance contracts including the insurer’s 
duties during the claim investigation, the insurers’ duties to act in good faith 
when exercising their discretions, powers, and rights, and the insurer’s 
duties during the settlement of claims. Again, the study proposes to accept 
damages as the impact of implying the duties to allow damages to be 
claimed for the breach of this implied term. 
B. Outcomes For Saudi Jurisdiction 
1- Takaful insurance law should not be recognised in Saudi Arabia. The study 
shows that the donation basis of Takaful insurance does not comply with 
the approach of Saudi laws and regulations such as LSCIC, IRLSCIC, 
IMCCR, and ICPP, which are based on commercial law and regulations. 
Consequently, there is a contradiction in the Saudi jurisdiction, on the one 
hand. On the other hand, there are many difficulties and challenges in 
Takaful insurance. The prohibition of conventional insurance goes back to 
the 1970s, and the law makers should take into account the views of modern 
Islamic scholars throughout these years. Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia 
currently are much more open to accept changes and to appreciate society’s 
needs. Significantly, this study proposes to apply conventional insurance 
instead of Takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia, as the nature and the basis of 
Takaful insurance challenge the existence of significant duties such as the 
duty of disclosure. 
2- The study proposes to the law makers and SAMA to have a unified and 
comprehensive insurance law that includes legal concepts, rights, and duties 
instead of developing several regulations. This change is important because, 
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firstly, it should limit repetition and avoid contradiction. Secondly, it is 
significant for CRIDV when solving insurance disputes. Thirdly, it is also 
significant for contracting parties especially consumers to have easier access 
to their rights and duties. Fourthly, academics can study insurance law 
appropriately and develop further discussions and studies. The study also 
proposes that the law makers recognise the invalidity of insurance 
provisions of CCL 1931, as chapter 2 shows that this law is in reality invalid, 
old, not clearly understood, and it has been used only as a guide for 
arbitrators. 
3- Saudi laws and regulations and Sharia principles require the existence of the 
doctrine of good faith. However, Saudi laws and regulations fail to explicitly 
state this requirement unlike the duty of disclosure. The study proposes to 
recognise the doctrine of good faith by a clear wording especially in terms 
of consumer protection under ICPP. 
4- Unlike the laws and regulations, CRIDV recognise the doctrine of utmost 
good faith. However, this study finds no significant need to distinguish 
between ‘good faith’ and ‘utmost good faith’ under Sharia law, as the root 
of the doctrine of good faith is accepted to a high standard by Sharia law. 
This study proposes to consider simply ‘good faith’ because the distinction 
between these doctrines gives rise to several concerns when compared to 
the UK jurisdiction. Accordingly, Saudi laws and regulation should learn 
from the UK experience to prevent the same difficulties as long as Islamic 
principles can support this conclusion.  
5- As the study shows in chapter 5 and 6, the Saudi approach has been 
remarkably improved by applying consumer protection to the insurance 
industry. However, the disadvantage is that this approach does not differ 
between consumers and businesses. Accordingly, this study proposes to 
learn from the UK jurisdiction. It is proposed that consumer insurance 
should not include small, medium, and large businesses and multi-national 
corporations, but it is proposed that micro-businesses and individual traders 
should be included under consumer protection provisions especially for the 
Saudi insurance industry where the insurance industry is modern and the 
awareness level is still modest.  
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6- As this study proposes to adopt the UK experience to distinguish between 
consumer and business insurance, this study also proposes to adopt a similar 
approach as in the UK of applying the duty of reasonable care to not make 
misrepresentation and abolish the duty of disclosure for consumer 
insurance. The study proposes to adopt the duty of fair presentation of risks 
for business insurance based on enquiry rather than disclosure. 
7- As shown in chapter 6, it is put to the law maker and SAMA to consider 
provisions about physical and moral hazards which include previous 
refusals, claims history, criminal conviction excepts those considered as 
spent based on Saudi law, dishonesty, and the insured’s financial status for 
business insurance similar to the UK. This study also proposes to the law 
maker and SAMA to consider the knowledge of the insurer and insured by 
reforming article 42 of  IMCCR 2008 which only refers to the insured’s 
knowledge relying on a ‘reasonable person’ test. Although this test is 
accepted for consumer insurance, it is too basic for business insurance. 
Learning from the UK experience would be significant for Saudi insurance 
industry especially by learning from s 4 and 6 of IA.  
As far as chapter 6 is concerned, the study suggests to the law maker and 
SAMA to recognise the insurer’s right of waiver in a specific provision such 
as article 84 of IRCHIL 2014 which recognises the case of waiver; however, 
this regulation is limited to cooperative health insurance and is not for all 
types of insurance. 
8- Saudi laws and regulations provide detailed provisions about insurers and 
insureds’ duties, but they fail to provide legal remedies upon the breach of 
the duties. This approach reflects uncertainty and lack of predictability when 
resolving insurance disputes. However, CRIDV apply numerous legal 
remedies including damages, avoiding liability for the insured, termination, 
returning premiums, and reconciliation. The study proposes that these 
remedies should be codified to maintain stability and predictability in the 
insurance industry.  
The study proposes that CRIDV should maintain a balance of power 
between contracting parties especially for consumers as the lack of 
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experience in negotiation may impact their rights. Otherwise, the study 
proposes to exclude consumers’ disputes from the application for 
reconciliation.  
It is proposed as well to consider proportionate remedies similar to the 
model that is applied in the UK jurisdiction by differentiating the remedies 
in case of deliberate and reckless breach and innocent or careless breach of 
both consumer and business insurance. 
9- As chapter 7 shows, it is proposed to the law maker and SAMA to recognise 
clearly the insured’s post-contractual duties of utmost good faith including 
the insured’s duty to provide required documents, the insured’s duties to use 
the subject of insurance contract in good faith, and the insured’s duties 
during the settlement of claims. Although CRIDV decisions considered 
some of these duties, CRIDV shall not be bound by any previous CRIDV 
decisions when resolving future disputes, as was considered in decision no 
22/D/1435H (2014) which was affirmed by the Appeal decision no 
257/a/1436H (2015). 
As far as chapter 7 is concerned, although Saudi laws and regulations define 
fraud and how to deter it, they fail to provide appropriate legal remedies. 
Accordingly, this study proposes to learn from the UK experience by 
considering s 12 of IA that is about legal remedies in case of fraudulent 
claims. 
10- As the study shows in chapter 8, it is proposed for the law maker and SAMA 
to specify further duties to the insurers’ pre-contractual duties of utmost 
good faith including the insurers’ duty to inform the insureds’ about the 
consequences of breach of the insurance contract, and the insurers’ duty to 
ensure the accuracy of the insureds’ disclosure especially for consumer 
insurance. The study also proposes to consider specific legal remedies on 
breach of the insurers’ pre-contractual duties of utmost good faith by 
including termination, return of premiums paid, and an award of damages.  
11- As the study shows in chapter 9, it is proposed for the law maker and SAMA 
to specify further duties to the insurers’ duties to act in good faith when 
exercising their discretions, powers, and rights. The study also proposes to 
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consider specific legal remedies upon breach of insurers’ post-contractual 
duties of utmost good faith by including termination, return premiums of 
paid, and payment of damages. 
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